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ABSTRACT
This thesis aims to explore Nietzsche’s concept of individuality. Nietzsche, a radical 
and innovative thinker who attacks Christian morality and proclaims the death of God, 
provides us with a self-interpreting way to understand humanity and affirm life 
through self-overcoming and self-experimentation.
Nietzsche’s concept of individuality is his main philosophical concern. I first compare 
his perspective on human nature in Human, All Too Human, Daybreak and Beyond 
Good and Evil with Charles Darwin’s, Sigmund Freud’s and St Augustine’s in order to 
examine how his thinking differs from theirs with regard to the concept of human 
nature. Second, I turn to his On the Genealogy o f  Morals, in comparison with the 
thought of John Stuart Mill, analysing their criticism of Christian morality and 
discussing their different conceptions of individuality and the development of the self. 
The last chapter compares Nietzsche’s The Anti-Christ, Twilight o f the Idols and Ecce 
Homo with Ralph Waldo Emerson’s philosophy of self-development, using this 
comparison to highlight the way in which Nietzsche expounds his concept of 
individuality and sets himself as a living example of an individual with autonomy and 
responsibility.
Nietzsche attacks Christianity and argues that humanity can potentially be developed 
not through Christian morality but reflective self-interpretation. We shall not forget 
that being a self-developing individual is Nietzsche’s chief aim although his 
arguments are too circuitous and controversial to be easily comprehended. His aim is 
not to offer some final, authoritative solution to these issues of the self and morality. 
In contrast, he offers us a new, uneven and perhaps dangerous way to understand 
humanity and modem culture. In order to achieve this, we need to interpret what he 
says from our own standpoints and also to interpret ourselves through self-reflection. 
Nietzsche’s radical but insightful perspective is a means for guiding us to open our 
minds and affirm our lives through interpretation and experimentation. Then we might 
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This list shows that Nietzsche’s works have been selected and abbreviated in the 
thesis for analysis.
A The Anti-Christ
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Chapter 1 
Introduction
Our ‘new world’: we have to realize to what degree we are the creators of our value 
feelings -  and thus capable of projecting ‘meaning’ into history.
(Nietzsche: The Will to Power 1011)1
This thesis explores the development of Nietzsche’s concept of individuality in 
relation to his notions of self-overcoming, self-experimentation and the affirmation of 
life. Since ancient times, philosophy has sought to play an enlightening role: the 
traditional role of philosophy has been seen as epitomised by the aim to find truth and 
to understand human nature and by the assumption that doing so is an intrinsic good. 
If philosophers are those who inspire us to reflect critically upon our beliefs and hence 
our identities by providing alternative conceptions of the nature of thought and 
knowledge, Nietzsche is pre-eminent in seeking to challenge our usual understanding 
of humanity and life by means of his innovative perspective. His aim is to emphasise 
that we are responsible for our history and we make life meaningful by creating our 
own values. Modem culture is fundamentally constructed according to the principles 
enshrined within Cartesian philosophy and Christian values. The thinkers of the 
Enlightenment highlight the importance of reason and consider the use of reason as
1 This quotation is from N ietzsche’s The Will to Power (1967), Ed. Walter Kaufimann. Trans. Walter 
Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale. N ew  York: Vintage Books.
2 Christianity inculcates in us the concept o f  the existence o f  God, separating man from God by raising 
the notions o f subject and object. This conception o f the absolute stresses that man is originally sinful 
and needs to be redeemed through Christian doctrine holding out another world o f illusion. This 
conception, which focuses our unforgettable past, i.e. we were bom with sin, and our unfulfilled future, 
makes us unable to live in the present and ignore the importance o f the self and our earthly world. As 
Nietzsche in G enealogy argues that we “cease believing in one’s own se lf ’ and “deny one’s own 
‘reality’” (GM III: 12). Likewise, the idea o f the primacy o f  subjectivity also influences many thinkers, 
for example, Descartes, in his ideas o f the self and God, argues that mind and body are separated from 
each other, proposing that the mind is the locus o f  authentic, self-validating selfhood. Regarding the 
misconceptions created by Christianity and Cartesian dualism, Nietzsche wants to proffer a conception 
o f the embodied self, which contrasts with Christianity and Descartes’ mind-body dichotomy and 
claims that we become what we are not through a transcendent deity but through present 
self-overcoming and self-experimentation.
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essential for scrutinising the progress of man and culture. But Nietzsche questions the 
progress of humanity in modernity, proclaims the death of God and tells us that we 
live in a nihilistic world in which the Christian God is dead3 and we need to create 
our own values. This cultural event, for Nietzsche, implies the demise of Christian 
precepts and initiates the problem of value-creation. In Nietzsche’s view, the death of 
God brings with it the requirement that we must accept that constant questioning of 
values, rather than a divine source that lends morality authority. This initiates a crisis. 
This announcement o f the death o f God indicates the crisis that Nietzsche diagnoses 
in modem culture: we have lost our faith in God and Christian doctrine. This 
pronouncement of the death of God is the way that Nietzsche urges us to abandon our 
dependence on tradition and Christian values so as to create our values and live 
independently.
Why does Nietzsche assert the end o f Christian doctrine and the consequent need to 
create our values? The first reason is because Nietzsche believes that the Christian 
Church and its doctrine inhibit us from being both concerned with and responsive to 
our mortal existence by providing a negative conception of humanity, one determined 
according to the concepts of sin and redemption. As Walter Kaufmann argues, 
“Nietzsche prophetically envisages himself as a madman to have lost God means 
madness and when mankind will discover that it has lost God, universal madness will 
break out. This apocalyptic sense of dreadful things to come hangs over Nietzsche’s 
thinking like a thundercloud” (1974: 97). Nietzsche is aware that we, people in 
modernity, are incapable of living to the full extent of our human dignity and worth,
3 In The Gay Science, Nietzsche invents a parable o f  the madman to pronounce the death o f  God: 
“Where is G od?...G od is dead! God remains dead! And we have killed him! How can we console 
ourselves, the murderers o f  all murderers! The holiest and the mightiest thing the world has ever 
possessed has bled to death under our knives: who will wipe this blood from us?” (125)
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but habitually restrain ourselves by obeying Christian concept of the existence of the 
Almighty God and its doctrine. With the impact of Cartesian philosophy and the 
Enlightenment, which stress the importance of reason in accordance with extreme 
Christian doctrine, we set out our views of humanity and knowledge by turning to the 
mind and following the notion of the omnipotent God, as Nietzsche claims, 
“Christianity...has made a great contribution to enlightenment: ‘it taught moral 
scepticism in an extremely trenchant and effective way -  accusing, embittering, but 
with untiring patience and refinement; it annihilated in every single man the faith in 
his ‘virtues’” (GS 122). Adorno and Horkheimer, in Dialectic o f  Enlightenment, argue: 
“In the Enlightenment’s interpretation, thinking is the creation of unified, scientific 
order and the derivation of factual knowledge from principles, whether the latter are 
elucidated as arbitrarily postulated axioms, innate ideas, or higher abstractions” 
(81-82). This notion of the omnipotent God, however, not only creates an absolute 
being which differs from human beings, but also indicates that our inborn sinfulness 
and imperfection can only be redeemed through Christian doctrine. The conceptions 
of sinful humankind and redemption which cause our nihilistic modem culture, 
according to Nietzsche, make us deny ourselves and therefore we are unable to 
overcome nihilism and live autonomously at present. In this respect, as Kaufmann 
says, the parable of the madman is a tool that Nietzsche uses to suggest we question 
our values, i.e. Christian values, which we normally follow. Christianity harms our 
ability to “function and flourish”, as Robert Solomon and Kathleen Higgins comment: 
for Nietzsche, the Christian worldview “obstructs one’s view of the real world, addles 
one’s ability to see the real forces at work in one’s life, and destroys one’s ability to 
recognize how best to address them” (88). Thus Nietzsche advises that we be aware of 
this cultural predicament widespread in modernity and questions the notion of the 
absolute argued in Christianity.
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Put simply, if  enlightenment can be regarded “as a worldview, as a mind-set, as way 
of thinking” continuing to grow and develop in our society, as David Beran explains 
(87), Nietzsche’s thought brings us to let go the impact of Cartesian philosophy and 
the Enlightenment which is influenced by Christianity, but concentrate on 
enlightening ourselves through self-interpretation. With regard to the relation between 
Nietzsche and the Enlightenment, Kaufmann comments that Nietzsche’s argument is 
closer to the Enlightenment for leading us to development but different from the 
proposal of the Enlightenment. Nietzsche rejects the notion of the absolute and 
expects to give a new view of Enlightenment by way of questioning the moral values 
in tradition and Christianity and showing how to create values without divine sanction 
(1974: 361). For Nietzsche, we enlighten ourselves through self-critical understanding; 
this is the key to the progress of mankind. But Adorno and Horkheimer argues that 
Nietzsche’s relation to the Enlightenment is discordant (44) and associate him with 
the bourgeois world, saying that “despite all the twilight of the idols”, Nietzsche is 
unable to “abandon the idealistic convention which would accept the hanging of a 
petty thief and elevate imperialistic raids to the level of world-historical missions” 
(100). Georg Lukacs likewise contends in The Destruction o f  Reason that Nietzsche 
opposes socialism but promotes irrationalism by intentionally offering a road “which 
avoided the need for any break, or indeed any serious conflict, with the bourgeoisie” 
(317). Lukacs asserts that Nietzsche’s aim is to keep his position as “the reactionary 
bourgeoisie’s leading philosopher” (315); therefore, he regards the attempt that 
associates Nietzsche with the Enlightenment as “childish, or rather, as an expression 
of history-fudging in the service of American imperialism on the lowest level yet 
seen” (320). And Jurgen Habermas in The Philosophical Discourse o f  Modernity 
argues that Nietzsche “renounces a renewed revision of the concept of reason and bids
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farewell to the dialectic of enlightenment”, standing for the “entry into 
post-modernity” (1987: 85-86). Lukacs and Habermas criticise Nietzsche’s
proclamation of the death of God which inaugurates an approach away from the 
Enlightenment but to irrationalism.
There are two points that I wish to make here. First, Nietzsche’s standpoint on the 
Enlightenment is not what these critics argue. He is not an advocate for the 
bourgeoisie, nor does he think the Enlightenment should be thrown away. As he 
claims in Daybreak: “This Enlightenment we must now carry further forward: let us 
not worry about the ‘great revolution’ and the ‘great reaction’ against it which have 
taken place -  they are no more than the sporting of waves in comparison with the 
truly great flood which bears us along!” (D 197)4 What Nietzsche rejects is the 
concept of the absolute, stemming from tradition and Christianity. The Enlightenment 
is a movement that deepens this concept, makes it widespread in modem culture, and 
inhibits our ability to create our values. Robert Pippin contends that it is mistaken to 
regard Nietzsche as an anti-Enlightenment thinker, “since ‘the Enlightenment’ or 
‘modernity’ is not itself o f central importance in Nietzsche’s treatment of major 
contemporary institutions” (255). Nietzsche promotes an alternative standpoint to 
interpret how Christianity undermines modem culture: “Christian self-subjection can 
be a brilliant strategy for mastery, and that, as in the classical account of tyranny, 
mastery can be a form of slavery” (Pippin 272).
Second, Nietzsche is unable to abandon convention but the reason is not what Adorno 
and Horkheimer indicate. We can say this is the way of living that Nietzsche chooses.
4 Nietzsche indicates how the Germans fight against the ideas o f  Newton and Voltaire bringing the 
great revolution to the medieval world, but intend to “restore the idea o f  a divine or diabolical nature 
suffused with ethical and symbolic significance”, like Goethe and Schopenhauer, as the great reaction.
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He is concerned with convention but uses it as a self-reflexive motive to help him 
maintain his concept o f individuality and perspectivism. As he claims, “only after we 
have corrected in such an essential point the historical way of thinking that the 
Enlightenment brought with it, may we once again carry onward the banner of the 
Enlightenment... Out of reaction, we have taken a step forward” (HAH 26). Nietzsche 
proposes an oscillating and perspectival attitude which challenges orthodox 
conceptions and rejects any claims to the absolute in the traditional Western 
philosophical or theological mode. This attitude might be controversial and 
questionable but splendid, as Karl Jasper says, Nietzsche stands “at the entrance door 
to modem thought” for not pointing out “the right way” but illuminating “in an 
incomparable manner” (quoted in Behler, 310).5
The second reason that Nietzsche proclaims the end of Christian doctrine and argues 
the need for recreating our values is in order to suggest we reject the Christian 
conception of the absolute but embrace an experimental attitude and turn our 
self-critical experimental abilities upon ourselves. As Nietzsche claims: “But we, we 
others, we reason-thirsty ones, want to face our experiences as sternly as we would a 
scientific experiment, hour by hour, day by day! We want to be our own experiments 
and guinea-pigs” (GS 319). This claim is linked most directly to his proclamation of 
the death of God. The Christian God has become “unbelievable” (GS 344) and with 
this cultural event comes a new demand. Nietzsche’s concern is not solely with the 
proclamation o f “God’s non-existence”; he addresses himself to the question “which 
now emerges of how we are to reinterpret the world and ourselves and revalue our 
lives and our possibilities, given that we are no longer to think about them in relation
5 Ernst Behler, in “Nietzsche in the Twentieth Century”, argues how Jasper in his “On Nietzsche’s 
Importance in the History o f  Philosophy” views Nietzsche differently from Heidegger and promotes 
Nietzsche’s unique thought by comparing him with Marx and Kierkegaard.
to the existence of a transcendent deity” (Richard Schacht 1983: 122). Nietzsche 
shows us a way to reinterpret ourselves not according to traditional Christian values 
but our self-reflexive ability and then see how we possibly confront nihilism through 
self-overcoming and live affirmatively through self-experimentation. This is the 
notion of individual development that Nietzsche argues.6 This is also his aim: we 
enlighten ourselves not by any formula of morality and doctrines but by our 
self-reflexivity.
In terms o f Nietzsche’s thought which rejects the absolute but promotes a perspectival 
point of view, we need to ask a crucial question. How can we create our values 
without the traditional constraints imposed by Christian morality? In this respect, ‘we 
modems’ are for Nietzsche caught on the homs of a dilemma. We are on the one hand 
aware that we are in many key senses dominated by the fixed Christian doctrine. On 
the other hand, we perceive the potential to develop ourselves but there is no certain 
clue to reinforce us believing we enlighten ourselves with our own values. This 
question is important not only because it discloses how traditional Christian morality 
dominates humankind, but also because it offers us a new and self-reflexive means of 
understanding humanity, thereby allowing it to become independent and ‘better’. 
Being better, in Nietzsche’s view, does not mean being ‘more moral’ but ‘supra-moral’ 
(On the Genealogy o f  Morals, II: 2). It means that we live beyond the moral values
6 I take Zarathustra’s teaching to exemplify N ietzsche’s concept o f the development o f  human nature. 
Zarathustra tells his disciples o f the three metamorphosis o f the spirit: the spirit needs to reflect upon 
itself and transforms itself by self-awareness firstly from a load-bearing camel to a creative lion with 
freedom, and then an innocent child who says yes to life (Z, I, “On the Three Metamorphoses”). 
Regarding the development o f  human nature, the first step is to encounter and experience the 
difficulties which happen in life, as a camel which bears a huge load endures. These difficulties 
stimulate us to reflect upon our lives, and we start to consider how we can overcome them. At this 
turning point, we are aware that we can change our plight and alter our lives by way o f  reflecting upon 
ourselves and adjusting our point o f  view. But this is not the end o f  the development. The final step is 
not only to understand that the self is complex, but also to be willing to see life as an innocent child 
who does not give any fixed and partial judgement but always welcomes new things. These stages 
epitomise N ietzsche’s understanding o f  the emergence and development o f  the self or spirit.
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provided by tradition and Christianity and seek to live with “an inborn self-reliance 
and nobility” (Daybreak 191). In order words, we live, through the ability constantly 
to transform, reinterpret and overcome ourselves. In these texts Nietzsche sees ethics 
as a stage of cultural development, something that is necessary to the formation of the 
self but which needs to be gone beyond [overcome/sublimated] in order for its true 
potential to be realised.
Nietzsche’s philosophy unfolds the essential crisis in modem culture that, according 
to him, we all too rarely reflect upon. This is the fact that modernity is, to use his 
word, ‘decadent’ -  an epoch o f decline. Providing a perspectival understanding of 
man and morality, Nietzsche’s philosophy seeks to encourage us to understand life 
and ourselves in a different way. But this unconventional way is dangerous to us if we 
misunderstand what Nietzsche says and are unable to view life and ourselves in an 
open-minded and self-interpreting manner. As Richard Rorty argues, Nietzsche 
inverts Platonism and this radical Nietzschean view, “the impulse to think, to inquire, 
to reweave oneself ever more thoroughly”, brings us not a wonder of understanding 
humanity, not a wonder “in which Aristotle believed philosophy to begin was wonder 
at finding oneself in a world larger, stronger, nobler than oneself’ but a terror that 
might frighten us in exploring humanity (1998: 309). But Rorty does not deny that 
Nietzsche shows us to unconventionally see self-knowledge as self-creation (307). 
Tracy Strong likewise tells us that Nietzsche’s thought which has been vastly 
misappropriated in politics “is not (really) political” but “provides material for 
developing a new progressive politics” (128). Strong however confronts the 
unresolved controversy remained in reading Nietzsche’s thought; he on the one hand 
does not want to argue that Nietzsche was or would have been a Nazi but on the other 
hand is unable to “exclude that possibility on the grounds that his texts ‘show’ us that
he wasn’t (or would not have been)” (131). Nietzsche’s thought might be read with 
confusion or misappropriated in many ways, but Strong maintains a key point: we 
shall not lose our own intellectual or moral bearings when interpreting Nietzsche’s 
perspectivism which allows diversity and contains contradiction. Otherwise, we might 
be as confused as Strong argues: “Nietzsche’s texts, therefore, are written in such a 
manner that if one seeks to find out what they ‘really mean,’ to appropriate them, one 
will only project one’s own identity onto them” (140). In this respect, Strong does not 
agree that Nietzsche’s perspectivism implies that “there are many ‘positions’ from 
which one can see an entity” but rather “an argument that who (or rather ‘what’) one 
is is the result, and not the source, of claims to knowledge or action” (139). In other 
words, the purpose of interpreting Nietzsche’s perspectivism is not to judge whether 
his claim is correct but use it as a means for bringing our attention back to ourselves.
We need to investigate how we reflect on ourselves through Nietzsche’s thought and 
see how we respond to the cultural crisis that Nietzsche leads us to ponder. As Strong 
concludes that we could stop politically appropriating Nietzsche when which “one can 
learn is to let uncertainty and ambiguity enter one’s world, to let go the need to have 
the last word, to let go the need that there be a last word. In politics, Nietzsche can 
give us only the first word -  but that may be more than we have now” (142). At this 
point, Rorty also mentions that Nietzsche who “abandons the traditional notion of 
truth” does not “abandon the idea of discovering the causes of our being what we are”. 
In order to achieve this kind of self-understanding that Nietzsche proposes, according 
to Rorty, “we are not coming to know a truth which was out there (or in here) all the 
time” (1998: 307). For Nietzsche, in order to comprehend the development of modem 
culture, we need to reflect on ourselves by taking the two consecutive steps in relation 
to the development of humanity. The first step is to understand the self and its origins.
The reason for this is that we need to clarify the misconception o f the self provided by 
Cartesianism, and elucidate the embodied self. Descartes argues the mind is the self 
and despises the body. This mind-body dichotomy inhibits us in our consciousness 
and unable to embody and experience the earthly life with affirmation.
Why is the concept of the embodied self important to Nietzsche? As he argues in The 
Gay Science, “one could conceive o f a delight and power of self-determination, a 
freedom o f the will, in which the spirit takes leave o f all faith and every wish for 
certainty, practised as it is in maintaining itself on light ropes and possibilities and 
dancing even beside abysses” (GS 347), Nietzsche wants to tell us that human 
potential to be a self-mastery individual with a free spirit, which has been neglected 
by Christian morality. He suggests we release ourselves from our obedience to 
Christianity and live with responsibility. The second step is to analyse nihilism as the 
paradigmatic expression of modem culture in order to identify ourselves in its midst. 
We not only need to understand the embodied self, but also to seek why we live in a 
nihilistic era and how we can overcome nihilism and live with self-reliance. We have 
to liberate the self from the limitations o f the absolute Christian morality by 
interpreting anew the relationship between humanity and religion, and then develop 
ourselves in our nihilistic era through self-overcoming and self-experimentation.
This introductory chapter will be divided into two sections corresponding to these two 
stages. First, I start it with a preliminary discussion of Nietzsche’s concept o f the self 
and relate it to alternative philosophical viewpoints. I consider briefly the question of 
the self as it is raised by him in relation to his views on knowledge and the 
relationship between the self and philosophy. In contrast to the Cartesian conception 
which argues that we are a thinking thing, I relate Nietzsche’s conception o f the self to
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his understanding o f the nature o f knowledge within the philosophical tradition. My 
purpose is to explore Nietzsche’s notion of consciousness which differs from the 
Cartesian conception in order to clarify the questions of the self and understand the 
importance o f self-overcoming. Influenced by Christianity, Descartes brings us to 
believe that we are the mind and what we are conscious of is certain. But Nietzsche 
argues that consciousness is a means for our communication and our ideas are 
“superficial” (WP 476). We are not consciousness but we, the embodied self, master 
our consciousness.
Nietzsche’s understanding of the nature o f knowledge helps us to view consciousness 
in a new way. I also relate his conception of the self to his philosophical standpoint 
for the purpose o f indicating why he is concerned with self-experimentation. 
Nietzsche tells us that the purpose o f philosophy is not to provide us with moral 
knowledge but to offer us vivid pointers toward the experimental way o f life, through 
the experience o f encountering true philosophers.7 As Ansell-Pearson explains, for 
Nietzsche, “philosophy is ‘material’ in that it rests on a unity o f body and soul” and a 
true philosopher is one who “recognises that his or her thoughts are bom out o f the 
pain o f experience which, like the experience o f giving birth, should be endowed with 
‘blood, heart, fire, pleasure, passion, agony, conscience, fate, and catastrophe’” (1994: 
19). The first section explores Nietzsche’s conception o f the self, and the second 
section analyses how the embodied self potentially develops itself and overcomes 
nihilism. In the second section I elaborate Nietzsche’s conception of the development 
o f the self as it is linked to his concept o f nihilism, and explore his understanding of 
the relationship between humankind and religion. What is the self? Can Nietzsche’s
7 Nietzsche, for example, argues that we do not need an argument to tell us what happiness is. What we 
need is “philosophy o f  life” which enables us to realise our “greatest measure o f  happiness”, even 
though our lives “can still be miserable and little to be envied” (D 345).
philosophy inspire us to achieve a deeper understanding of our identity? I argue that 
the answer to these questions is ‘Yes’.
1.1 Conceptions of the Self
Rene Descartes, who is considered to be the “father of modem philosophy” (Schacht 
1984: 5), articulates a famous and highly influential argument that captures his 
concept o f the self: ‘I think, therefore I am’ (cogito ergo sum). It is usually claimed 
that the rise of the modem idea of the self emerges from the Renaissance,8 but 
Descartes, seeking to overcome the philosophy o f scepticism and break with the 
philosophical thought of the Middle Ages, is the crucial philosopher who identifies 
the self with the T ,  the ego or the unity of consciousness and separates mind from 
body in his mind-body dualism. In Meditations, Descartes argues, “7 am, I  exist: this 
is certain”, and then continues, “I am therefore, precisely speaking, only a thing which 
thinks, that is to say, a mind, understanding, or reason, terms whose significance was 
hitherto unknown to me. I am, however, a real thing, and really existing; but what 
thing? ...a  thing which thinks” {Meditations 2: 105). As a person who desires 
knowledge and believes that it should be “clear and certain knowledge” (Schacht 
1984: 7), Descartes attempts to convince the notion of the certainty of knowledge in 
his self-reflexive conceptions of the self9 and the existence of God.10 He identifies
8 Peter Burke elucidates that people in different periods have their own conceptions o f  the self. But the 
rise o f  concern with the se lf should go back to the Renaissance, from Petrarch in the early fourteenth 
century to Descartes in the early seventeenth (17).
9 Roger Smith argues that Descartes turns inwards to “examine his individual mind as a source o f  
knowledge” and he regards it as “an individual act, not an act characteristic o f  life in a certain 
community o f  people” (51). But Descartes’ concept o f the self through rational self-reflection is 
obviously questionable and different from what Nietzsche argues. Descartes’ conviction in believing 
knowledge is certain and the mind is the se lf  limits him self and thus causes him be unable to explain 
the interaction between the mind and the body but uses the pineal gland to explain it, which is, as 
Schacht describes, a “ludicrous” solution (1984: 20).
10 Similarly, when Descartes argues that the idea o f  “this supremely perfect and infinite being”, God, is 
entirely true” {Meditations 3: 124), it is obvious that his argument which is mainly concerned with the
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the mind with consciousness, and announces that the self is the mind, a thinking 
subject. This is the only certainty that Descartes knows. For Descartes, the essence of 
what it is to be a person lies in thought and consciousness. Descartes likewise holds 
that mind and body separate from each other as two different substances, which exist
in “an intimate union” (Schacht 1984: 17). As he explains,
And although perhaps I have a body to which I am very closely 
united...because, on the one hand, I have a clear and distinct idea o f  
myself in so far as I am only a thinking and unextended thing, and 
because, on the other hand I have a distinct idea o f the body In so far as it 
is only an extended thing but which does not think, it is certain that I, that 
is to say my mind, by which I am what I am, is entirely and truly distinct 
from my body, and may exist without it. (Meditations 6: 156)
On the one hand Descartes states that thought, a mental substance, constitutes the 
locus o f our personhood, but on the other hand effectively denies the significance of 
the body in his account o f personal identity. This is his mind-body dichotomy. In other 
words, he argues that consciousness is the only substance which exemplifies our 
existence; the self is the mind which identifies humanity. In Descartes’ view, there is 
nothing that can be attributed to thought that can be derived from the concept o f the 
body. As Peter Sedgwick explicates, for Descartes mind is a substance that is 
essentially different from body (2001: 6). Descartes constructs “an account of human 
knowledge, and he is doing so by way o f reflection on his own ability to thinkf* 
(Sedgwick 2001: 7). In this respect, Descartes not only seeks to deny any connection 
between the mind and the body when it comes to defining selfhood - thus emphasising 
the concept o f the self as a purely mental entity - but also considers the body as an 
extended substance which is irrelevant when it comes to considering this question. 
The body is only something that Descartes possesses, whereas the mind alone is what 
he is (Schacht 1984: 17). Descartes’ proposal that our reason makes us human and his
notion o f  subjectivity does not independent from the influence o f  traditional Christian values.
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treatment of the body as a trivial and derivative substance had a significant effect on 
modem philosophy, as Dave Robinson describes: “European philosophy relied on the 
guaranteed authenticity of the existence of the self -  the ‘Cogito’ -  the only thing that 
Descartes claims to be indubitable” (23). Taking Kant as an example, Robinson argues 
that Kant uses “this faith in rational thought and autonomy to reinforce Christian 
ethical beliefs. Practical reason could produce universal and absolute moral laws that 
were eternally true and so compulsory for everyone” (14). Nietzsche rejects this 
dyadic Cartesian mind-body doctrine which argues the self is the absolute mental 
entity but despises the body. He in contrast claims his alternative point of view of the 
self.
Nietzsche’s notion of the self is epitomised by a speech of Zarathustra:
What the sense feels, what the spirit knows, never has its end in itself.
But sense and spirit would persuade you that they are the end of all things: 
that is how vain they are. Instruments and toys are sense and spirit: 
behind them still lies the self. The self also seeks with the eyes of the 
senses; it also listens with the ears of the spirit. Always the self listens 
and seeks: it compares, overpowers, conquers, destroys. It controls, and it 
is in control of the ego too. Behind your thoughts and feelings, my 
brother, there stands a mighty ruler, an unknown sage -  whose name is 
self. (Z, I, “On the Despisers of the Body”)
Nietzsche elucidates a conception of the self that contrasts starkly with the Cartesian 
model. According to Zarathustra, we are habitually deceived when we assume that the 
conscious mind epitomises the self. Consciousness and selfhood, however, are 
different. Nietzsche argues that the mind, the sense and the spirit are the tools o f the 
self. In Nietzsche’s view, the mind is not the self; on the contrary, the self is 
something greater: a commander that controls the mind. We exist not because o f the 
mind but because of the embodied self. Nietzsche thereby suggests that we view the 
self in a different way from Descartes. According to Zarathustra, the self is epitomised
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by embodiment: “In your body he dwells; he is your body” (Z, I, “On the Despisers of 
the Body”). Nietzsche thereby intends to overturn the mind-body dichotomy. First, he 
claims that the self is a powerful ruler of the mind, a being that dwells inside the body. 
The self, according to Nietzsche, not only controls the mind and the sense, but also 
commands the body, the indispensable vehicle of the self that sustains us. Against 
Descartes, Nietzsche holds that the body cannot be separated from the self because the 
body is the place where the self is located. When Nietzsche argues that the self dwells 
in the body, he does not regard the self and the body as two separate substances. 
Rather, he implies a concept of wholeness, that is, the self and the body are joined 
together as a unity. So when Nietzsche argues that the self “lives” inside the body, his 
intention is to explicate the existence of the self in terms of its essentially embodied 
nature. As a whole, the self commands the body, but the self is at the same time 
unthinkable as distinct from its embodied nature.
Nietzsche’s second claim is that the self is the body. The self is “a multiplicity of 
subjects, whose interaction and struggle is the basis of our thought and our 
consciousness in general” (WP 490). We can say, according to Nietzsche, the mind, 
the sense and the spirit are individuated elements that make up the parts of the self. 
These elements function together in such a way as to constitute the specifically human 
body. Therefore, the body is also considered a multiplicity of these elements. It might 
be thought that these two conceptions of the self appear to be contradictory. We may 
ask how the self can dwell in the body and yet also be the body. Is Nietzsche not 
presupposing the very thing he purports to reject? But the question is raised because 
we are still viewing the self and the body in terms that follow the preconceptions that 
underlie Cartesian dualism. Descartes regards the mind and the body as two different 
substances and argues that they separate from each other. If we say the self is ‘inside’
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the body, according to Cartesian dualism, we cannot claim that the self is also the 
body since the two have already been presupposed to be different in kind. This is why 
one might feel Nietzsche’s two conceptions to be contradictory. Nietzsche proffers a 
different point of view.11 If we hold that the self and the body join together and are 
each of them individually meaningful because they are part of a whole, we are able to 
understand what Nietzsche implies.
In accordance with Nietzsche’s claim, that the self is ‘inside’ the body, we can explain 
that the self is like a king and the body is the kingdom which he commands. The body 
lives and operates by following the order of the self; the self manages the body. 
Likewise, Nietzsche’s second conception tells us that the self is the body. The self is 
the body because they are joined together as an entity. The self, the commander of the 
body, is united with the body and cannot be thought without it. The two, it follows, 
are really one in so far as they cannot be separated in a manner that would allow them 
to function individually. Nietzsche emphasises the importance of the body and argues 
that it is wrong to despise it. We are simply unable to live if we lack embodiment. The 
reason why the body is important is thus not merely because we need it to sustain our 
lives, but also because the body is where the sense, the spirit and the mind come from
and where they work together. As Zarathustra explains,
The body is a great reason, a plurality with one sense, a war and a peace, 
a herd and a shepherd. An instrument of your body is also your little 
reason, my brother, which you call ‘spirit’ -  a little instrument and toy of
11 Nietzsche’s idea can be compared with Spinoza’s concept which he praises on a postcard to Franz 
Overbeck on July 30th, 1881: “I am utterly amazed, utterly enchanted! I have a precursor, and what a 
precursor! I hardly knew Spinoza: that I should have turned to him just now, was inspired by "instinct." 
Not only is his overtendency like mine— namely to make all knowledge the most powerful affect—but 
in five main points o f  his doctrine I recognize m yself’ (quoted in The Nietzsche Channel, 1999-2007, 
www.geocities.com/thenietzschechannel/nlettl 881 .htm). Different from Descartes who says that the 
mind and the body are distinct things, Spinoza argues that a human being is both a physical thing and a 
mental thing. Spinoza means that the mind and the body are the same thing under different attributes 
(quoted in the introduction o f Spinoza in Peter J. King’s One Hundred Philosophers, pp. 94-95.)
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your great reason. ‘I,’ you say, and are proud of the word. But greater is 
that in which you do not wish to have faith -  your body and its great 
reason: that does not say ‘I,’ but does ‘I.’ (Z, I, “On the Despisers of the 
Body”)
The mind, of which traditionally we are proud and regard as a purely rational entity, is 
not the self but a tool that is commanded by the self. On the contrary, Nietzsche 
emphasises that the body, which the mind despises, is an important substance united 
with the self and is the self, the great commander.
In Nietzsche’s view, the body is significant because it is united with the self: “What 
has been called ‘body’ and ‘flesh’ is unutterably more important: the remainder is just 
a minor accessory” (Notebook 1887-1888, 11:83). We are essentially embodied, 
according to Nietzsche. Without the embodied self, there would be no experience of 
life. We simply are embodied and it is this that endows us with all our abilities to be 
human. But I need to emphasise a crucial point, that is, the sense and the mind 
function together within the body as a whole. So it is incorrect to say the body, the 
sense and the mind are separate and operate individually; in contrast, they need to be 
together in order to function well for living. Descartes despises the body by arguing 
that the self is the conscious mind by which we exist; on the contrary, Nietzsche tells 
us that the body is the most important but the mind is only a tool, or a recorder, of the 
self. As he criticises that reason, the subject, the authority that Descartes grants, is 
only a tool (BGE 191). We do not regard the mind but the embodied self as the most 
important. But we should not misunderstand that Nietzsche attempts to say the mind 
is unimportant; his intention is to overturn the misconception of the self in order that 
we can view it in an alternative way. Body and mind are all necessary features to 
humanity, but the misconception that draws a categorical distinction between them 
should be abandoned. We assume the self is the mind, by following the Cartesian
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conception, so we habitually despise the body and are concerned chiefly with 
consciousness.
Maurice Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenological view of the embodied self can be
i  'y
compared here with Nietzsche’s account of embodiment. Richard Shusterman 
points out the difference between Nietzsche and Merleau-Ponty: “In contrast to 
Nietzsche hyperbolic somaticism, Merleau-Ponty’s argument for the body’s 
philosophical centrality and value is more shrewdly cautious” (155). But Kristen 
Brown remarks their similarity: “The idea of a reified entity has traditionally 
presupposed a proper, conceptually articulable definition. For Nietzsche, as for 
Merleau-Ponty, the possibility o f experiencing things as reified would have to begin 
with bodily perception. Perceptions as perceptions are in themselves, for Nietzsche, 
translations -  designing the forces they interpret” (148). Regarding Descartes’ ‘I think, 
therefore I am’, Merleau-Ponty, in Phenomenology o f  Perception, offers a view 
opposed to the Cartesian conception of the self. As he argues, “we must be clear about 
the meaning of this equivalence: it is not the ‘I am’ which is pre-eminently contained 
in the ‘I think,’ not my experience which is brought down to the consciousness which 
I have of it, but conversely the ‘I think,’ which is re-integrated into the transcending 
process of the ‘I am’, and consciousness into existence” (446). In contrast to 
Descartes who claims that we are a totally distinct mental entity and the body is an 
irrelevant substance, Merleau-Ponty contends that the mind and the body do not 
distinct from each other but function together.
12 In the Preface to Phenomenology o f  Perception, Merleau-Ponty explains that phenomenology, “the 
study o f essences”, is “a philosophy which puts essences back into existence, and does not expect to 
arrive at an understanding o f  man and the world from any starting point other than that o f their 
‘facticity’” (vii). According to Merleau-Ponty, phenomenology is a method that leads us to view things 
themselves as they originally are: “The phenomenological world is not the bringing to explicit 
expression o f  a pre-existing being, but the laying down o f  being” (xxii). Merleau-Ponty suggests we 
see things from our own viewpoints. This is the fundamental argument in his philosophy, as he says: 
“We shall find in ourselves, and nowhere else, the unity and true meaning o f phenomenology” (viii).
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In Merleau-Ponty’s view, as Eric Matthews remarks, we are not considered as the 
minds but as “unified persons who form intentions and act in the world, but can do so 
only because our bodies function mechanically in certain ways”(69). As Nietzsche 
does, Merleau-Ponty not only corrects the Cartesian misconception of the self: “All 
inner perception is inadequate because I am not an object that can be perceived, 
because I make my reality and find myself only in the act” (445), but also emphasises 
the importance of embodiment, as he says that the world is not “what I think” but 
“what I live through” (Preface: xviii). Merleau-Ponty emphasises that we experience 
and understand ourselves through our bodily movement, and this is also what 
Nietzsche emphasises in his thought. Our body, according to Merleau-Ponty, is “in the 
world as the heart is in the organism: it keeps the visible spectacle constantly alive, it 
breathes life into it and sustains it inwardly, and with it forms a system” (235). For 
Merleau-Ponty, as also for Nietzsche, embodiment is essential and imperative for 
humanity to understand itself.
Nietzsche rejects the mind-body dichotomy which prevents us from mastering 
ourselves and experimenting with life. Whatever we observe in the world, according 
to Nietzsche, the limits o f consciousness automatically restrict us from approaching 
the truth of things, including the self. As Nietzsche tells us: “We live only by means of 
illusions; our consciousness skims over the surface. Much is hidden from our view” 
(P&T, The Philosopher: 50). The question of the self is thus intimately connected with 
the limitations o f consciousness. Therefore, Nietzsche indicates two levels of 
understanding in response to the question of the self. One is the kind of understanding 
that occurs as a consequence of adherence to the dominance of habit, culture and 
tradition. This knowledge is limited but essential in order for humanity to be fully
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what it is. It is the level of conscious understanding that is characteristic of communal 
culture and which endows us with the ability for self-understanding and hence 
self-interpretation. The other higher level is the understanding attained by way of 
overcoming these necessary but limited.
Habitual understanding, in Nietzsche’s view, is a useful means that leads to our 
self-interpretative nature. In ancient ages, “where pessimistic judgments as to the 
nature of man and world prevail”, according to Nietzsche, people who are unable to 
act directly in response to pessimistic judgements use thinking as a way to express
1 Ttheir weary and melancholy ideas. As Nietzsche continues, “whatever he may think 
about, all the products of his thinking are bound to reflect the condition he is in .. .the 
content of these products of his thinking must correspond to the content of these 
poetical, thoughtful, priestly moods” (D 42). Thinking aids people to reflect on their 
conditions of life and be able to respond to them. Nietzsche claims that knowing is a 
means that brings humanity to recognise human nature and the world, and 
consciousness, which comes after habits, is an expression that is used for the 
communal condition of primitive social life. As he argues, “at the outset, 
consciousness was necessary, was useful, only between persons (particularly between 
those who commanded and those who obeyed); and that it has developed only in 
proportion to that usefulness. Consciousness is really just a net connecting one person 
with another -  only in this capacity did it have to develop” (GS 354). However, the 
conception of habitual understanding has been converted under the influence of 
traditional philosophy and Christianity. Habitual understanding is no longer viewed as
13 In The Birth o f  Tragedy, for example, Nietzsche uses the story o f the wise Silenus, who told to King 
Midas that the best thing for human beings is something outside their grasp: not to be bom, not to be, to 
be nothing, and the second best thing is to die soon (BT 3), to show us how the early Greeks created the 
imaginative Olympian world o f  gods as a way o f  thinking to bear their suffering in life and overcome 
their fear o f  death. Thereby the Greeks were able to keep on living.
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a mere means for responding to the condition of life and interpreting human nature, 
but has been transformed into a powerful passion “which shrinks at no sacrifice and at 
bottom fears nothing but is own extinction” (D 429). As Nietzsche argues, “our 
actions, thoughts, feelings, and movements -  at least some of them -  even enter into 
consciousness is the result o f a terrible ‘must’ which has ruled over man for a long 
time” (GS 354).
This passion for knowledge, which has been accumulated for a long time, still lies 
deep in the human brain “with such judgements and convictions; and ferment, 
struggle, and lust for power developed in this tangle” (GS 110). The problem is that 
we are accustomed to regarding the mind, the consciousness, as the most important 
aspect of humankind. Accepting the Cartesian conception of the self, we give high 
praise to the ego and see it as the essential part, our identity. Being influenced by the 
mind-body dichotomy, we assume what the mind provides is pure and absolute. 
Accordingly, we rely on the mind, believing that we could not live without it. We live 
and judge by following moral values and accumulated understanding, without being 
aware that we are restricted by consciousness. As Nietzsche argues that the ego’s 
desire for appropriation is ceaseless (D 286), our ego does not stop its desire to 
control us. Consciousness restrains us just as much as it endows us with abilities, 
especially our positive abilities. It is only because the human past is marked out by 
violent restraint and the yoke of custom that the kind of animal that came to be human 
was bred. The limitations of consciousness hinder us from approaching truth; 
therefore, we rarely perceive this as a problem and erroneously believe that our 
accumulated knowledge guides us to understand humanity. Nietzsche clarifies the 
misconception o f consciousness, the main concern in traditional philosophy. Though 
habitual understanding is produced by humankind as a useful tool to interpret our
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nature and be able to live in a world (WP 568), we need to change this erroneous 
mode of judging, which is built up by the first level of understanding, in order to free 
ourselves from the restrictions of consciousness. Nietzsche challenges our general 
attitude towards knowledge by providing the conception of the higher level of 
understanding, which is in accordance with his conception of the self.
This higher level of understanding is the key to the development of the self. When we 
are used to observing and judging from our accumulated knowledge, we only see the 
partial truth of things. In order to attain the higher level of understanding, Nietzsche 
suggests us view consciousness and knowledge in an unusual way. As he explicates, 
“man, like every living creature, is constantly thinking but does not know it; the 
thinking which becomes conscious is only the smallest part of it” (GS 354), 
consciousness, according to Nietzsche, is not a pure and essential substance because it 
does not belong to “man’s existence as an individual but rather to the community and 
herd-aspects of his nature” (GS 354). Our consciousness that we usually regard as 
“the highest stage of organic development and as the most astonishing of all earthly 
things”, in Nietzsche’s view, is just a tool we have (Notebook 1885, 37: 4). We 
“simply have no organ for knowing, for truth” (GS 354), and consciousness exists 
only when we need it to communicate for social and communal life. Likewise, 
Nietzsche claims that knowledge should not be considered as secure and guaranteed. 
As he argues that the world is knowable because we interpret it, knowledge is 
acquired by our interpretation. Knowledge is also interpretable (WP 481). Nietzsche 
claims that knowledge is not fixed and certain; on the contrary, it is a concept which is 
constantly evolving and changeable according to the way that we interpret it. As 
Schacht argues, Nietzsche wants to stress that knowledge is not “a non-perspectival, 
unconditioned apprehension of true being” (1983: 84). Nietzsche perceives that
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traditional philosophy has produced a deep effect on humanity: people are unaware of 
being restricted by the Cartesian conception and Christian doctrine, and also reluctant 
to admit that a thought comes when ‘it’ wants to, and not when T  want it to (BGE 17). 
But Nietzsche’s aim is not solely to elucidate the misconception of knowledge. He 
claims that the exceptional few can attain a higher level of understanding by 
overcoming habitual understanding and experimenting with life. As Nietzsche argues, 
“logic does not doubt its ability to assert something about the true-in-itself (namely, 
that it cannot have opposite attributes)” (WP 516), we are unable to stop the mind 
keeping its desire to dominate us because this is the way it acts. Nietzsche, on the 
other hand, claims that humanity can liberate itself from the limits of consciousness 
when it no longer considers the self as the rational mind. In other words, whether the 
higher level of understanding can be reached, for Nietzsche, is decided by how much 
the conception of the self can be understood.
Nietzsche also claims, “‘Life as a means to knowledge’ -  with this principle in one’s 
heart one can not only live bravely but also live gaily and laugh gailyl” (GS 324) Our 
experience of life, in Nietzsche’s view, can help the self reflect and interpret itself, 
and develop understanding to a higher level. Being constantly aware that the self is 
not the mind but the commander of the mind and living with experimentation, 
humanity can prevent itself from being controlled by consciousness and overcome 
accumulated knowledge. According to Nietzsche, most people are unaware of the 
question of the self as it is raised and emphasised by him. Likewise, traditional 
philosophers do not perceive Nietzsche’s concern with the development of the self as 
a matter of self-overcoming. The impact of the mind-body dichotomy on traditional 
philosophy highlights the difficulty of perceiving the importance of freeing the self 
from the limitations of Christian morality. But Nietzsche offers a different attitude to
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knowledge. He attempts to point out that a higher level of understanding can be 
attained in virtue of self-awareness and self-overcoming. As Keith Ansell-Pearson 
comments,
Nietzsche designs in positive terms as the development of a new kind of 
understanding and knowledge concerning the conditions and 
circumstances under which particular values evolved and changed, and in 
which morality acts as a symptom and a sickness, but also as a stimulant 
poison. (1997: 16-17)
Nietzsche’s striking critique o f traditional philosophy and his conception of the self 
inspire us not to be restricted to the Cartesian conception, but on the contrary to 
develop the understanding of the self from a necessary and limited realm to a higher 
level. This stimulus is unusual, dangerous but powerful because it inspires us to 
perceive and interpret our nature.
Nietzsche is concerned with the development o f self and the relationship between the 
self and philosophy. He perceives that there is something he can do in order to 
maintain the value of philosophy. Philosophy, for Nietzsche, is “an essentially creative 
affair, in a number of ways, pertaining not only to the interpretation of events but also 
to the direction they take” (Schacht 1983: 16). Nietzsche’s intention is to reject 
traditional philosophy which is solely concerned with the mind; he emphasises the 
need for living down to earth and practising our present life through a process of 
perpetual experimentation. As he tells us: “Admitting untruth as a condition of life: 
that means to resist familiar values in a dangerous way; and a philosophy that dares 
this has already placed itself beyond good and evil” (BGE 4). The traditional notion 
of the self, which implies that the mind exists independently as the essence of 
humanity, has to be discarded. As Solomon and Higgins argue, Nietzsche is tired of 
traditional philosophy “without a point or any goal other than to enhance the
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reputation o f the philosopher”, “without any evident concern for the plight of 
modernity and the future of humanity” (211-212). This misconception of the self, for 
Nietzsche, does not help people to understand the self but impairs their positive 
abilities to create and affirm life. In contrast, Nietzsche gives his alternative view of 
philosophy.
In Nietzsche’s opinion, the role of philosophy is not to enhance our moral knowledge. 
Rather, it should enlighten humankind about itself. Nietzsche does not think there is 
‘moral knowledge’, which should be inculcated by philosophy; on the contrary, he 
regards the understanding of the self as the most important philosophical concern. 
Nietzsche also argues that a philosopher should keep his mind open and be willing to 
conduct new experiments, even to declare himself opposed to his previous arguments 
(Kaufmann 1974: 85). A philosopher does not need to provide us with moral 
knowledge but shows us the way o f life that he experiments and responds to his life. 
As Nietzsche comments of Kant: “When he does shine through his thoughts, Kant 
appears honest and honourable in the best sense, but insignificant: he lacks breadth 
and power, he has not experienced very much, and his manner of working deprives 
him of the time in which to experience things” (D 481), Nietzsche argues that Kant 
has an intelligent mind but lacks experience of life which inspires us to view the self 
and develop humanity. As he tells us: “The fairest virtue of the great thinker is the 
magnanimity with which, as a man of knowledge, he intrepidly, often with 
embarrassment, often with sublime mockery and smiling -  offers himself and his life 
as a sacrifice” (D 459). A great thinker does not need to explain things in a dogmatic 
manner but is willing to contribute what he is able to provide, such as showing how 
he encounters challenge and experience. As Schacht argues that a philosopher, in 
Nietzsche’s view, should not be “committed methodologically to some requirement of
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absolute certainty or presuppositionlessness in philosophical inquiry” but should 
rather be “convinced of the genuinely problematical character of any and all such 
assumptions” (1983: 14). We do not need a philosopher who comes to teach us about 
knowledge; on the contrary, we need philosophers who can reveal how to live through 
experiment.
Nietzsche’s approach is to stress a new view of philosophy, which leads humankind to 
self-awareness and self-development, as Kaufmann argues, “Experimenting involves 
testing an answer by trying to live according to it” (1974: 89). Nietzsche emphasises 
that philosophy does not solely concern epistemology but the way that we live. When 
Nietzsche observes that people in modernity seemingly lack the energy of affirming 
life, he shows us the way we might potentially live by the question of the self that he 
raises. His attempt of raising the question of the self expresses his deep concern with 
the future of humanity. But his concern does not imply that he could save and develop 
humanity, nor does he want to be an idol to others. We should not confuse Nietzsche’s 
personal life with his thought when we interpret them. Andre Gide points out that 
Nietzsche becomes “his own captive” when he is unable to depart completely from 
decayed modernity which he criticises but appears like a “lion in the cage of a 
squirrel” (quoted in Behler, 298). Thomas Mann also views Nietzsche, in an image of 
a ‘martyr of thought’, a ‘saint o f immoralism’, who died the ‘martyr’s death of the 
cross of thought’ (quoted in Behler, 299). Gide and Mann both ignore the crucial point 
shown in Nietzsche’s perspectivism. When Nietzsche stresses human ability to 
confront our cultural crisis by overcoming the self and experimenting with life, he 
does not mean that the consequence can be expected and guaranteed, including his 
own. In other words, we should not misjudge him and deny all his controversial 
thought only because of his insanity; otherwise, we might lock ourselves again in the
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traditional concept of the absolute that Nietzsche rejects.
We do not need to categorise Nietzsche as “a hero of thought, a conqueror of freedom, 
and advocate of life, and the pronouncer of new and daring doctrines” as Elisabeth 
Forster-Nietzsche extraordinarily and pompously maintained for the purpose of 
promoting her own “thought” (quoted in Behler, 287). But neither are we required to 
regard him as a martyr as Gide and Mann insist. Both sides are so extreme that they 
inhibit us in an absolute manner and thereby distract our attention from viewing 
Nietzsche as an eccentric individualist and his thought as a means to reflect ourselves. 
Put it simply, Nietzsche’s thought mainly reveals that he loves humanity and that he is 
concerned with the development o f the self. Nietzsche understands that human nature 
is complex and contradictory. However, his understanding of humanity does not cause 
him to promulgate his thoughts as doctrines that all of us have to follow but provides 
us an uncommon way to understand humanity, with his conception of the self. 
“Nietzsche envisages a program of cultural engineering which will bring about a new, 
sovereign species of human that is both intellectually strong and ethically 
independent” (Ansell-Pearson 2006: 246). Nietzsche stresses the importance of the 
development of humanity, letting us see how we can live bravely and independently in 
the midst of nihilism. In what follows, I will discuss Nietzsche’s concept of nihilism 
as the means to explicate his analysis of the development of the self.
1.2 Nietzsche’s Concept of Nihilism
In The Will to Power, Nietzsche defines nihilism: “the highest values devaluate 
themselves” (WP 2). Nietzsche’s concept of nihilism emerges from his proclamation 
of the death of God, aimed at rebuking and challenging traditional Christian morality.
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Christian morality proffers an account of the meaning of life, especially endowing the 
necessity o f redemption for releasing suffering, leads humans to a pessimistic attitude 
that rejects the embodied self and hence existence as it truly is. As Irena Makarushka 
comments: “The principle charge he [Nietzsche] made against Christianity is that it 
rejected this life in favour of an eternal life in the hereafter. This rejection had 
ideological and political implications particularly insofar as it informed the 
construction of values o f Western culture” (29). Nietzsche argues that Christian moral 
values that we regard as the highest values have lost the ability to guide and develop 
humanity and the consequence is that we live amidst nihilism. Nihilism, in 
Nietzsche’s understanding, is a cultural phenomenon that leads us to face up to 
self-reflexive problems of humanity. The advent of nihilism for Nietzsche is crucial 
because it “represents the ultimate logical conclusion of our great values and ideals” 
(WP Preface: 4). As Nietzsche continues, we need to experience nihilism so as to 
understand why we discard traditional Christian morality and create our values (WP 
Preface: 4). When Nietzsche raises the question of the self, he not only invites us to 
acknowledge the limitations of the traditional mind-body dichotomy, but also 
encourages us to reflect upon the nature of our identity through self-examination.
Having explored Nietzsche’s conceptions of the self, we go to elucidate his view of 
nihilism in order to know how we overcome nihilism and move forward when we stay 
in a nihilistic culture: “God is dead; but given they way people are, there may still for 
millennia be caves in which they show his shadow. -  And we -  we must still defeat 
his shadow as well!” (GS 108) Nihilism is an unhealthy characteristic of modem 
culture, the origins o f which are profoundly rooted in Christian morality and 
metaphysics. As Nietzsche contends, “it is an error to consider ‘social distress’ or 
‘physiological degeneration’ or worse, corruption, as the cause of nihilism... Rather, it
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is in one particular interpretation, the Christian-moral one, that nihilism is rooted” 
(WP 1). Christian doctrine imbues us with a sense of the need for repentance for 
original sin and the idea of redemption that is fulfilled in an afterlife. Christianity has 
converted the origins of religion and morality and become a nihilistic religion which 
misleads humankind to embrace nothingness.14
As Nietzsche describes the origin o f religion,
People in those times do not yet know anything of natural laws... There is 
no concept whatsoever o f natural causality...To him nature -  
uncomprehended, frightful, mysterious nature -  must seem to be the 
realm o f  freedom , o f choice, o f a higher power, a seemingly superhuman 
level of existence, a god. (HAH 111)
In prehistory, people did not have the conception of causality and the monotheistic 
conception of God. Religion, in this respect, represented their response to the power 
of nature, not an attempt at subordinating it. As Nietzsche explains: “The meaning of 
religious worship is to direct nature, and cast a spell on her to human advantage, that 
is, to impose a lawfulness on her, which she does not have at the start; whereas in 
present times, man wishes to understand the lawfulness of nature in order to submit to 
it” (HAH 111). People at that time had different ideas of religion and religious 
worship. Religion sought to render nature law-like, i.e. customary and amenable to 
supplication, like our prehistoric ancestors, and the purpose of religious worship was 
to gain power over nature. In contrast, modernity sees in nature something invariably 
inhuman and coercive, a realm of necessity that imposes its order upon us. This is a 
misinterpretation of religion and nature.
14 Nietzsche argues that Buddhism is also a nihilistic religion, a passive nihilism and symptomatic of 
weakness (WP 23). But he considers Buddhism better than Christianity because Buddhism does not 
give the concept o f  original sin (WP 342). For Nietzsche, Christianity is worse than Buddhism because 
it leads humanity to decadence by imposing the concept o f  original sin on us and imbuing us with the 
need for redemption and salvation through the Christian God:
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On the other hand, the nature of morality has also been misunderstood. Nietzsche 
argues that morality was originally a set of customs enabling people to live in 
communities. Morality is the basic requirement for all social life; it is a human
product. As Nietzsche explains,
Thus the concept of the ‘most moral man’ of the community came to 
include the virtue of the most frequent suffering, of privation, of the hard 
life, of cruel chastisement -  not, to repeat it again and again, as a means 
of discipline, of self-control, of satisfying the desire for individual 
happiness -  but as a virtue which will put the community in good odour 
with the evil gods and which steams up to them like a perpetual 
propitiatory sacrifice on the altar. (D 18)
Morality was initially not aimed toward developing human nature and regulating the 
way of life. People invented it, according to Nietzsche, for the purpose of living and 
experiencing when they were in communities; therefore, morality did not contain any 
transcendent origin of developing human nature and instructing a correct way of life. 
To put it simply, morality for prehistoric people was regarded as customs in daily lives. 
There was no connection between religion and morality. As Nietzsche argues: “In 
itself, a religion is nothing to do with morality, but the two offspring of the Jewish 
religion are both essentially moral religions, ones that prescribe how we ought to live 
and gain a hearing for their demands with rewards and punishments” (Notebook 
1885-1886, 2: 197). It is Christianity that alters the relationship between man and 
religion by providing an absolute idea of the Almighty God, polarises human nature 
into good and evil according to Christian moral values, and makes us feel guilty 
because o f original sin. Christianity dominates the self by means of the belief in 
morality and undermines our self-confidence.15
Nietzsche criticises Christianity because it uses morality as a tool of domination on
15 See Chapter 3 for the further analysis o f  Nietzsche’s concept o f  morality.
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man, and brings about decadent culture:
Nihilism appears at that point, not that the displeasure at existence has 
become greater than before but because one has come to mistrust any 
‘meaning’ in suffering, indeed in existence. One interpretation has 
collapsed; but because it was considered the interpretation it now seems 
as if there were no meaning at all in existence, as if everything were in 
vain. (WP 55)
Nietzsche here explicates why nihilism appears in modem culture. Christian morality 
falsifies the meaning of existence, polarises humanity by moral judgement, and 
enslaves us in Christian precepts. People who rely on Christianity actually lose faith 
in salvation. As a result, we live in pessimism and nothingness, and finally lose the 
self-confidence to live. “Nihilism in this sense thus represents the failure of the 
metaphysics of weakness to overcome decadence and liberate the weak” (Dudley 134). 
Nietzsche considers nihilism as a symptom of modernity and names it a “European 
form of Buddhism -  doing No after all existence has lost its ‘meaning’” (WP 55). The 
consequence of this is that “man has lost dignity in his own eyes to an incredible 
extent” (WP 18). However, Nietzsche has no intention to dissolve nihilism because he 
realises it is a part of western culture, the effect of Christianity. For him, nihilism is 
incomplete because we are in the midst of it (WP 28). He identifies two ways of 
understanding nihilism, suggesting instead that we should confront nihilism with a 
new view of it. One is active nihilism, which Nietzsche regards as “a sign of the 
increased power of the spirit”, and the other is passive nihilism, which he regards as 
“a decline and retreat o f the spirit’s power” (Notebook 1887, 9: 35). Nietzsche on the 
one hand argues that passive nihilism is undermining in its consequences because the 
attitudes that typify it consider everything to be ultimately meaningless. On the other 
hand, active nihilism strengthens the intention to act and experience. “Nihilism is the 
state of strong spirits and wills: and for these it’s not possible to stop at the No ‘of 
judgement’ -  the No of the deed springs from their nature. An-nihil-ation by the
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judgement is seconded by annihilation by the hand” (Notebook 1887-1888, 11: 123). 
Passive nihilism compels us to embrace nothingness but active nihilism revives us, 
provoking us to take action. If we are able to perceive how nihilism restrains us 
through the power of its ‘in vain’, we can transform ourselves without being 
destroyed by it. In this respect, active nihilism becomes the power that enables the self 
to live in a nihilistic era and go beyond it.
Nietzsche is aware that we are in a nihilistic era in which we lose our assurance of the 
self and live in meaninglessness, as he claims, “we are losing the center of gravity by 
virtue of which we lived; we are lost for a while” (WP 30). This thought gives a new 
impetus to modem culture, especially to postmodern thinkers. As David Harvey says 
in The Condition o f  Postmodernity: “By the beginning of the twentieth century, and 
particularly after Nietzsche’s intervention, it was no longer possible to accord 
Enlightenment reason a privileged status in the definition of the eternal and 
immutable essence of human nature” (18). Nietzsche suggests we face the advent of 
nihilism and then overcome it. However, postmodern commentators misinterpret his 
philosophy. They argue that Nietzsche initiates a decentering of the subject and regard 
him as a proto-postmodemist. Thus they connect themselves with Nietzsche, for the 
purpose of legitimising the postmodern standpoint: “To the degree that it does try to 
legitimate itself by reference to the past, therefore, postmodernism typically harks 
back to that wing of thought, Nietzsche in particular, that emphasizes the deep chaos 
of modem life and its intractability before rational thought” (Harvey 44). In terms of 
the relationship between Nietzsche and postmodern thinkers, these postmodern 
thinkers misunderstand Nietzsche’s thought and adapt it as a key element in mounting 
their own critique of modernism and subject. The reason why I argue here is because I 
want to clarify that Nietzsche’s concern is not to destroy tradition and advocate
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fragmentation as postmodernism stresses, but to claim a self-reflexive concept of 
individuality. Nietzsche has widely been misinterpreted, as Solomon and Higgins 
elucidate, his “argument of ‘only interpretation’ “warm the cockles of the ‘nothing but 
the text’ generation”, and his attack to traditional conception of the self “much in tune 
with the ‘fragmentation o f the subject’ and ‘death of the author’ fixations of the 
current French academic scene”, but he is not a postmodernist. Nietzsche solely tends 
to “promulgate a more vigorous, positive philosophy” by giving very different views 
of the self and subjectivity (42). In what follows, I analyse how postmodern 
commentators appropriate Nietzsche’s thought.
Harvey argues that an emphasis on pluralism is a central trait of postmodern thought. 
As he observes: “The idea that all groups have a right to speak for themselves, in their 
own voice, and have that voice accepted as authentic and legitimate is essential to the 
pluralistic stance o f postmodernism” (48). Postmodernism attempts to overturn 
modernity by concentrating on pluralism and replication in a chaotic condition, and 
postmodern thinkers advocate a pluralistic perspective, explicitly associating this 
stance with Nietzsche’s philosophy. Postmodernism which entirely accepts the 
condition of “fragmentation”, “ephemerality”, “discontinuity” and “chaotic change” 
in fact “swims, even wallows, in the fragmentary and the chaotic currents of change 
as if  that is all there is” (Harvey 44). For postmodern thinkers, Nietzsche offers an 
unconventional way of criticising modernity with his concept of nihilism. There are 
numerous accounts which differently interpret Nietzsche’s attitude toward nihilism. 
We need to keep in mind that reading Nietzsche, as Sedgwick argues, “always 
involves an appreciation of the conflicts which provide the grounds for interpretation 
itself’ (1991: 24). I take Gilles Deleuze as the first example. Deleuze conspicuously
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creates a new vision of Nietzsche.16 In Nietzsche and Philosophy, he reinterprets 
Nietzsche’s thought, arguing that the concept of multiplicity is developed to its utmost 
in his philosophy. In Deleuze’s understanding, Nietzsche’s concept of the eternal 
recurrence17 is considered as “the expression of a principle which serves as an 
explanation of diversity and its reproduction, of difference and its repetition” (49). 
Nietzsche calls this principle will to power.18 The will to power for Deleuze is 
articulated on the basis o f the affirmation of becoming: “This is why the eternal return 
must be thought o f as a synthesis; a synthesis of time and its dimensions, a synthesis 
o f diversity and its reproduction, a synthesis of becoming and the being which is 
affirmed in becoming, a synthesis of double affirmation” (48). Deleuze argues that 
Nietzsche’s thought is in accordance with the affirmation of becoming, saying that the 
idea of becoming is the foundation of the concept of the eternal recurrence.
I agree with Deleuze when he argues that Nietzsche’s philosophy cannot be 
recognised for what it is if  we neglect to take his essential pluralism into account (4). 
It is, on the other hand, possible to question whether it is accurate to assimilate 
Nietzsche’s thought simply to the affirmation of becoming as Deleuze does. We can 
interpret Nietzsche’s pluralism as embracing becoming or ceaseless movement, but 
we risk ignoring the ambiguities o f his pluralism if we seek to render it solely in terms
16 Deleuze is not a postmodernist, but he and Guattari in A Thousand Plateaus stresses multiplicity by 
offering the idea o f  rhizome: “A rhizome has no beginning or end; it is always in the middle, between 
things, interbeing, intermezzo'’'' (25), which is derived from his understanding o f Nietzsche’s idea o f  
becoming.
17 In terms o f  the concept o f  the eternal recurrence, Nietzsche argues, “Everything becomes and recurs 
eternally -  escape is impossible!” (WP 1058) He stresses the revaluation o f  all values: “No longer joy  
in certainty but in uncertainty; no longer ‘cause and effect’ but the continually creative; no longer will 
to preservation but to power; no longer the humble expression, ‘everything is merely subjective,’ but ‘it 
is also our work! -  Let us be proud o f  it!” (WP 1059) Nietzsche’s idea o f the eternal recurrence 
suggests us not escape from the situation in which we are, i.e. a decayed realm, but interpret anew the 
world and keep proceeding our lives. The eternal recurrence offers a new way that shows us to see how 
we ought to live.
18 The will to power, according to Nietzsche, is “a multiplicity o f  forces, connected by a common 
mode o f  nutrition, we call ‘life’” (WP 641). Nietzsche suggests us see life in a perspectival attitude.
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of an ontology of becoming. Deleuze misinterprets Nietzsche’s concept of becoming. 
In The Gay Science Nietzsche posits the idea of eternal recurrence and asks: “Or how 
well disposed would you have to become to yourself and to life to long for nothing 
more fervently than for this ultimate eternal confirmation and seal?” (GS 341) He also 
claims in Ecce Homo: “At this point, I can no longer avoid actually answering the 
question how one becomes what one is...That one becomes what one is presupposes 
that one does not have the remotest idea what one is” (Clever 9). We do not need to 
ponder how to become what we are, because becoming and the self for Nietzsche are 
linked as an essential way of existence. What Nietzsche means is not solely to affirm 
‘becoming’ but to claim that the self becomes what it is when it experiments with life. 
But the premise is that the conception of the embodied self should be understood and 
distinguished from the mind-body dichotomy.
We are unable to presume what we will become; in other words, we become what we 
are while experiencing our lives. Nietzsche’s concept of becoming is in accordance
with his conception of the self. As Thiele remarks:
The paradox contained within the dictum ‘Become who you are’ reveals 
the nature o f living one’s life as a work of art. The self is not so much 
created as unfolded. The uniqueness of the individual makes this 
revelation appear as creation, for what unfolds is nowhere 
duplicated...As the individual ‘creates’ himself over time, facet after 
facet o f the preexisting self is revealed. Yet the self is never completely 
discovered. Its unfolding is as the paring of an infinitely large onion.
(1990: 215)
When Nietzsche argues that we have to become ourselves, he does not say that we can 
anticipate what we become. As Thiele explicates that the self for Nietzsche is never 
completely revealed and discovered but constantly creates itself as an art, Nietzsche’s 
concern is not to concentrate on how ‘becoming’ can be affirmed but how the self
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creates and simultaneously becomes what it is through self-reflection and 
self-interpretation. Nietzsche argues that the self needs constantly to reflect and 
transform itself; in other words, he suggests we experience life with zeal at every 
moment. In this respect, there is no core of the self independent of becoming, since 
identity as it is articulated with regard to humankind is always a matter of 
self-interpretation. We simply become what we are through experimentation. We can 
regard Nietzsche’s concept o f becoming as a ceaseless process in which the self 
reflects on itself. It is wrong to emphasise his concept of becoming without 
mentioning his conception o f the self. When Nietzsche mentions becoming, his aim is 
not to break altogether with tradition but to understand that the self becomes what it is 
through experimentation and self-awareness. “Nietzsche does not argue for an escape 
from the conceptually determined realm of ‘metaphysical philosophy’ into pure 
becoming” (Sedgwick 2001: 156). We can say that Nietzsche’s primary concern is the 
self, which endlessly transforms itself and becomes what it is. But I do not mean that 
Deleuze’s should not relate Nietzsche’s philosophy to the affirmation of becoming; 
rather, Deleuze views Nietzsche’s thought partially and fails to understand that it 
would be one-sided to equate Nietzsche’s pluralism simply with the affirmation of 
becoming. Therefore, Deleuze’s approach is questionable.
I take the postmodern thinker Jean-Frangois Lyotard as another example to 
demonstrate how Nietzsche’s idea has been misinterpreted. In The Postmodern 
Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Lyotard argues that the legitimation of knowledge, 
in postmodern culture, is formulated in different terms and that the grand narratives 
have lost their credibility, which is considered an effect of modem techniques and 
technologies (37). Knowledge in postmodern society, according to Lyotard, has 
become “linked to exchange value and the play of exterior forces” (Sedgwick 2001:
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268). Lyotard links his idea to Nietzsche’s philosophy, saying that the ideas of 
fragmentation and pluralism are shown in Nietzsche’s thought. According to Lyotard, 
Nietzsche uses different terminology to indicate the advent of European nihilism, the 
problem of modem culture which has “resulted from the truth requirement of science 
being turned back against itself’ (39). In response to postmodern condition, Lyotard 
claims that it is necessary to provide a pluralistic view, and emphasises the importance
of dissension and paralogy:
The problem is therefore to determine whether it is possible to have a 
form of legitimation based solely on paralogy. Paralogy must be 
distinguished from innovation: the latter is under the command of the 
system, or at least used by it to improve its efficiency; the former is a 
move (the importance of which is often not recognized until later) played 
in the pragmatics of knowledge. (61)
According to the issue of the legitimation of knowledge that he raises, Lyotard 
contends that paralogy is essential and necessary for humans to respond and then 
legitimate knowledge in such a fragmented postmodern culture. Lyotard’s analysis of 
knowledge in contemporary culture is acceptable, but I need to say he also 
misinterprets Nietzsche. His thesis o f fragmentation is different from Nietzsche’s.
Nietzsche argues the notions of fragmentation and pluralism, but they should not be 
separated from the conception of the self, which is the fundamental concern in his 
thought. His ideas of fragmentation and pluralism should be considered an alternative 
attitude that Nietzsche advises we understand humanity and world. As Higgins 
comments, although Nietzsche and the postmodernists “advocate a fragmented, 
perspectivist orientation toward our experience, Nietzsche’s purpose distinguishes 
him from his alleged intellectual heirs. Nietzsche’s primary concern is the possibility 
of rich and meaningful subjective experience”(191). Nietzsche’s pluralistic 
perspective differs from postmodernism. His concept of pluralism does not aim at
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advocating fragmentation and breaking down the discourse of modernity, but 
represents an alternative viewpoint of interpreting humanity and culture. When he 
proclaims the death o f God, declaring our new battles in nihilism, Nietzsche inspires 
us to perceive how we liberate ourselves from the views which stem from Christian 
values and create new values. In other words, he criticises the absolute, the subject 
which emerges from traditional philosophy and Christianity but emphasises human 
subjectivity which is related to his conception of the self. His aim is to release us from 
traditional notion of subjectivity so as to raise the importance of self-reflection. Put 
simply, Nietzsche does not argue for the necessity of fragmentation; on the contrary, 
his philosophy emphasises creating our values in a self-reflexive stance. His criticism 
of “the modem obsession with history is thus directed at the personal instead of the 
societal. This call to existential, subjective self-transformation differentiates Nietzsche 
from the large number of postmodernist theorists who deny the meaningfulness of the 
idea of a coherent se lf’ (Higgins 1990: 197-198). Nietzsche motivates us to 
concentrate on the self, without following the mind-body dichotomy that is imposed 
by tradition and Christianity, and then overcome modernity and nihilism.
I finally compare Habermas’ with Gregory Smith’s different understandings of 
Nietzsche and postmodernism. Habermas argues that it is Nietzsche who marks the 
advent of postmodemity: “With Nietzsche, the criticism of modernity dispenses for 
the first time with its retention of an emancipatory content. Subject-centered reason is 
confronted with reason’s absolute other” (94). Habermas is not a postmodernist -  far 
from it - but he sees Nietzsche as a proto-postmodemist. He criticises Nietzsche and 
other postmodern thinkers who intend to break with tradition and give up “the project 
of modernity”, which “aimed at applying the values of scientific objectivity, universal 
morality and law as they had developed according to the rules of their own ‘inner
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logic’ to the everyday social realm” (Sedgwick 2001: 280). Smith in Nietzsche, 
Heidegger and the Transition to Postmodernity gives a commentary on the 
relationship between Nietzsche, Heidegger19 and postmodemity. Smith, however, 
distinguishes Nietzsche from postmodernism. He claims that Nietzsche’s idea of 
nihilism has been overemphasised by postmodernists, but on the other hand admits 
that Nietzsche’s philosophy reveals the idea of postmodemity.20 Contemporary 
postmodernism, as Smith argues, “is fundamentally a sign o f disintegration, of 
transition, o f waning faith in the modem ideas o f Reason and Progress, and the 
Enlightenment project in general. It lacks faith in the modem autonomous subject as 
self-grounding and self-legislating” (8). In order to advance and stabilise their 
position, postmodernists take Nietzsche’s perspective as a means to support their ideas 
and argue that diversity is allowable, but they fail to understand that it should be 
dependent upon the condition that we embrace a self-reflexive critical stance.
Postmodernists, in Smith’s view, are unable to understand Nietzsche’s protean thought.
On the other hand he argues,
Contemporary postmodernism is only one conceivable deflection of the 
thought o f Nietzsche and Heidegger -  and not the most essential 
deflection given that it deflects Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s thought back 
onto a fundamentally modem path. Postmodernism abstracts elements o f 
the thought o f Nietzsche and Heidegger and uses them as weapons to 
defeat the essential core of Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s thought. That 
most essential core is what opens a door to the genuinely postmodern.
(281)
19 In my discussion, I only focus on Smith’s view o f  Nietzsche’s thought although he attempts to link 
Nietzsche and Heidegger together in order to analyse their effect upon postmodern culture.
20 As Smith argues, “A  postmodern thinking, understood as free-spirited, would have to take itself out 
o f  the business o f  legislation, manipulation, change, and control” (170). This point shows how  
postmodernism differs from N ietzsche’s thought. Smith also says, “any consistently postmodern 
position must try to stand beyond the highest manifestations o f  modem thought: metaphysical freedom 
and history” (62). He takes Nietzsche’s and Heidegger’s thought to explicate his idea o f  postmodemity 
linked with the concept o f  metaphysical freedom and history, i.e. the emancipation o f  praxis.
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Smith distinguishes between postmodern and ‘genuine’ postmodern attitudes. The 
latter is akin to what Nietzsche and Heidegger do (the ‘essential core’ of their 
thinking), and the former merely reintroduces many of the errors the postmodernists 
seek to rid us of. Regarding Habermas’ and Smith’s views of Nietzsche, I say they 
both misinterpret Nietzsche. Since I have already argued that Nietzsche is not a  
postmodernist, it will be clear that I do not agree with Habermas’ view of Nietzsche. 
Nietzsche does not abandon modernity; in contrast, he uses an unconventional way to 
emphasise the development of the self, which can be attained through self-reflection. 
As Smith remarks, Nietzsche’s attack on tradition does not mean an attack on 
traditionalism. Nietzsche on the contrary gives us a possible future with his 
philosophy that is different from the view o f postmodernists: “At a time when 
philosophy seemed at an end, he [Nietzsche] sought to restore the possibility of 
philosophy as a way of life rather than something always eventuating in dogmatic 
systems and the Spirit o f Revenge” (168).
On the other hand, I have to concede that Smith is partially right in seeing how 
postmodernists use Nietzsche for the purpose o f opposing modernity. I agree with his 
criticism o f the postmodernists, but his claim that Nietzsche’s philosophy provides a 
route toward achieving a “genuinely postmodern” (281) standpoint, I think, is 
questionable. Nietzsche does not advocate any ‘-ism’; his thinking is more subtle than 
that. His thought elucidates radical and unusual ways of viewing modem culture and 
moral values, and escapes the kind o f categorisation that the word ‘postmodern’ has 
come to imply. Nietzsche provides us with an alternative view of humanity and the 
world. But this does not mean that he is positing a postmodern future for us. The term 
‘postmodern’ does not mean anything to Nietzsche because he died before 
postmodernism emerges. Smith denies one version o f the postmodern link to
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Nietzsche but asserts another. Nietzsche is concerned more with how we are able to 
create values in a self-reflexive way and overcome modernity and nihilism when we 
live in modem culture. Our awareness of nihilism in the modem era should not be 
considered a pretext for evading life but a reason for affirming life. Unlike 
postmodernists who insist on breaking with tradition and modernity, Nietzsche has no 
intention to negate modernity according to his criticism of our decadent modem 
culture. He stands in a higher self-critical position viewing the human world in an 
ambivalent perspective. In terms of the interpretations of Nietzsche’s conception, I 
accept diverse views of Nietzsche because I realise some of them are correct in 
different ways. Nietzsche’s philosophy inspires postmodernists and influences their 
ways of thinking, but it is inappropriate to solely interpret Nietzsche as a harbinger of 
postmodernism by associating his attack on Christianity and tradition with 
postmodern premises. In contrast, Nietzsche seems to be a kind of individualist who is 
concerned with the development of the self. In what follows, I am going to explore his 
concept of individuality which is related to the notion of nihilism.
When Nietzsche espouses nihilism, he tells us that we no longer require the Christian 
God to save and redeem us, and then suggests we develop the self and redefine the 
meaning of existence. Nietzsche addresses the conception of individuality on the basis 
of his notion o f nihilism. The route to developing the self, according to Nietzsche, is 
to break with Christianity and be aware of the need for individuality and
independence. As he argues,
The Kingdom of Heaven is a condition of heart: Not something ‘above 
the earth.’ The Kingdom of God does not ‘come’ 
chronologically-historically, on a certain day in the calendar, something 
that might be here one day but not the day before: it is an ‘inward change 
in the individual,’ something that comes at every moment and at every
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moment has not yet arrived. (WP 161)
In Nietzsche’s view, Christianity cannot lead humankind to attain the kingdom of
Heaven because it misinterprets what the kingdom of heaven refers to. The kingdom
of Heaven, for Nietzsche, is not a place above the earth which we should seek; in
contrast, it is the condition of our hearts. We do not need to search for the kingdom of
Heaven, as proclaimed by Christianity, and rely on it for supporting our lives; it can
be reached by way of self-reflection and self-overcoming. In other words, we should
depend on ourselves and live independently. In Nietzsche’s view, Christianity
provides us a pessimistic view o f humanity. The nihilistic culture not only decreases
our self-confidence, but also tightly restricts us in the prison of nothingness; as a
result, we lose our dignity and wallow in pessimism. Nietzsche has already perceived
this terrible consequence; therefore, he shows his rejection of it by his attack on
Christianity. “Nietzsche’s critique of traditional and dominant moralities rests rather
on a sharpened concept of the individual responsibility o f  the self which he thinks is
incipiently present in traditional moral systems, but not taken seriously by them”
(Gerhardt 284). Nietzsche’s notion of nihilism not only reveals a nihilistic culture that
we should be aware of, but also inspires us to overcome it by affirming the concept of
individuality.
In terms of Nietzsche’s concept of individuality, two points should be noted. First, 
Nietzsche’s concern for the individual does not mean that his thought is akin to the
European Individualism which is associated with Christian morality. As he argues,
Through Christianity, the individual was made so important, so absolute, 
that he could no longer be sacrificed: but the species endures only 
through human sacrifice -  All ‘souls’ became equal before God: but this 
is precisely the most dangerous of all possible evaluations! If one regards 
individuals as equal, one calls the species into question, one encourages a 
way of life that leads to the ruin of the species. (WP 246)
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For Nietzsche, European individualism, which emphasises liberty and civilisation as 
the need for every person, misinterprets the meaning of individuality and undermines 
our ability to develop the self. This individualism, which regards that everyone is 
equal before God and asks for personal liberty, obviously denies one’s distinctive 
ability to create one’s life and damages the foundation of our communal life, that is, 
the need for interaction and cooperation of every person. Nietzsche criticises 
Christianity which provides humans with a concept “strictly egoistic fundamental 
belief in the ‘one thing needful’, in the absolute importance of eternal personal 
salvation” (D 132). To be an individual, for Nietzsche, does not mean that we live 
only for satisfying our personal desire and waiting for the redemption of the Christian 
God. On the contrary, we are responsible for our deeds and conduct, as he argues that 
all of us have to undergo the rigours o f life: “No one is free to live everywhere; and he 
who has great tasks to fulfil which challenge his entire strength has indeed in this 
matter a very narrow range o f choice” (EH Clever: 2). The concept of individuality, 
therefore, should not be taught and regulated by tradition and Christian morality. 
Rather, it refers to the human ability to continuously reflect upon the self and 
overcome the self. Because o f this, one does not need to prove one is individual by 
means of others’ judgements or standpoints; in other words, humanity stands only for 
itself as an individual. As Nietzsche tells us: “When man no longer considers himself 
evil, he ceases to be so -  ‘Good and evil are only interpretations, by no means fact or 
in-themselves” (Notebook 1885-1886, 2: 131). Individuality should be attained 
through the ceaseless development o f and reflection on the self.
Second, I stress that Nietzsche’s concept o f individuality is only suitable for the few. 
To live independently and practising life through experimentation without being 
restricted by Christian tradition and morality is fundamental to Nietzsche’s attitude.
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But he does not say that everyone can develop himself. Those few individuals who 
are able to overcome themselves and create their values are able to attain the 
possibility of self-development. In order to develop the self, Nietzsche emphasises the 
need for creating a battlefield in the mind, a self-reflexive and self-overcoming arena. 
Nietzsche in this respect argues that only the rare individual overcomes the weakness 
of humanity and accepts his fate. As Kaufmann argues: “The highest type, to 
Nietzsche’s mind, is the passionate man who is the master of his passions, able to 
employ them creatively without having to resort to asceticism for fear that his 
passions might conquer him” (1959: 217). Likewise, I want to point out that 
Nietzsche is not only concerned with the importance of individuality, but also 
represents himself as an individual who affirms life with the experimentation of the 
self. I take Nietzsche’s attitude towards his illness as an example to show how he 
conceives o f self-development. As he describes, “I discovered life as it were anew, my 
self included, I tasted all good and even petty things in a way that others could not 
easily taste them -  I made out of my will to health, to life, my philosophy” (EH Wise: 
2). Nietzsche does not complain about his unhealthy condition when he feels 
intolerable but regards it as a stimulant that helps him to explore the self and 
understand life. As he also describes himself: “I am by nature warlike” (EH Wise: 7). 
This claim does not mean that Nietzsche likes war; in contrast, it shows us what way 
o f life Nietzsche wants to have. He is determined to insist on fighting with the 
difficulties o f life, both physically and mentally, until the last moment of being 
conscious before his insanity.
Nietzsche does not allow himself to be defeated by physical discomfort but insists on
the need to fulfil ‘his’ task of life, as he says,
It is my fate to have to be the first decent human being, to know myself in
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opposition to the mendaciousness of millennia...I was the first to 
discover the truth, in that I want the first to sense -  smell -  the lie as 
lie...M y genius is in my nostrils...I contradict as has never been 
contradicted and am none the less the opposite of a negative spirit. (EH 
Destiny: 1)
More precisely, I argue that Nietzsche’s understanding of the self through 
self-reflection sustains him to keep overcoming the self and laying stronger claim to 
individuality. Nietzsche shows us the way of life he creates and this is how he 
responds to nihilism by taking himself as a living experiment for his philosophical 
investigation. As he argues, “so onwards along the path of wisdom, with a hearty 
tread, a hearty confidence! However you may be, be your own source of experience!” 
(HAH 292) The exceptional individual, in Nietzsche’s view, is the one who is able to 
conquer his limitations by understanding the self and then affirms life according to 
what he learns from his experience o f life. “The only means to affirm life as a whole 
is to affirm the suffering it entails, which is to say, to transform it into growth” (Thiele 
1990: 54). When the individual observes that modem culture is pessimistic, he 
chooses not to follow Christian values; on the contrary, he behaves autonomously and 
independently. As Nietzsche claims: “We few or many who dare to live again in a 
world emptied o f  morality, we who are pagan by belief: we are probably also the first 
to understand what a pagan belief is: having to imagine higher beings than man, but 
these as beyond good and evil; having to appraise all being-higher as also 
being-immoral” (Notebook 1888, 16: 16). The individual is a man who knows that he 
keeps conquering contradictory human nature and lives unconstrained by any moral 
doctrine. As an individual, Nietzsche reveals how he views life through his concept of 
individuality, and his insistence on the task of life also proves how he responds to life 
with a thoughtful and responsible attitude.
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In “Revisiting the Will to Power: Active Nihilism and the Project of Trans-human 
Philosophy”, Daniel Conway argues that Nietzsche identifies nihilism with the 
experience o f decay, referring to it as “a psychological state and a physiological 
condition, both of which are marked by exhaustion, pervasive pessimism, a pandemic 
dissipation of will, and an unprecedented erethism” (2000: 119). Nietzsche redefines 
the meaning of nihilism by distinguishing between active nihilism and passive 
nihilism, in order to provide a trans-human philosophy. I agree with Conway that 
Nietzsche does not intend to “redeem” anyone from decadent modem culture with his 
concept of nihilism (2000: 123). Nietzsche argues that most philosophers are passive 
nihilists who “treat decay as the definitive objection to existence itself’ (2000: 126). 
Against this, Nietzsche plays the role of a philosopher who questions Christian value.
As Conway argues,
Turning to his advantage the nihilism that darkens the horizon of late 
modernity, he conducts various philosophical experiments that have been 
heretofore impossible to undertake. The devaluation of the highest values 
uniquely positions him to call into question -  and perhaps to suspend -  
several o f the hoariest prejudices of Western philosophy and theology.
(2000: 127-128)
Nietzsche illustrates how much we live pessimistically in the shadow of nihilism by 
blindly following Christian morality. So he set out to provide different attitudes 
toward values and life by showing us his criticism of Christianity. Understanding the 
nihilism deeply rooted in Western philosophy, Nietzsche consequently emphasises the 
need for developing the self in the direction of an experimental mode of life. Life, for 
Nietzsche, is considered as “a transpersonal force that spontaneously overflows itself 
in a sumptuary expression of its unquenchable vitality” (2000: 131). Conway, at this 
point, tells us that Nietzsche demonstrates his view of life which is different from 
other philosophers; Nietzsche questions Christian values which leads us to 
nothingness, and then stresses the need to overcome nihilism by experiencing life
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with our values. As he argues: “One must have loved religion and art like one’s 
mother or wet-nurse -  otherwise one cannot become wise. But one must be able to 
look beyond them, outgrow them; if one stay under their spells, one does not 
understand them” (HAH 292). Nietzsche here points out that we should realise how 
Christian morality dominates humankind, and then treat ourselves as ‘experiments’ so 
as to understand what way o f life we ourselves want to have. Experimentation is 
crucial for humanity because it leads us to reflect upon ourselves, and then overcome 
our limitations and become an individual. According to Nietzsche, we stop following 
Christian doctrine and looking for salvation to the Christian God. We, on the contrary, 
regard ourselves as experiments, brave enough to confront the nihilistic era in which 
we have broken with the Christian God.
In this respect, nihilism, in Nietzsche’s view, is an important and necessary means for 
alerting us to know how to live independently. Nietzsche considers nihilism, i.e. the 
crisis of modernity, as something that alternatively causes us to understand our 
decayed culture and rethink the way we are able to live amidst nihilism. It seems that 
we stand at the crossroads, perceiving the need for breaking with traditional Christian
morality and seeking new directions. As Nietzsche argues,
The period of clarity: one understands that the old and the new are 
basically opposite, the old values bom of declining and the new ones of 
ascending life -  that all the old ideals are hostile to life (bom of 
decadence and agents of decadence, even if in the magnificent Sunday 
clothes of morality). We understand the old and are far from strong 
enough for something new. (WP 56)
In this situation, the crux is how we, who no longer believe in the Christian God and 
live in the condition of nihilism, resolve to move ahead. Modernity, as viewed by 
Nietzsche, is a realm wherein nihilism springs up. Although Nietzsche points out that 
we are not able to free ourselves from the nihilistic milieu of modem culture, he
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implies a new vision o f individuality that provokes us to rethink our responsibility for 
being human, overcome our limitations, and learn to live in the nihilistic era. This 
new vision o f individuality, which leads us to gain a radically new perspective on how 
humanity, morality and the self can be integrated, can be considered as three steps as 
shown in the following chapters. The first step is to understand our contradictory 
nature in a way which is distinguished from the judgement of tradition and 
Christianity, and then redefine the relationship between the individual and society. 
The second step is to analyse the misconception o f Christian morality, and explore 
what way o f life we require for affirming life and living as an individual. The third 
step is to examine how humankind overcomes and improves itself to the point of 
becoming autonomous through self-realisation, and live confidently and 
independently in modem culture. As Dudley writes: “This opportunity for 
self-redemption is liberating in two senses: it frees us from  our dependence on a 
Christlike savior, and it enables us to be free in our world, since we no longer need to 
escape that world in order to be redeemed. The tragic soul who redeems the world 
thus liberates herself at the same time” (208). Nietzsche’s philosophy implies a sense 
o f freedom and self-redemption, which can be achieved through self-reflection and 
self-overcoming. This sense o f freedom does not belong to everyone but to the few 
individuals who can constantly overcome themselves and live affirmatively at present. 
“Simply being unconstrained is not an appropriate mark o f freedom; being free should 
only serve the pursuit o f great achievement, a pursuit that most people can not 
endure” (Hatab 53). According to Nietzsche, we are responsible not for others but for 
our own conduct; therefore, life offers us an opportunity to identify who we are. 
Nietzsche’s perspective offers us a chance to welcome a new conception of the self. In 
order to see how Nietzsche affirms life on the basis of his concept of 
self-development, I am going to explore his concept o f individuality which is
developed in the following chapters.
Likewise, I should explain why I do not analyse Nietzsche’s Thus Spoke Zarathustra 
and his ideas of the will to power and eternal return, as most of Nietzsche’s readers do. 
I have two reasons. First, regarding Nietzsche’s self-critical interpretation as discussed 
in my fourth chapter, I do not choose Zarathustra but Ecce Homo since the latter is 
more precise in showing Nietzsche’s critical view of humankind and himself. As 
distinct from Zarathurstra which inspires us to understand human beings and the 
world according to Zarathustra’s teaching, Ecce Homo brings us to see how Nietzsche 
conceives himself as a self-interpreting individual who reflects upon himself and 
affirms life. Second, the concepts o f the will to power and eternal return are derived 
from Nietzsche’s notion of the embodied self and his rejection of the concept of the 
absolute. When Nietzsche’s concept o f the self is not restricted by the concept of the 
absolute, i.e. Christian doctrine, but understood through self-reflection, we are able to 
grasp that his concepts of the will to power and eternal return are connected to his 
notion of individuality. In this respect, there is no need to separately emphasise these 
concepts because what Nietzsche does is to stimulate us to become aware of the 
embodied self and the process of self-cultivation. The next chapter sets out to clarify 
his conception of human nature, the first step toward his concept of individuality.
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Chapter 2
The Self-Interpretative Development of Human Nature
In the Preface to Human, All Too Human, Nietzsche states that a person must become 
his “own master” and the master o f his “own virtues” in order to be a free spirit (HAH 
Preface: 6). On the one hand, we are aware that our nature is complex and 
contradictory, but on the other hand, we are capable of mastering ourselves and 
creating our own values. In order to create values, we need to prevent ourselves from 
being misled by traditional values and judgements of human nature, and conceive that 
humanity can be raised to a higher level through its self-interpretative development. 
The first step on the journey of self-cultivation is to understand the different aspects 
o f our nature. In this chapter, I examine Nietzsche’s concept of human nature as 
outlined in Human, All Too Human, Daybreak, Beyond Good and Evil, and On the 
Genealogy o f  Morals, clarifying his conception of self and the relationship between 
individual and society. I do so in three sections, which seek to highlight Nietzsche’s 
conception o f the human by way o f comparative analysis of his writings with those of 
other important figures. The first compares Nietzsche’s view of human nature with 
those of Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer and the Social Darwinists.21 They support 
the idea o f human evolution but give different aspects in interpreting it. This 
comparison highlights their respective concepts of evolution in relation to the 
development o f humanity. The reason why I compare them is because Nietzsche does 
not approve Darwinism and the Social Darwinists’ conceptions of humanity in 
accordance with their theory of evolution from a biological point of view. He 
criticises their inaccurate conceptions o f culture and human development with his
21 N ietzsche’s v iew s o f  Darwin, o f  Spencer and o f  the Social Darwinists are connected together in his 
criticism.
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anti-Darwinian stance. In The Will to Power, Nietzsche argues: “The utility of an 
organ does not explain its origin; on the contrary! For most of the time during which a 
property is forming it does not preserve the individual and is of no use to him, least of 
all in the struggle with external circumstances and enemies” (WP 647). Nietzsche 
conversely puts the case that this evolutionary conception, which refers to natural 
selection and the struggle for existence and resembles man and animals as organisms, 
reveals the progress of humanity. In contrast, he criticises this conception that 
degrades distinctiveness of human beings and misinterprets humanity. Nietzsche 
accepts that evolution is essential to the progress of humankind, but he does not agree 
with Darwinism and the Social Darwinists’ conception of evolution regarding the 
need for competition and struggle for life. Nietzsche argues that we require cultural 
evolution for the progress o f humanity; we develop ourselves through 
self-interpretation.
The second section is the comparison between Sigmund Freud and Nietzsche. Both 
Freud and Nietzsche claim instinct as essential to human nature but they analyse its 
importance in different ways. Kaufmann in Discovering the Mind reports that Freud 
showed his admiration of Nietzsche in the weekly meetings of the Vienna 
Psychoanalytic Society. On October 28, 1908, according to the Minutes23 (1967, p. 
3 If.). As Freud said: “The degree of introspection achieved by Nietzsche had never
22 In the second volume, Nietzsche, H eidegger and Buber, and the third volume, Freud, Adler and 
Jung, o f  the trilogy, D iscovering the M ind  (New Brunswick: Transaction, 1992), Walter Kaufmann 
stresses the similarities between Freud and Nietzsche. He points out Freud’s admiration o f  Nietzsche 
which is shown in many reports, and analyses their similar ways o f  interpreting human nature. But 
Kaufmann also remarks that Freud denied that Nietzsche had influenced him. As Kaufmann explains, 
Freud “did not wish to be influenced by Nietzsche’s formulations one way or the other -  either to 
accept them or to make changes to show his own independence” (Vol. 3: 264). Regarding Freud’s 
contradictory attitudes toward Nietzsche, Kaufmann says that Freud might have felt guilty because he 
“had never given Nietzsche sufficient credit for his creation o f  depth psychology and had slighted him 
in a way by not reading him and by not indicating all the points on which Nietzsche actually had 
priority” (Vol. 3: 270).
23 Minutes o f  the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, Translated by M. Nunberg. New York: International 
Universities Press, 1962, 1967, 1974, 1975.
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been achieved by anyone, nor is it likely ever to be reached again” (Vol. 2: 47-49). 
Kaufmann comments that Freud and Nietzsche are similar when they view humanity 
from a psychological viewpoint, for instance, Nietzsche uses a similar image to call 
himself an old psychologist who has ears behind his ears in the Foreword of Twilight 
o f the Idols (Vol. 2: 53). Kaufmann also argues that their concepts of the unconscious 
are similar: Both Freud and Nietzsche “were endowed with an exceptionally powerful 
reason.. .but they also recognized that we cannot being to discover the mind as long as 
we ignore the irrational and subterranean springs of behavior as well as thought” (Vol. 
2: 65). Kaufmann obviously to this extent regards Freud as the heir of Nietzsche, 
whereas Paul-Laurent Assoun in Freud and Nietzsche provides another commentary 
on them. He mentions that Freud, in a letter to his friend Fliess on the first of 
February 1990, shows his interest in Nietzsche’s ideas and thus turns to Nietzsche “in 
the hope of finding the words for the many things that remain mute within him” (20). 
Freud and Nietzsche both endeavour to proffer an account of human nature that has 
psychological elements and elucidate human nature according to their conceptions of 
instinct and the unconscious, but I have to say their focal points of self-understanding 
differ from each other and this is why I have chosen to compare them. “Nietzsche and 
Freud are often in a position o f practically saying the same thing, but not always 
about the same thing” (Assoun 50). My attempt is to clarify their ambivalent concepts 
of human nature.
Freud considers psychoanalysis as “the hermeneutic science of the drives, whose 
parallel ‘meta-psychology’ describes its theoretical scope” (Assoun 70) and his 
concept of instinct, which is hereafter transformed into the concept of drive, is 
initially based on a biological standpoint. Freud designs his psychoanalytic method 
with experiment, stressing that this psychological method is the key element to
52
discover the self. But Nietzsche does not consider psychology as an effective solution
for discovering the self. As he argues,
Until now, all psychology has been brought to a stop by moral prejudices 
and fears...we are going to be travelling beyond morality, and by daring 
to travel there we may in the process stifle or crush whatever remnant of 
morality we have left -  but what do we matter! Never yet has a deeper 
world of insight been opened to bold travellers and adventurers. (BGE 
23)
Nietzsche raises the critical claim that psychology, under the influence of Christian 
morality, is a science which limits our understanding of humanity and leads us to the 
key problems but not to the resolution. Human nature, in Nietzsche’s view, cannot be 
wholly revealed through psychological observation and experiment because it is 
constantly undergoing transformation. Nietzsche shows us a nature inside humankind 
which stimulates us to create our values. Freud highlights his psychological method 
for the purpose of exploring what we are unaware in the unconscious, whereas 
Nietzsche is concerned with self-critical interpretation for raising our self-awareness. 
My comparison between Freud and Nietzsche aims at exploring how we might view 
human nature according to their psychological accounts of human life.
Saint Augustine and Nietzsche is the last section, which allows us to address the issue 
of human nature in a religious view. Robert M. Helm argues, “Augustine and 
Nietzsche are alike in having a polemical rather than an expository purpose in their 
references to Plato” (31). Augustine’s thought24 can be regarded as a mixture of
24 In his crucial role as a thinker bridges classical culture and the Christian tradition, Augustine has 
exerted a great influence on Western philosophy and theology. His spiritual quest was developed in 
four stages. He was firstly inspired by Cicero’s dialogues to have an interest in ethical and religious 
ideas. He recognised the ideas o f  good and evil by the dualistic religion o f  Mani, or Manicheism. 
Unsatisfied with the conception o f  evil that is based on materialism, he turned to Neoplatonism. 
However, the temporary spiritual peace provided by Neoplatonism could not help him to quell his 
physical desire and inner conflict when choosing his path o f  life. His conversion occurred 
instantaneously, and Augustine was finally determined to dedicate himself to Christianity and the 
Christian God.
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Neoplatonism and Christianity in accordance with his own conception of religion. 
Augustine accepts the Platonic concept of God as absolute and unchangeable, but he 
does not agree with the Platonic devaluation of the body, which Nietzsche also 
criticises. As Augustine argues in Confessions: “In each category of your works, when 
you had said they should be made and they were made, you saw that every particular 
instance is good....This truth is also declared by the beauty of bodies. A body 
composed of its constituent parts, all o f which are beautiful, is far more beautiful as a 
whole than those parts taken separately” (Conf, 13, 28, 43). For Augustine, as Carl 
Vaught remarks, a human being is a composite of a soul and a body, but he regards the 
soul is primary and the body is secondary, and the soul rules the body through the will 
(11). Augustine accepts that the soul is more important than the body, but he views the 
body is a part o f God’s creation which should not be undervalued and abandoned as 
Neoplatonists claim. Carol Harrison also argues, Augustine concedes that the Platonist 
theory of body and soul is preferable to that of the Manichees, but he argues that the 
body, which is created by God, should not be considered solely as a prison according 
to the Platonism (157). This is the first reason why I compare Augustine and 
Nietzsche, who views humanity according to their own interpretation.
My second reason is that they both are concerned with self-understanding, but regard 
it differently according to their conceptions of God and man. Augustine’s focus is to 
advocate that humanity can only be developed by way of relying on God’s word, but 
Nietzsche concentrates on the ability of self-reliance and self-awareness. Based on his 
adaptation o f Platonic thought mixed with his personal interpretation of Christian 
doctrine, Augustine emphasises that man needs to obey God’s will and repents for 
salvation. He argues that our contradictory nature can be redeemed through God’s 
word, and thus regards Christian doctrine as fundamental to the development of
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humanity. But Nietzsche in The Gay Science proclaims the death of God and points to 
a crisis of value (125). He attacks Western philosophical and religious ideology which 
is built upon Christian culture and morality, and asserts that we should be courageous 
enough to live moral lives ourselves without relying on external support but on our 
creation and affirmation of our lives. Nietzsche does not agree that we follow 
Christian doctrine and ask for redemption as the only method to develop ourselves; 
Christianity for Nietzsche makes us suffer by accepting the notion of original sin. In 
contrast, Nietzsche stresses the need for self-awareness and self-transformation. 
Regarding Augustine’s doctrine o f reliance on Christian doctrine for salvation, 
Nietzsche views him as weak, feeble-minded and a slave to religious doctrine. As 
Nietzsche comments: “A person who lives in an age of disintegration that mixes all 
the races together, will carry in his body the heritage of his multifarious origins, that is 
to say, contradictory and often more than merely contradictory standards and instincts 
that struggle with one another and seldom come to rest” (BGE 200). Augustine, 
according to Nietzsche, lacks self-assertion and does not know how to live wisely and 
independently but takes Christian doctrine as a compulsory way of life. In this section 
I shall explore how Augustine and Nietzsche analyse human nature according to their 
conceptions of God and man.
In contrast to The Birth o f  Tragedy, which argues for a Dionysian, aesthetic viewpoint
influenced by Schopenhauer, Nietzsche’s Human, All Too Human is often considered
to mark the beginning o f Nietzsche’s middle period,25 where he alters his viewpoint
and starts to explore increasingly controversial perspective on human nature, morality,
25 “The Entry into Postmodemity: Nietzsche as a Turning Point” in The Philosophical Discourse o f  
Modernity (1987, Massachusetts, Cambridge: the MIT Press, pp. 83-105) Habermas divides 
Nietzsche’s thought into two periods. The young Nietzsche, influenced by Wagner and Schopenhauer, 
formulates an aesthetic idea in his admiration o f  the Dionysian ecstasy. The mature Nietzsche is the one 
who recognises his disappointment with Wagner and starts to view knowledge, culture and morality in 
a more sceptical way.
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knowledge. In Daybreak, his next book, Nietzsche begins to more fully develop his 
ideas on the morality o f custom. Beyond Good and Evil reveals how the mature 
Nietzsche views the human condition, and On the Genealogy o f Morals, the work 
after Beyond Good and Evil, displays his critique of morality and interpretation of the 
history of ethics. Above all, it illustrates possible ways of reflecting on the self, 
creating values, and simultaneously affirming life. In what follows, I shall explore 
Nietzsche’s account of human nature under these three different aspects, and show 
how he affirms life through his understanding of human nature.
2.1 A View of Evolution: Darwin Versus Nietzsche
In human history, the continuous development of reason and self-consciousness is 
what makes human beings cultivated and different from animals. Human evolution is 
a crucial concept that stresses the development of humanity. In what follows, I 
analyse how Darwin, Spencer and the Social Darwinists view human nature according 
to their evolutionary conceptions, and how Nietzsche criticises them with his notion 
o f evolution. In The Origin o f  Species Darwin expounds his theory of natural selection 
and observes that the struggle for existence is an unavoidable condition for organisms 
due to limited resources. He argues that “each organic being is striving to increase at a 
geometrical ratio; that each at some period of its life, during some season of the year, 
during each generation or at intervals, has to struggle for life, and to suffer great 
destruction” (1968: 129). With regard to this condition, he states that natural selection 
is essential to organisms because it preserves those species which are able to survive 
and procreate their kind (130-131).
Darwin explains that natural selection decides how organisms are able to survive and
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exist according to their capacity for adaptation. According to Kenneth Waters, 
Darwin’s theory of natural selection holds that “species changed through a process of 
selection akin to the method of artificial selection that breeders used to modify 
domesticated varieties of plants and animals” (118). Darwin illustrates evolution 
through his observation of the various species, arguing that the species most adaptable 
to the environment are able to survive in the process of natural selection and produce 
their descendants. Natural selection is vital for the evolution of organisms; it is, for 
Darwin, the mechanism o f their evolutionary change. Darwin’s concept of the 
evolution refers to the mechanism underlying the development of organisms, but he 
did not directly refer to humankind when he originally outlined the theory of natural 
selection in The Origin o f  Species. He uses plants and animals to explain the 
modifications and evolution o f organisms, and his initial aim is to find out the facts by 
biological observation and experiment in order to explain the mechanism of evolution 
which he calls ‘natural selection’ (Bratchell 47). But he links the theory of evolution 
to humankind by inferring the resemblance between man and animals in The Descent 
o f  Man. As he writes: “We have now seen that man is variable in body and mind; and 
that the variations are induced, either directly or indirectly, by the same general causes, 
and obey the same general laws, as with the lower animals” (Vol. 1: 135). Darwin 
compares people and animals, attempting to infer similarities between them and thus 
implying that the struggle for existence appears not only in animals but also in 
humankind. Humans, according to Darwin, too are affected by natural selection and 
governed by the struggle for existence: “As all animals tend to multiply beyond their 
means of subsistence, so it must have been with the progenitors of man; and this will 
inevitably have led to a struggle for existence and to natural selection” (Vol. 1: 154).
Darwin uses biological facts to explain the modifications o f human body structure,
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and indicates that organisms are adapted to the environment by natural selection. The 
similarities between humans and animals that Darwin infers highlight the evolution o f  
humankind, saying that it is the most distinctive of organisms. As he argues in The 
Descent o f  Man,
Man in the rudest state in which he now exists in the most dominant 
animal that has ever appeared on the earth. He has spread more widely 
than any other highly organised form; and all others have yielded before 
him. He manifestly owes this immense superiority to his intellectual 
faculties, his social habits, which lead him to aid and defend his fellows, 
and to his corporeal structure... These several inventions, by which man 
in the rudest state has become so pre-eminent, are the direct result of the 
development of his powers o f observation, memory, curiosity, 
imagination, and reason. (Vol. 1: 136-137)
We can see that Darwin wants to elucidate why humans are more adaptable than other 
organisms by the way o f evolution. He lists many traits to show how man evolves. 
For example, we can use mental power properly with talent, express ideas through 
language, cooperate each other in society, and defend ourselves against the treat of the 
struggle of existence. Darwin here not only stresses that we are more adaptable than 
other animals to the environment, but also implies that it is natural selection that 
causes us to evolve more distinctively than animals.
Likewise, Darwin takes civilisation as an example to emphasise why the theory of 
natural selection is crucial in explaining the development of humankind. In The 
Descent o f  Man, he tells us: “Although civilisation thus checks in many ways the 
action of natural selection, it apparently favours, by means of improved food and the 
freedom from occasional hardships, the better development of the body. This may be 
inferred from civilised men having been found, wherever compared, to be physically 
stronger than savages” (Vol. 1: 170-171). On the one hand, Darwin regards the origins 
o f humankind and animals as similar, but on the other hand he says that the difference
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between them is that human beings progress because they are more adaptable to the 
environment. Darwin’s theory of evolution overturns orthodox theological ideas about 
the divine creation of human beings; his aim is to show how a natural mechanism -  i.e. 
natural selection -  is essential to the development of human nature. In response to 
Darwin’s concept of natural selection, I would say that it is inappropriate to view the 
development of human nature solely according to the theory of natural selection. 
Loren Eiseley comments that Darwin fails “to distinguish consistently between 
biological inheritance and cultural influences upon the behavior and evolution of 
human beings” (202). Benjamin Farrington likewise argues that Darwin’s weakness is 
his extension of this account to every aspect of humankind: “Having made an 
immense advance in understanding the mode of evolution in the instinctive realm of 
animal life, he then without any misgiving applied his findings to the rational life of 
man” (103). Darwin regards humans as organisms and emphasises human evolution in 
accordance with his theory of natural selection. We cannot deny that he is a pioneer in 
biology. As Farrington comments: “His quick insight into nature’s ways enabled him 
to anticipate modem views on the transition from the inorganic to the organic stage 
and on the dramatic change in the whole economy of nature involved in the advent of 
life” (102). Darwin implies that the modifications of human body structure, 
expression and lifestyle are crucial to the evolution of human beings, but fails to 
understand that they are not the key reason that explains the progress of humanity.
The key thing that Darwin neglects is our ability to interpret and thereby fashion 
ourselves. At this point, we can understand that Darwin’s concept of the progress of 
man is based on the concept of adaptation to the environment. This is Darwin’s view 
of the ‘higher’ organism. As George Levine explains: “‘Higher’ simply refers to 
capacity for adaptation, which, for Darwin, usually, but even here not inevitably,
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means more complex organizations with more elaborate division of labor among the 
organs” (112). Darwin obviously regards humankind as an organism and his view of 
the progress of human beings is based on a biological point of view. As Levine goes 
to argue, “the idea o f progress can only mean this biological development in 
adaptation, and has no moral or spiritual significance” (113). In other words, Darwin 
sees humankind as an organic kind of being, and his concern with human evolution is 
solely based on its biological development. For Levine, “Darwin’s insistence on law - 
natural selection is, after all, a ‘law’ - was required not only to displace the erratic 
interpositions of a miracle-making God without leaving the world unintelligible, but 
also to affirm the scientific validity of the study of organisms (and the human, too)” 
(89). Though Darwin wants to provide us with a new interpretation of the origins of 
life from a scientific viewpoint, his view o f human nature and culture is superficial. It 
is too restrictive for Darwin to explain human nature in terms of his biological 
observations and theories. Let us go back to his argument in the introduction of The 
Origin o f Species,
Still less do we know of the mutual relations of the innumerable 
inhabitants of the world during the many past geological epochs in its 
history. Although much remains obscure, and will long remain obscure, I 
can entertain no doubt, after the most deliberate study and dispassionate 
judgement o f which I am capable, that the view which most naturalists 
entertain, and which I formerly entertained -  namely, that each species 
has been independently created -  is erroneous. (69)
Although Darwin here admits that there are many problems and issues about the 
evolution of organisms that he is unable to completely explain by means of his theory 
of natural selection, but his insistence on the theory of natural selection and his 
extension from animals to humanity is not appropriate in interpreting human nature. 
Darwin fails to understand that human nature is controversial and changeable. Though 
Darwin’s world can be regarded as “a world of ‘mixed’ conditions” (Levine 112), it
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seems that his view of human nature does not correspond to the ‘conditional’ 
viewpoint he suggests. He stresses that we are descended from other animals and 
regards the mechanism of development (natural selection) as fundamental to the 
progress o f human nature.
Darwin cannot conceive that his theory of natural selection does not completely 
explain the human condition, and is unaware of the difference between humanity and 
other animals, that is, our ability to create. But his evolutionary viewpoint has had a 
powerful impact upon modem culture. When he develops the theory of natural 
selection and publishes it, he makes a clash with the orthodox Christian teaching of
creation and the origin of humankind (Bratchell 16). As Bratchell continues,
There was considerable interest in the theory of evolution before 1859, 
but Darwin’s book acted as a catalyst and precipitated universal comment 
on an unprecedented scale, because although it was written for the 
layman it aroused serious scientific opinion and provoked theological and 
philosophical reaction. For many Darwinism became synonymous with 
evolution, and the ‘monkey theory’ became the talk of the day, not the 
explanation of the mechanism of natural selection which was Darwin’s 
real contribution to the debate on evolution. (73)
Darwin attempts to discover the facts which could explain the evolution of humankind 
by means of biological observation. But his theory of natural selection and 
interpretation o f human nature surprised his contemporaries, forced them to ponder 
what man is, and sparked intensive public debate on the nature of humanity. In turn, 
his theory was adapted by the contemporary the British philosopher Herbert Spencer 
and the Social Darwinists. Although Spencer’s theories were largely formed before 
Darwin published The Origin o f  Species, as Sian Martin Davies points out, Spencer 
later used Darwin’s work for the purpose of validating the authority of his own (193). 
In other words, Spencer postulated “the existence of a universal principle of
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‘evolution’ or ‘development’ in nature (a progressive tendency towards increased 
complexity), although Darwin did not want his scientific theory to be confused with 
Spencer’s philosophical speculation (Gayon 242).
Spencer makes a synthesis o f biology, physics, sociology, and philosophy with his 
concept of evolution. In terms of evolution, Spencer in “The Principles of Biology” 
uses the phrase “Survival o f the Fittest” to replace Darwin’s “Natural Selection”. As 
Oldroyd explicates, “Spencer coined his famous phrase ‘Survival of the Fittest’ -  the 
phrase that Darwin chose to adopt and add to the heading of Chapter 4 of the fifth 
edition of The Origin, and which led subsequently to the charge that the theory of 
evolution by natural selection was non-scientific, being tautological or unfalsifiable” 
(207). Darwin is considered a naturalist who concentrates chiefly on biological facts 
and experiments, but Spencer, as Bratchell remarks, links the principle of evolution to 
sociology in order to envisage a progressive development in human affairs (104).
Furthermore, Spencer’s followers, the Social Darwinists, also used natural law to 
polarise relations between rich and poor, arguing that, “whatever existed was natural -  
the rich were rich and the poor were poor because of natural law” (Berry 134). The 
term ‘Social Darwinism’, as explained by Oldroyd, takes Darwin’s evolutionary 
theory as a means to “give descriptions of society or prescriptions for its best 
constitution”; therefore, Social Darwinism is generally considered “a loose amalgam 
of doctrines such as conservatism, militarism, racism, rejection of social welfare 
programs, eugenics, laissez-faize economics and unfettered capitalism” (212). The 
movement of Social Darwinism “was made up of people who tried -  in many 
different or even contradictory ways -  to apply the theories of Darwinian 
evolutionism to descriptions of the way society is constituted, or, more riskily, to say
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how they thought it ought to be structured” (Oldroyd 204). Likewise, Berry in God
and Evolution explains the intention of the Social Darwinists,
Social Darwinists fallaciously derived behavioural prescriptions from 
very questionable premises, from distorted slogans summarising the early 
theory of evolution. That life was a competition in which the fittest 
survived by dint o f superior strength, cunning and aggression was 
somehow supposed to justify the laws of the socio-economic jungle.
(160)
Under the influence of Spencer, the Social Darwinists transform Darwin’s theory of 
natural selection, emphasising the idea of ‘Survival of the Fittest’ which may have as 
its consequence a widening o f the gap between the rich and the poor. Though Spencer 
and the Social Darwinists seem to advocate the progress of humanity and society, they 
do not help people elevate themselves to a higher level but restrict them by imposing 
concepts that stimulate competition and inhibit developmental capabilities.
Darwin offers a striking vision that stimulates us to rethink the relationship between 
man and nature, whereas Nietzsche rejects this vision, arguing that the evolutionary 
development of an organism is not the appropriate way to evaluate the progress of 
humankind. Nietzsche agrees that evolution is fundamental when we encounter the 
struggle for life, but he thinks evolution is not the mechanism that underlies human 
development, which is more essentially characterised by a self-interpretative 
development of personhood through cultural practices. For Nietzsche, Darwin’s 
emphasis on the evolution of organisms is unable to account for the development of 
human nature; on the contrary, Nietzsche explains that the Darwinist solely stresses 
the importance o f mechanism. Darwin’s concept of evolution cannot help to elevate 
human nature but makes the human condition worse. Nietzsche rejects Darwin’s 
concept of evolution: “ ‘Useful’ is the sense of Darwinist biology means: proved 
advantageous in the struggle with others. But it seems to me that the feeling of
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increase, the feeling of becoming stronger, is itself, quite apart from any usefulness in 
the struggle, the real progress: only from this feeling does there arise the will to 
struggle” (WP 649). Nietzsche does not agree with Darwin who claims that the 
improved adaptation of an organism refers to the progress of human beings. Darwin 
emphasises too much on the need for struggle and survival. But this emphasis on the 
contrary brings us to a lower level of self-awareness. As Nietzsche also explains: 
“These half-animals who were happily adapted to a life of wilderness, war, nomadism, 
and adventure were affected in a similar way to the creatures of the sea when they 
were forced either to adapt to life on land or perish -  in a single stroke, all their 
instincts were devalued and ‘suspended’” (GM II: 16). Nietzsche here criticises 
Darwinism for regarding humanity as the most adaptable organisms and saying that 
the development of human being is based on our ability to biologically modify 
ourselves for adaptation to the environment. Nietzsche argues that this conception 
stressing human progress through biological adaptation will diminish our potential 
ability to create our values. Nietzsche’s disagreement is also shown in his criticism of 
Spencer and the Social Darwinists. He regards Spencer as a mediocre man with a 
shopkeeper’s philosophy (WP 382) and a decadent (TI 9:37). With regard to Spencer’s 
concept of ‘Survival of the Fittest’, Nietzsche argues that it is not the right way to 
develop culture and humanity.
Taking the industrial progress o f England as an example, Nietzsche points out that it 
is incorrect to believe that the progress of society through Darwinian style adaptation 
and competition can raise human nature to a higher level, as Nietzsche argues: “The 
conditions under which a strong and noble species maintains itself (regarding spiritual 
discipline) are the reverse of those which govern the ‘industrial masses,’ the 
shopkeepers a la Spencer” (WP 901). Human evolution, for Nietzsche, is not a
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development involving merely adaptation to the environment but a dynamic and 
ceaseless development through self-understanding. Nietzsche demonstrates his 
opposition to the progress o f humanity argued by Darwin, Spencer and the Social 
Darwinists:
First proposition: man as a species is not progressing. Higher types are 
indeed attained, but they do not last. The level of the species is not raised. 
Second proposition: man as a species does not represent any progress 
compared with any other animal...Third proposition: the domestication 
(the ‘culture’ ) o f man does not go deep -  Where it does go deep it at 
once becomes degeneration (type: the Christian). (WP 684)
According to Nietzsche, the evolution of human beings differs from the evolution of 
animals. Our modified ability to adapt to the environment does not mean we are 
progressing to a higher level. Nietzsche claims that people need to elevate themselves 
to a higher type by way of self-interpretation. In other words, Nietzsche argues that 
human evolution occurs not merely through biological development but by 
self-critical understanding. The understanding of the self is the key to human 
evolution; it is not biological modification but self-understanding that most essentially 
characterises our development. According to Lewis Call, what Nietzsche rejects is not 
“biological science in its entirety, but rather [...] Darwinistic trends within 
nineteenth-century biology” (3). Nietzsche provides an alternative approach to the 
topic of human evolution, and stresses that Christian culture is the main reason which 
prevents us from attaining a higher level of cultural existence. After all, Nietzsche is 
primarily concerned with cultural evolution.
Darwin’s theory o f evolution shows us a scientific way to understand human nature, 
but the fact is that human nature is too complicated to be completely subsumed by his 
theory. Nietzsche, in contrast, formulates his own controversial interpretation of 
human nature. As Schacht points out, there are two crucial themes in Nietzsche’s
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work. One is the analysis of what we are. The other is an attempt to address the 
question of what we may become (1989: 885). Both Darwin and Nietzsche argue that 
we are animals, but they interpret the similarities between man and animals differently. 
Nietzsche believes that we all have natural instincts and desires like animals for 
survival and competition. Thus, for example, in Daybreak he claims that the 
beginning of justice, “as of prudence, moderation, bravery -  in short, of all we 
designate as the Socratic virtues, are animal: a consequence of that drive which 
teaches us to seek food and elude enemies” (D 26). Like Darwin, who considers us 
biologically evolving organisms, Nietzsche argues that we are animals. But he also 
argues that we are not solely animals which fight and procreate for survival. Nietzsche 
draws our attention more to human nature. Although Nietzsche regards man and 
animals as being similar, he argues the reason why we are distinctive from animals is 
because we are able to adjust ourselves through inner reflection and 
self-interpretation.
Likewise, Nietzsche argues that we are also inevitably influenced by our innate
human animality and limits of consciousness. As he says,
All judgments about the values of life have developed illogically and 
therefore unfairly...M an cannot experience a drive to or away from 
something without the feeling that he is desiring what is beneficial and 
avoiding what is harmful, without evaluating knowingly the merit of the 
goal. We are from the start illogical and therefore unfair beings, and this 
we can know : it is one of the greatest and most insoluble disharmonies of 
existence. (HAH 32)
Here Nietzsche explains what human nature is. Simply put, we are illogical, 
contradictory in behaviour and our judgement is partial and subjective. Nietzsche 
claims that animality is an essential part of human nature, which indicates that we are 
organisms like animals. But this is not Nietzsche’s conclusion about human nature.
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The fundamental point is that he wants to stress our need to understand who we are. 
Even though we know that we are illogical and contradictory, Nietzsche wants to tell 
us that human nature can potentially be developed through self-understanding. He is 
thereby concerned with the progress o f human nature, but in accordance with his
concept of the will to power. As he argues in Genealogy,
Man has had enough...but, like everything else, even this disgust, this 
fatigue, this frustration with himself emerges so powerfully in him that it 
is immediately transformed into another chain. The No which he says to 
life brings, as it by magic, an abundance of tender Yeses to light; even 
when this master o f destruction, of self-destruction wounds himself -  it is 
the would itself which afterwards compels him to live. (GM III: 13)
We feel frustrated and challenged by our illogical and contradictory nature, but on the 
other hand, Nietzsche says that humanity also has an inner self-reflexive and 
self-interpreted ability to continuously transform and develop itself, and this is the 
will to power. Nietzsche’s notion o f power exists as potentiality, as Ansell-Pearson 
comments, and the ‘power’ in the term ‘will to power’ should not be denoted a fixed 
and unchangeable entity but an accomplishment of the will overcoming or 
overpowering itself. (1994: 46).
While Spencer and the Social Darwinists tell us that we need to struggle and compete 
for existence, Nietzsche holds that we are, essentially, continuously in conflict with 
our own contradictory nature. But Nietzsche considers this ceaseless contradiction 
within humanity as a stimulus to understand humanity and life. He takes ancient
philosophers as an example,
The old ancient philosophers were able to give their existence and 
appearance a meaning, a support, an underlying reason which inculcated 
fear  in others. Examined more closely, this derived from an even more 
fundamental need, that of inspiring self-respect and an inner fear of 
themselves. For within themselves they found all the value-judgements
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turned against themselves, they had to suppress all sorts of suspicion and 
resistance towards ‘the philosopher within’. (GM III: 10)
According to Nietzsche, ancient philosophers did not ignore the conflict with their 
contradictory nature and neither did they evade from their struggles; on the contrary, 
they cultivated themselves through self-interpretation in order to overcome the 
limitations and continue to live. This is how Nietzsche understands human evolution. 
What people have suffered and experienced in their lives will then be transformed into 
a powerful strength, i.e. the will to power, that assists them to overcome struggle and
96attain self-development and individuality.
Regarding human evolution, Nietzsche does not imply that Darwin’s theory of 
evolution is false. What he rejects is that aspect of Darwin’s concept of evolution 
which is mainly concerned with the adaptation of organisms, and the need for 
competition, ignoring the fact that human nature should be enhanced not through the 
adaptation to environment but through will to power within humanity. As he explains: 
“Basic errors of biologists hitherto: it is not a question of the species but of more 
powerful individuals. Life is not the adaptation of inner circumstances to outer ones, 
but will to power, which, working from within, incorporates and subdues more and 
more of that which is ‘outside’” (WP 681). Nietzsche’s notion of the will to power 
refers to the ability within humanity that overcomes the struggle for life, develops us 
by way of self-reflection, and drives us to move ahead with perfect self-assurance. For 
Nietzsche, we need to understand the meaning of being humans, and this is the most 
essential to humanity, which can be achieved by way of self-interpretation. “The
26 Nietzsche’s view  o f  life is connected with the will to power, as he argues: “Life -  to us, that means 
constantly transforming all that we are into light and flame, and also all that wounds us; we simply can 
do no other... Only great pain is the liberator o f  the spirit... Only great pain, that long, slow pain that 
takes its time and in which we are burned, as it were, over green wood, forces us philosophers to 
descend into our ultimate depths and put aside all trust, everything good-natured, veiling, mild, 
average -  things in which formerly we may have found our humanity” (GS Preface: 3).
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thoroughly self-referential world o f the individual was a prominent theme throughout 
Nietzsche’s writings” (Thiele 1990: 35). We exist because we come to experience life 
and thereby raise ourselves to a higher level of self-understanding. The notion of 
human nature and self-development, according to Nietzsche, is what will to power is 
all about. We evolve and progress is not because we are the most adaptable organisms 
to the environment but because we are able to cultivate ourselves and fashion our 
fluid and contradictory nature through will to power, the inner ability that leads us to 
interpret and reflect upon ourselves, and then continue to be alive as an independent 
individual. As he claims, “the famous theory of the survival of the fittest does not 
seem to me to be the only viewpoint from which to explain the progress of 
strengthening of a man or o f a race” (HAH 224). As opposed to Darwin’s concept of 
evolution, which is biological, Nietzsche conceives of a cultural evolution that 
develops in us, making us different from animals through the cultivation of 
self-interpretation.
Nietzsche addresses two crucial points about human evolution. First, he suggests we 
conceive of the possibility that we are continuously evolving. As he argues: “However 
far man may extend himself with his knowledge, however objective he may appear to 
himself -  ultimately he reaps nothing but his own biography” (HAH 513). According 
to Nietzsche, our knowledge is undoubtedly limited no matter how hard we attempt to 
view everything in an objective way. Regarding this point, Nietzsche argues that 
humanity can continuously overcome and evolve itself by way of self-interpretation. 
Second, he proposes that we can liberate ourselves from the restraint of tradition and 
philosophy if we are aware that we create our values. Nietzsche inspires us to 
understand that human evolution should not be solely and narrowly interpreted 
according to Darwin’s biological conception. As he argues, “The struggle for survival
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is only an exception, a temporary restriction of the will to life; the great and small 
struggle revolves everywhere around preponderance, around growth and expansion, 
around power and in accordance with the will to power, which is simply the will to 
life” (GS 349). Nietzsche argues that the struggle for existence which Darwin 
emphasises should not be considered as the primary concern in evaluating 
self-development. Though Nietzsche agrees with Darwin who claims that we 
encounter the struggle for existence as other organisms, he also argues that we need to 
understand how to cultivate ourselves through self-understanding, and then we are 
able to encounter our struggle and overcome it by way of self-interpretation. The crux 
is that we need to know the self, understanding that we need no longer allow 
ourselves to be limited and directed by tradition and custom but are also able to focus 
on and cultivate our individuality. As Nietzsche claims, “it is not part of the nature of 
the free spirit that his views are more correct, but rather that he has released himself 
from tradition, be it successfully or unsuccessfully. Usually, however, he has truth, or 
at least the spirit o f the search for truth, on his side: he demands reasons, while others 
demand faith” (HAH 225). Nietzsche’s concept of individuality can best be grasped in 
this way. What Nietzsche does is to provoke our sense of self-awareness and 
individuality, which propels human evolution not in physical and biological but in 
cultural ways. Thus Nietzsche emphasises the importance of self-awareness for the 
development of human nature.
Keith Ansell-Pearson, in “Nietzsche contra Darwin”, explores what Nietzsche really 
wants to say in his criticism of Darwinism. In Ansell-Pearson’s view, although 
Nietzsche criticises Darwin and proposes an alternative law of life with his concept of 
self-overcoming, he actually endorses “the subtler Darwin he never cultivated an 
appreciation o f ’ (1998: 8). Nietzsche nevertheless provides wide-ranging,
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unconventional and open-minded interpretations of human nature and human 
evolution. Ansell-Pearson argues that Nietzsche does not respond to Darwinism as “a 
biological theory” but as “a social theory, as social Darwinism” (1998: 10), offering
an innovative and striking idea of evolution and selection:
It is not so much, therefore, a question of refuting Darwin’s conception of 
utility, where ‘useful’ is synonymous with proven advantageousness in 
the struggle with others, but o f constructing an order of rank, in which the 
‘real development’ is located in the feeling of increase in power, ‘the 
feeling of becoming stronger’, apart from any usefulness in the struggle 
of life as the ‘survival of the fittest’. (1998: 11)
According to Ansell-Pearson’s commentary, Nietzsche aims at correcting the 
Darwinian conception o f evolution, which mainly focuses on the need for struggle 
and survival and arguing that will to power drives humanity to cultivate and evolve 
itself and becomes what it is. Nietzsche does not refute the biological facts argued by 
Darwin. He criticises Darwin’s, Spencer’s and the Social Darwinists’ theories of 
evolution which have a negative impact on culture and society. With regard to human 
evolution, Nietzsche differs from Darwin, stressing a cultural evolution for the 
progress of humanity in connection with his concepts of self-overcoming and 
individuality.
Nietzsche gives his personal interpretation of human evolution, as argued by Gregory
Moore in Nietzsche, Biology and Metaphor:
Nietzsche envisages life itself -  the will to power -  as a struggle of 
unequal parts. The concept of struggle is not, as it was for Darwin, 
merely confined to the antagonistic relationship between organisms or 
between organisms and their environment. According to Nietzsche, there 
is not only a struggle for existence; existence is itself an incessant 
struggle. (46)
Nietzsche at this point proposes to view evolution not by emphasising the relationship 
between people and environment but by analysing how humankind is able to evolve
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through self-interpretation. Whereas Darwin describes and explains the struggle for 
existence, Nietzsche regards life as a battle, and self-understanding as the specifically 
human trait that characterises our battle. On the one hand Nietzsche explicitly exposes 
the traits of our nature: its pride, pity, power and arrogance. “The pride of mankind, 
[...] resists the theory of descent from the animals and establishes the great gulf 
between man and nature” (D 31), and pity “becomes the antidote to self-destruction, 
as a sensation which includes pleasure and proffers the taste of superiority in small 
doses” (D 136). On the other hand, he contends that people are capable of freeing 
themselves from the cage of custom, morality and history when they become aware of 
the hidden motives of action, and can challenge themselves to accept their animal 
being. This is the point that Nietzsche seems to convey metaphorically in the analogy
between a butterfly flying high and the free spirit,
The butterfly wants to break through his cocoon; he tears at it, he rends it: 
then he is blinded and confused by the unknown light, the realm of 
freedom. Men who are capable o f that sorrow will make the first attempt 
to see if mankind can transform itself from a moral into a wise 
mankind... Everything in the sphere of morality has evolved; changeable, 
fluctuating, everything is fluid, it is true: but everything is also streaming 
onward -  to one goal. (HAH 107)
In this passage, Nietzsche makes two points. First he reminds us that we are able to 
overcome our animality, but this can only be achieved when we are liberated from the 
limitations imposed by Christina morality. The second point is that we live as an 
independent individual, who is willing to face his contradictory nature and experience 
every good and bad thing happened in his life.
In contrast to Darwin’s concept of biological evolution, Nietzsche is concerned with 
the achievement of culture. Moore concludes that Nietzsche “reintroduces a 
teleological aspect to evolution by claiming that there is in nature a vital force that
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seeks the increase o f power” although he does not want to equate his idea of evolution 
with the progress of organisms or a linear ascent of organic forms (55). In this way 
Nietzsche offers us a new perspective on human evolution. The path that leads to
human progress is not smooth, as Nietzsche claims,
Every smallest step in the field of free thought, of a life shaped personally, 
has always had to be fought for with spiritual and bodily tortures: not 
only the step forward, no! the step itself, movement, change of any kind 
has needed its innumerable martyrs through all the long path-seeking and 
foundation-laying millennia. (D 18)
Nietzsche in this respect reveals the need to fight ceaselessly for the enhancement of 
individuality by enduring spiritual and physical struggle. He not only criticises 
Darwin and Spencer for offering inaccurate views of evolution and the progress of 
humanity, but also argues that human nature should be developed through cultural 
evolution. Darwin raises the question of the difference between human nature and 
exclusively animal nature. My comparison between Darwin and Nietzsche discusses 
human nature and explores how according to their respective conceptions of human 
development the progress of humankind is attained. This is the first step toward 
understanding Nietzsche’s viewpoint of human nature. Regarding the complexity of 
human nature, the next step is to explore how Nietzsche interprets human nature by 
focusing on his analysis o f instinct and the unconscious, in comparison with Freud’s 
concepts which reveals the conflict between reason and instinct in human nature.
2.2 A View of Instinct : Freud Versus Nietzsche
Freud defines the essential nature of instinct in Instincts and Their Vicissitudes?1 He 
claims that instinct arises not from the external world but within the organism where it
27 All materials which reveal Freud’s thought are according to the selected work furnished by Peter 
Gay (1995) in The Freud Reader. Ed. Peter Gay. London: Vintage.
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never operates as a force giving a momentary impact. Freud approaches the concept 
of instinct from a biological viewpoint: instinct appears constantly in organisms. 
There are two kinds o f primal instinct that Freud stresses: the self-preservative instinct, 
and the sexual instinct (568). Freud views human instinct (especially the sexual
instinct) as the central motive o f human behaviour. As Freud argues,
If now we apply ourselves to considering mental life from a biological 
point of view, an ‘instinct’ appears to us as a concept on the frontier 
between the mental and the somatic, as the psychical representative of the 
stimuli originating from within the organism and reaching the mind, as a 
measure of the demand made upon the mind for work in consequence of 
its connection with the body. (566)
Freud regards instinct as an innate force which originates within the organism and 
stimulates people to action. He associates instinctual stimuli with the term ‘need’ and 
argues that a need can only be satisfied with “an appropriate (‘adequate’) alteration of 
the internal source of stimulation” (564-568). We can say his concept of instinct refers 
to inner impulse or drive of humanity. Taking sexual instinct as the main subject in his 
conception of psychoanalysis, Freud assumes that a person’s fundamental character 
can be derived from analysing manifestations of sexual instinct in childhood and that 
sexual satisfaction is important to the development of human nature. In turn, the 
problems that arise in the course of seeking sexual satisfaction lead to psychoneurosis. 
Instinct is crucial to humankind, according to Freud, and the aim of instinct is to 
achieve an instant satisfaction through the body. In contrast to external stimuli which 
is from muscular movement, Freud claims that instinctual stimuli, which “maintain an 
incessant and unavoidable afflux of stimulation”, will force the nervous system “to 
renounce its ideal intention of keeping off stimuli” until they have been satisfied (566). 
As he concludes that instinctual stimuli are “the true motive forces behind the 
advances that have led the nervous system, with its unlimited capacities, to its present 
high level o f development” (566), the neurotic problems arise if instinct cannot be
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fully satisfied.
Freud likewise uses the concept of the unconscious, which is related to the notion of 
repression, to explain the complexity of human nature.28 As he argues in The 
Unconscious’. “Consciousness makes each o f us aware only of his own states of mind; 
that other people, too, possess a consciousness is an inference which we draw by 
analogy from their observable utterances and actions, in order to make this behaviour 
of theirs intelligible to us” (575). But the unconscious is different. As he explicates, 
“We have learnt from psycho-analysis that the essence of the process of repression 
lies, not in putting an end to, in annihilating, the idea which represents an instinct, but 
in preventing it from becoming conscious. When this happens we say of the idea that 
it is in a state of being ‘unconscious’” (573). In contrast to consciousness which 
makes us aware of our behaviour so that we are then able to identify ourselves, Freud 
regards the unconscious is our inner drive which we are unaware its existence. The 
unconscious helps us to modify our inference of the self and know our ‘primitive 
animism” (577) when it is disclosed by psychological investigation.
Freud pictures man as aggressive and instinctive, stressing that instinct which 
motivates us, especially from the unconscious, should not be neglected. Freud wants 
to argue two points in accordance with his concept of instinct. The first one is his 
criticism of civilisation. As he argues in The Future o f  An Illusion,
28 In Repression, Freud explains: “One o f  the vicissitudes an instinctual impulse may undergo is to 
meet with resistances which seek to make it inoperative. Under certain conditions...the impulse then 
passes into the state o f ‘repression’” (569). According to his psychoanalytic observation, repression for 
Freud is not “a defensive mechanism which is present from the very beginning”; on the contrary, he 
argues that the essence o f  repression “lies simply in turning something away, and keeping it at a 
distance, from the conscious” (569-570). Assoun likewise argues that repression for Freud is to 
“designate the unconscious process in its dynamic reality” because what is produced by repression is 
fundamentally unconscious. Freud thus affirms that ‘ the theory o f  repression is the cornerstone on 
which rests the whole edifice o f  psychoanalysis” (115).
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[E]very individual is virtually an enemy of civilization, though civilization 
is supposed to be an object of universal human interest. It is remarkable 
that, little as men are able to exist in isolation, they should nevertheless 
feel as a heavy burden the sacrifices which civilization expects of them in 
order to make a communal life possible. Thus civilization has to be 
defended against the individual, and its regulations, institutions and 
commands are directed to that task. (687)
Freud thinks that instincts are natural and constant needs within organism that have to 
be fulfilled, and argues that everyone wants to fulfil the desire for contentment. 
Humans, on the one hand, want to fulfil their instinctive satisfactions but they, on the 
other hand, have to conform to the regulations of civilisation and society. In this 
respect, Freud objects that civilisation restricts humans from fulfilling their essential 
needs as an individual. Freud in Civilization and Its Discontents also contends that 
civilisation “has to use its utmost efforts in order to set limits to man’s aggressive 
instincts and to hold the manifestations of them in check by psychical 
reaction-formations” (750). Freud does not deny civilisation; on the contrary, he 
suggests we view civilisation in a different way. We should not let us be restricted by 
civilisation but regard it as a proper means to understand and develop ourselves. As he 
also argues, “the liberty o f the individual is no gift of civilization...The development 
o f civilization imposes restrictions on it, and justice demands that no one shall escape 
those restrictions” (ibid.: 741), Freud stresses the need for understanding instincts and 
attacks the bad influence of civilisation on us. The second point is his assertion of the 
theory of psychoanalysis. He advocates the importance of psychoanalysis, asserting 
that the assumption of the unconscious in psychoanalysis helps us explain hidden 
impulses that we are not aware of in conscious life but are apt to unconsciously 
repress. In Three Essays on the Theory o f  Sexuality, he explains how he uses 
psychoanalysis for treating hysteria : “Psycho-analysis, however, can invariably
29 Freud explicates that a neurotic problem is revealed in the character o f hysterics: “a degree o f  sexual
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bring the first o f these factors to light and clear up the enigmatic contradiction which 
hysteria presents, by revealing the pair of opposites by which it is characterized -  
exaggerated sexual craving and excessive aversion to sexuality” (255). For Freud, he 
views psychoanalysis is a way that provides us to respond to our instinct more 
rationally and be more human (Bettelheim 33).
Freud directs us to disclose the facets of instinct in humanity according to his 
biological conception o f instinct: human instincts arise naturally in the body and 
constantly need to be fulfilled. He stresses that humans need to recognise and accept 
themselves as instinctive beings, and satisfy their inner drive. I would like to add my 
point of view in response to Freud’s attitude towards instinct and psychoanalysis. 
Assoun argues that Freud regards instinct as a demand which is necessary in a 
physical system; instinct for Freud “connotes less a value than it denotes a function”, 
and his notion of drive shows “a material, incomplete nature submitted to a positive, 
descriptive investigation” (69). Likewise, the concept of the unconscious is applied by 
Freud to designate “a representational sphere accessible to a psychological, clinical 
investigation” (Assoun 116). Freud intends to use a biological viewpoint to explain 
instinct. Freudian concept of human nature in this way represents an extension of the 
biologism that Darwinian thought generates. But this conception restricts our 
understanding of human nature. In the first section, we have discussed that Darwin 
ignores human ability to create when he stresses the importance of evolution. Freud 
seemingly focuses too much on approaching to discover and satisfy instinct, in 
accordance with his psychoanalytic concept, but neglects our self-reflexive nature that
repression in excess o f  normal quantity, an intensification o f  resistance against the sexual instinct 
(which we have already met with in the form o f  shame, disgust and morality), and what seems like an 
instinctive aversion on their part to any intellectual consideration o f sexual problem” (Three Essays 
255).
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is able to bring us to understand the self. As Ilham Dilman comments in Freud and 
Human Nature, “Even if, with Freud, we could still say that there is a beast in man, it 
does not mean man ‘must remain uninterested in the claims of morality’” (145); he 
disputes Freud’s deterministic viewpoint of human nature and instincts and shows that 
we cannot confine the motives o f human behaviour merely to self-satisfaction as 
Freud was sometimes prone to argue. Based on this limited conception, Freud 
believes that his theory o f psychoanalysis enables him to “say with some certainty 
what the appearance of a symbol in the dream of any patient meant” (Bettelheim 47). 
But his assurance that psychoanalysis is essential to understand ourselves does not 
mean that this psychoanalytic treatment is necessary and effective to everyone. No 
matter how precisely instinct and the unconscious can be disclosed through 
psychoanalytic treatment, human nature, which is constantly evolving and 
transforming, cannot be completely revealed and understood according to 
psychological investigation. We have to bear in mind that the key to 
self-understanding is not through psychoanalytic treatment but through our ‘own’ 
self-interpretation of human nature, as what Nietzsche argues in his thought.
There are three kinds o f instinct that Nietzsche distinguishes and describes. The first 
kind of instinct arises from the body is used as a means for socialisation. This concept 
of instinct is similar to Freud’s concept, which indicates our inner animal-like 
impulses. The second kind of instinct arises from our collective nature, which is 
related to the conception of consciousness argued by tradition and Christian morality. 
Nietzsche names it herd instinct and considers it an “instrument of culture” that is in 
control of humanity (GM I: 11). Herd instinct dominates and confines us in our daily 
life. As Nietzsche argues, “people ‘know’ what is good and evil. It must sound harsh 
and trouble the ears, then, if  we insist over and over that it is the instinct of man the
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herd animal that thinks it knows, that glorifies itself and calls itself good whenever it 
allots praises or blame” (BGE 202). Nietzsche declares that people rarely know what 
good and evil is because they are apt to judge things according to the dominant 
Christian culture and morality. Christian morality, in Nietzsche’s view, is herd 
morality. Herd instinct, as Nietzsche continues, “has had a breakthrough, has come to 
predominance, has prevailed over the other instincts and continues to do so as a 
symptom of the increasing process of physiological approximations and 
resemblances” (BGE 202).
Nietzsche here explains that the reason why herd instinct becomes predominant is 
because people are used to believing consciousness is the self and habitually 
following it as a way of life. Nietzsche criticises traditional philosophy for misleading 
people to regard consciousness as the self, as I have discussed in the introductory 
chapter. Similarly, he argues that Christian culture and morality mislead us into 
accepting a pessimistic attitude toward life, “the tired, pessimistic view, the mistrust 
of the enigma of life, the icy NO o f disgust at life” (GM II: 7), and spreads a negative 
assumption, the concepts of original sin and redemption, that makes us feel ashamed 
of our animal-like impulses in order to control us. Nietzsche rejects of Christian 
concept of consciousness, and claims that instinct which is connected with 
consciousness leads people to misinterpret humanity. In this respect, Nietzsche 
criticises herd instinct, and shows us another way to understand the potential of 
consciousness. Our habitual consciousness, in Nietzsche’s view, brings with it the 
tendency to adhere to the commands o f tradition and religion. People habitually 
follow tradition and do not conceive of this as a mistake. This is how herd instinct 
dominates us. As Nietzsche argues that consciousness is superficial (WP 476) and is 
used for communal life, we should not assert that consciousness is the only correct
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method that we use for making judgements. Though here we can see how Nietzsche 
criticises Christian culture which limits people in herd instinct, his intention in 
criticising Christian culture is different from Freud’s.
Freud advocates the need for satisfying the instinctive drives, that is, revealing the 
innate and unconscious impulses and desires of the organism. As Assoun concludes 
instinct for Freud is an essential physical demand which has to be satisfied (69). In 
contrast, Nietzsche argues that we should understand how we are dominated by herd 
instinct, and then we master intellectually our inner nature. Self-understanding is 
important, though it is not easy to perceive. Nietzsche’s aim is to suggest we conceive 
of the third kind o f instinct: our self-evaluating and self-interpretative nature, and act 
according to it. Nietzsche’s concept of instinct in this way, according to Assoun, is 
more creative in perceiving the vigour of life (68). Nietzsche emphasises its 
importance because this kind o f instinct drives us to overcome our contradictory 
nature and attain self-development. But people are rarely aware of the existence of 
this instinct, which is repressed in the unconscious, while they are accustomed to 
recognising only the conscious dimension of their mental lives and remaining under 
the domination of herd instinct and Christian morality. As Assoun states, Nietzsche 
considers the unconscious “a mask and means to health” for humankind and 
consciousness is “an non-necessary and non-universal predicate of life and action” 
(110). This concept of instinct is connected with Nietzsche’s notions of will to power 
and individuality. As Assoun goes on, the unconscious, for Nietzsche, not only 
“indicates an instinctive determination” but also “manifests the fundamental Will” 
(114). Nietzsche claims that people should liberate themselves from the domination o f 
Christian culture which restricts humankind in pessimism, perceive the self and then 
act instinctually. To be aware o f this ‘unconscious’ instinct, for Nietzsche, is
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fundamental way to view life and the development of humanity. As he tells us: 
“Physiologists should think twice before deciding that an organic being’s primary 
instinct is the instinct for self-preservation. A living being wants above all else to 
release its strength; life itself is the will to power, and self-preservation is only one of 
its indirect and most frequent consequences” (BGD 13).
According to Nietzsche, we should not erroneously assume our animal-like instinct as 
the primal concern for the purpose o f preserving life, nor do we mistakenly have to be 
subject to herd instinct and consciousness. On the contrary, we need to understand 
that our freedom can be attained only at the great cost of multifarious modes of 
subjugation, and our self-interpretative nature helps us reach self-transformation and 
individuality, according to Nietzsche. “A man is called a free spirit if he thinks 
otherwise than would be expected, based on his origin, environment, class and 
position, or based on prevailing contemporary views” (HAH 225). For Nietzsche, an 
exceptional individual does not retreat from the situation he has to confront but is 
willing to live instinctively by way o f  continuous transformation of the self. When the 
man could understand and reflect upon the self, he could let himself not be distracted 
by anything outside himself, such as the domination of traditional standards of 
Christian morality and culture. His focus is himself and he is continually struggling 
but overcoming himself so as to be the individual endowed with a free spirit. As 
Gerhardt says: “This ‘free spirit’ has his ground in himself. He determines himself not 
according to consequences -  which are incalculable anyway -  but from his beginning. 
His origin lies in what he is potentially, that is, in what really lies within his powers” 
(290). The wise individual, for Nietzsche, is capable of experiencing life with inner 
strength and a free spirit. As Nietzsche also remarks: “However far a man may go in 
self-knowledge, nothing however can be more incomplete than his image of the
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totality of drives which constitute his being” (D 119). Nietzsche tells us that 
humankind raises itself to a higher level of through self-interpretative development.
Likewise, Kaufmann distinguishes Nietzsche’s will to power from Freud’s concept of 
the pleasure principle. Freud’s pleasure principle means “a conscious state that is free 
of pain, displeasure and discomfort”, but Nietzsche does not agree that everyone 
desires this pleasure (Vol. 2: 84). Kaufmann points out that Nietzsche provides us 
with a twofold concept: “He denied the hedonist doctrine that all men really desire 
pleasure and the absence o f pain, and he replaced this doctrine with his own 
hypothesis that what people really desire is power” (Vol. 2: 85). But this power, or 
will to power, in Nietzsche’s view, means how humanity is able to interpret instinct, 
struggling with inner contradictory nature and self-misunderstanding so as to 
overcome and develop itself with free spirit. In other words, Nietzsche regards this 
kind of instinct as a “creative-affirmative’ virtue” which is valued by the demands of 
regeneration (Assoun 69). Nietzsche brings us to understand human nature by 
distinguishing the concept of the unconscious from the concept of consciousness, and 
claiming that the free spirit can be found not in consciousness but the unconscious. 
Thus: “When an individual’s highest and strongest instincts break forth with a passion, 
driving him far above and beyond the average, beyond the lowlands of the herd 
conscience, the community’s self-regard is destroyed as a result” (BGE 201). 
Nietzsche explores the possibility o f a new way of thinking about and evaluating 
humanity, according to his conception of instinct. This self-interpreted and 
self-cultivated justice is not to depend on Christian culture and morality but depends 
on a higher, more intellectual and more impartial attitude toward the self, people and 
life.
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If we want to apply the Nietzschean conception of justice and take it as a perspective 
on life, as Ansell-Pearson argues, it means that “one is able to comprehend life 
beyond the moral valuation o f good and evil and beyond the standpoint of 
humanism”(1993: 278). But Nietzsche knows this new way is immensely hard to
fulfil by most people. After all:
Every exceptional person instinctively seeks our his fortress, his secrecy, 
where he is delivered from the crowd, the multitude, the majority, where 
he is allowed to forget the rule o f ‘humanity’, being the exception to it; in 
one case, however, an even stronger instinct pushes him, as a person of 
great and exceptional knowledge, towards this rule. (BGE 26)
Only those exceptional individuals can conceive o f their self-interpretative nature and 
use it for overcoming and developing themselves. But we can regard Nietzsche’s 
concept o f instinct as an alternative source for perceiving how we are able to liberate 
ourselves from being dominated by tradition and Christian culture, and viewing 
humanity with an affirmative attitude. As Thiele claims: “The thoroughly 
self-referential world o f the individual was a prominent theme throughout Nietzsche’s 
writing” (1990: 35). Freud’s conception o f instinct and the unconscious are his means 
o f analysing human nature and advocating that we should satisfy the need for 
contentment. But Nietzsche’s is to delineate the importance o f self-awareness and 
independence, the core o f being an affirmative and developed individual, and leads us 
to understand human nature on a psychological level which is more profound than 
Freud’s. Though Freud and Nietzsche have different interpretations o f instinct, they 
both examine human nature and encourage us to understand ourselves through those 
conceptions. A t the beginning o f this chapter, we compared Darwin and Nietzsche, 
examining the fundamental distinction between man and other animals by means of 
their concepts o f evolution. Then we compared Freud and Nietzsche, focusing on the 
psychological analysis o f human instinct and the unconscious. The third part is the
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nucleus of my exploration in this section. In it I compare Saint Augustine and 
Nietzsche, examining how differently they identify human nature in their conceptions.
2.3 A View of God and Man : St. Augustine Versus Nietzsche
Augustine’s view of human nature is accordant with his conception of God. A son of a 
pagan father and a Christian mother, the young Augustine was inspired to recognise 
the ideas of good and evil by Manicheism, which “expressed in poetic form a 
revulsion from the material world, and became the rationale for an ultra-ascetic 
morality” (Chadwick 11). Augustine later rejected the notion of evil based on 
Manichean materialism which regards God as “subtle luminous matter” (Chadwick 
23), and turned to Neoplatonic ideas of the soul and God. Augustine in his 
Confessions claims that God is incorruptible, immune from injury and unchangeable 
(Conf, 7, 1, 1). “By introspection in solitude and by practising the way of dialectical 
regress from external to internal, from inferior and physical to superior and mental, he 
[Augustine] briefly attained a vision of eternal truth and unchanging beauty” 
(Chadwick 23). However, this spiritual peace provided by Neoplatonism did not solve 
Augustine’s question concerning the origin of evil, which was related to his 
irresistible sexual desire. As Chadwick continues, “Neoplatonic spirituality and the 
stress on interiority and on liberation from the distractions of the external world, 
sharpened Augustine’s feeling of being pulled in two different directions with his 
sexual drive as a downward pull” (25). Augustine was finally released from his 
torment of sexual desire after he had experienced a conversion, and dedicated himself 
to the Christian God and Christianity. In what follows, I discuss how Augustine views
30 Augustine met many Neoplatonists in Rome and his ideas in this respect were mostly influenced by 
Plotinus.
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human nature according to his interpretation of God, mixing his adaptation of the 
Platonic thought and Christian doctrine.
Following Neoplatonism, Augustine interprets God as absolute and immutable. He 
regards God as “not just someone or something who happens to exist; he is Being 
itself, and the source of all finite beings” (Chadwick 41). Likewise, he believes that 
God is the creator and all things that God creates are essentially good. He agrees with 
Plotinus who rejects any doctrine o f evil as “an independent power which could 
impinge upon the good” and teaches “the initiative of the good in giving form and 
unity to matter and evil as a declining from this order whilst being comprehended by 
it” (Harrison 7). Though Augustine accepts Neoplatonism and argues that origin of 
evil is not from God but from humanity, his view of evil is different from the 
Neoplatonic view. He prefers to argue that the root of evil is in “the soul’s instability” 
rather than is “in the body and in matter”, as claimed by Plotinus. Evil, for Augustine, 
“originated in a misused free choice which neglected eternal goodness, beauty and 
truth” (Chadwick 38). In Augustine’s view, evil does not exist because everything that 
is made by God is good: “Accordingly, whatever things exist are good, and the evil 
into whose origins I was inquiring is not a substance, for if it were a substance, it 
would be good” (Conf, 7, 12, 18). In this respect, we can see that Augustine uses a 
dualistic principle to distinguish God from humanity. He regards God as an 
immutable Being and man as created by this Being in its image. Humans, for 
Augustine, are created and endowed by God with free will, but they misuse their free 
will and in consequence sin. As he argues, “the free choice of the will is the reason 
why we do wrong and suffer your [God’s] just judgement” (Conf, 7, 3, 5). In other 
words, Augustine argues that all the things that God creates are good, including all of 
nature, and stresses that sin and evil derive not from God but from humanity. As he
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says: “From a human nature, which is good in itself, there can spring forth either a 
good or an evil will. There was no other place from whence evil could have arisen in 
the first place except from the nature -  good in itself -  of an angel or a man” (En, 4, 
15).
Augustine implies that humanity is essentially good when God creates it but our 
nature is not immutable like that o f the creator. It is the weakness of the soul that 
causes evil and makes people sin. Sin has two causes, as he explains in Enchiridion, 
“either from not seeing what we ought to do, or else from not doing what we have 
already seen we ought to do. O f these two, the first is ignorance of the evil; the second, 
weakness” (En: 22, 81). God provides us with free will to choose what we want to do, 
according to Augustine, and this free will would cause evil if we are ignorant and 
misuse it. At this point, he asserts that original sin is innate because of Adam’s and 
Eve’s fall: “The cause of evil is the defection of the will of a being who is mutably 
good from the Good which is immutable” (En, 8, 23). Augustine explains that it is 
Adam’s and Eve’s free will that brings them to disobey God and sin. As Herbert 
Deane explains, sin for Augustine is “man’s refusal to accept his status as a creature, 
superior to all other earthly creatures but subordinate to God. So the root cause of sin, 
of falling away from God and from goodness and toward evil, is man’s prideful 
self-centeredness” (16-17). Adam and Eve make themselves be sinners because they 
choose not to obey God’s command but behave according to their will. Adam’s and 
Eve’s disobedience also causes their descendents to be sinners from birth. Augustine 
here says that people are easily tempted to sin due to their weakness and disobedience 
to God. As he also says that sin results from “the punishment of a more freely chosen 
sin, because I was a son of Adam” (Conf, 8, 10, 22), we were bom with sin and suffer 
because we are the descendents of Adam. But Augustine also argues that sin can be
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cleansed when people are willing to obey God’s will and understand the need for 
repentance. The only way to avoid sin is to ask for the divine help.
According to Augustine’s conceptions, he distinguishes God from man: God is an 
immutable Being but man is created in the form and image of God. “In God, Being is 
identical with changeless goodness. In man, ‘to be or not to be’ signifies the measure 
in which he is approaching God’s goodness or falling away from it” (John Burnaby 
37). Augustine also claims that sin is unavoidable; it is not only because we are the 
descendents of Adam and Eve but also because we are not God and we misunderstand 
our free will. By accepting the judgement of the apostle Peter, Augustine contends 
that there is no more free will unless people are “delivered from the bondage of sin” 
and start to “be the servant[s] of righteousness” (En 9,30); true liberty is obeying the 
will of God, which is the right thing that people should. Accordingly, Augustine 
argues that our free will should not be regarded as doing what we want but doing what 
God wishes us to do. Otherwise, we are ignorantly led by our free will to disobey God 
and sin.
For Augustine, God is eternal and powerful but man is a creature bearing original sin. 
Separating man from God, Augustine argues that the only and essential way to raise 
ourselves and bring us back to God is depending on what God says through the 
Scripture. Augustine impresses upon us “the necessity of man’s turning towards God 
whose image is present in his rational soul, in order to be, to know, and to be 
beautiful” in his thought, and also suggests that “a turning away from this to lower, 
material reality would be to diminish his being and his capacity for knowledge and 
beauty” (Harrison 142). In contrast to his notion of God, Augustine claims that man 
should firstly confess his sin by means of God’s word, and then is able to know his
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soul as “an image of God” and to perceive “the beauty o f Creation and God’s 
presence in it” (Harrison 179). This is the way that Augustine views human nature, 
stressing that the development of humanity can solely be attained through Christian 
scripture. According to his conception o f God contrasting with his conception of man, 
Augustine’s faith in God and Christian doctrine is doubtless, and his attempt is to 
advocate God’s will and love. But I argue that he on the other hand adopts a 
pessimistic attitude toward humanity which limits us by through his notions of sin and 
evil. The problem is because Augustine lacks self-assertion, and his self-criticism 
restricts him from viewing humanity in a positive way. He focuses on Christian 
doctrine but neglects that humans are distinctive not only because they are made in 
the image of God but also because they have the ability to reflect on themselves, 
create their lives and be independent. This is our free will when God create us. Yet 
Augustine shows a misconception o f free will by arguing that people should obey 
God in order to find true free will. He refers free will to choose to follow God’s will. 
This kind of free will is limited because it is based on people’s obedience to God.
Though Augustine says that evil does not exist because everything that is created by 
God is good, he does not believe that we have the potential to understand ourselves 
through self-awareness. In contrast, he regards humanity as miserable, arguing that 
the only right thing that people have to do is to obey the will of God. God creates 
humanity, but God does not ask us to obey his commands blindly by following 
Christine doctrine. Augustine’s conception of man is questionable because he sees 
only the weakness o f humanity and takes this as evidence for the necessity of our 
obedience to God. When God creates us, he makes us in his image and gives us the 
ability to choose and create. According to this view, we are able to create our values 
and lives by ourselves. God does not solely create us as his toys for the purpose of
obedience but humanity who is responsible for what he acts. However, Augustine 
neglects the connection between God and humans: the ability to create. As he argues, 
“In their perverted way all humanity imitates you. Yet they put themselves at a 
distance from you and exalt themselves against you” (Conf, 2, 6, 14). The problem is 
that Augustine resolves to obey God’s will so blindly and criticises his own weakness 
so much that he is unable to see human nature in an alternative way. Augustine 
presents a pessimistic notion of human nature, which is mainly according to his 
personal uncomfortable experience and his interpretation of Christian doctrine. As he 
argues: “The blindness of humanity is so great that people are actually proud of their 
blindness” (Conf, 3, 3, 6). I take his following description of his son, to emphasise 
how pessimistic and partial he is when he views human nature: “He was about fifteen 
years old, and his intelligence surpassed that of many serious and well-educated men. 
I praise you for your gifts, my Lord God, Creator of all and with great power giving 
form to our deformities. For I contributed nothing to that boy other than sin” (Conf, 9, 
6, 14). Augustine obviously lacks the confident belief that he deserves to be a father. 
He treats himself and humanity in a negative way although he has faith in God and 
gratefully praises everything provided by God. Augustine is unable to provide a 
flexible attitude towards human nature. His personal experience before his conversion 
to Christianity and his conceptions of God and man cause him to keep criticising not 
only himself but also humanity.
Augustine obeys God and lives by following Christine doctrine, but on the other hand 
condemns man which is created by God, including himself. As Evans remarks, for 
Augustine, the effect of evil will on human souls “is to make them behave in a 
manner more appropriate to bodies, that is, to appear to be material not spiritual” (39). 
In order to avoid sin and bring us back to God, Augustine sees Christian doctrine as a
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necessary way to promote the development of humanity. But Augustine neglects the 
fact that self-awareness is the primal element that motivates humankind to avoid sin 
and develop itself. I take Augustine as an example. As I have discussed, what leads 
Augustine to release from being tempted by his irresistible physical desire and finally 
turn to God is not the notion of God that he has previously acquired through 
Neoplatonism but the conversion that he suddenly experiences and that inspires him 
to willingly rid himself o f his desire and devote himself to God. When Augustine was 
in conflict over whether to convert to Christianity, he heard a voice “from the nearby 
house chanting as if  it might be a boy or a girl” which kept asking him to “pick up and 
read, pick up and read” until he opened the book of the apostle: “I seized it, opened it 
and in silence read the first passage on which my eyes lit: ‘Not in riots and drunken 
parties, not in eroticism and indecencies, not in strife and rivalry, but put on the Lord 
Jesus Christ and make no provision for the flesh in its lusts’ (Rom. 13: 13-14)”. He 
thereby completely relinquished his desire: “I neither wished nor needed to read 
further. At once, with the last words of this sentence, it was as if a light of relief from 
all anxiety flooded into my heart. All the shadows of doubt were dispelled” (Conf, 8, 
12, 29). The main motive that leads him to persevere in his spiritual quest, from 
Manicheism to Neoplatonism and finally to Christianity, is that he is always conscious 
of his physical desire, which he names evil will, and wants to find a solution to release 
it, as he recalls his experience o f stealing the pears with friends: “But my pleasure was 
not in the pears; it was in the crime itself, done in association with a sinful group” 
(Conf, 2, 8, 16). The reason that Augustine is aware of the need for self-development 
is not that he from the outset reads Christian doctrine and obeys God’s will but 
because he is unable to endure his inner conflict which emerges from physical 
impulse, and then turns to Christianity by which he finds a way to help him master his 
contradictory nature.
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However, Augustine does not appreciate his capacity of self-awareness; on the 
contrary, his conversion limits himself in Christianity, and misleads him to think that 
obedience to God is fundamental to the development of the self. Merely obeying 
Christian doctrine cannot raise us to a higher level; it would oppositely inhibit us from 
knowing the self and in consequence dominates us, as what Nietzsche claims in his 
thought. This is the reason why Nietzsche criticises Augustine as a slave of 
Christianity: “The passion o f G od.. .There is an oriental deliriousness in it, like that of 
a slave who has undeservedly been pardoned or promoted; we find it in Augustine, for 
example, whose gestures and desires are offensive in their lack of any nobility” (BGE 
50). According to Nietzsche, Augustine follows Neoplatonism and accepts the notion 
of God, but he does not know how to create and live as an independent individual. His 
conception of God with its mixture of Neoplatonism and Christianity frees him from 
being tempted by physical desire; however, his limited and negative conception of 
humanity including himself prevents him from achieving human creativity and c auses 
him to be a slave who is dominated by Christianity. Nietzsche also argues, “among 
such bom enemies o f  the spirit emerges occasionally the rare piece of humanity that 
the people revere under such names as saint as sage. From among such men come 
those monsters o f morality who make noise, who make history -  St Augustine is 
among them” (GS 359). Nietzsche declares that Augustine is unable to live with a free 
spirit because he does not provide humanity the way of life that we ought to have, but 
confines us in a pessimistic life by preaching Christian doctrine.
In contrast to Augustine who advocates obeying God and relying on Christian 
doctrine for enhancing humanity, Nietzsche condemns Christianity that turns all 
evaluation “upside down” (BGE 62), and claims that we should not follow Christian
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doctrine but count on ourselves. With his proclamation of the death of God, Nietzsche 
rejects the conception of God claimed by Judeo-Christian doctrine: God exists and is 
the absolute and powerful Being which is capable of protecting and redeeming 
humans from suffering and misfortune. This notion that conceptualises God is 
superior, immutable and perfect but contrarily sees humankind is sinful and imperfect, 
for Nietzsche, is a means that the priests use for misguiding humans to fear of this 
portrayal of God as “a punishing justice” (HAH 132), and hereafter dominate them.
The idea of the omnipotent God, as Nietzsche argues, originally does not exist in 
ancient culture. People in ancient times do not have any idea of God. They do not feel 
themselves shameful but consider themselves as the only certain and calculable: “man 
is the rule, nature without rule”. “In the mind of religious men”, as Nietzsche 
continues, “all nature for them is the sum of the actions of conscious and intentioned 
beings, an enormous complex of arbitrary acts”; people in ancient culture do not lose 
confidence and feel subordinate when they encounter nature which is unknown, 
mysterious and inexplicable. Nietzsche regards this attitude as man’s basic conviction 
that governs “primitive, religiously productive ancient culture” (HAH 111). But 
Christianity inverts this conviction, altering man’s attitude towards humanity and 
nature and undermining his self-confidence by inculcating the notion of the existence 
of God. As Nietzsche states, a man “would have no reason to be dissatisfied with 
himself to any special degree” when he compares himself to other men, and would 
only “be sharing the common burden o f human dissatisfaction and imperfection”. The 
notion of a transcendent and absolute God, which is contrast to humankind, makes us 
feel not only frustrated about ourselves, as we look into a bright mirror which reflects 
our own imperfect and distorted nature, but also humiliated and appalled by 
perceiving the existence o f God in our imagination: “in every possible experience,
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large or small, he thinks he recognizes its anger, its menace, and he even thinks he has 
a presentiment of the whiplashes it will deliver as judge and executioner” (HAH 132). 
This conception o f God, which teaches us to repent for original sin and ask for 
redemption, thus causes humankind to disbelieve its own creativity, and finally to lose 
the ability to be independent and master itself.
By questioning the existence o f God, Nietzsche not only attacks Christianity which 
tames us by way of Christian precepts, as he contends: “For thousands of years, a 
deep, suspicious fear o f an incurable pessimism has forced people to cling to a 
religious interpretation o f existence” (BGE 59), but also reveals his concern for 
humanity which has to free itself from being repressed by Christian doctrine and no 
longer waits for an unfulfilled salvation. For Nietzsche, it is fundamental to perceive 
the demise of the belief in the existence o f God, which he regards as “a cultural event 
of profound significance for people who from time immemorial have been 
accustomed to thinking in terms of a theocentric interpretation of themselves, their 
lives, values, and reality” (Schacht 1983, 119-120). Nietzsche also clarifies the 
conception of sin in Christianity, arguing that we should release us from it in order to 
live with a free spirit. As he claims: “If one goes through the individual moral 
statements of the documents o f Christianity, one will find everywhere that the 
demands have been exaggerated so that man cannot satisfy them; the intention is not 
that he become more moral, but rather that he feel as sinful as possible” (HAH 141). 
Nietzsche elucidates that Christian doctrine provides us a frustrated and negative view 
of humanity and makes us sacrifice and undervalue ourselves according to the 
conceptions o f sin and salvation: “[The] Christian faith has meant a sacrifice: the 
sacrifice of freedom, pride, spiritual self-confidence; it has meant subjugation and 
self-derision, self-mutilation” (BGE 46).
Nietzsche tells us that we do not have innate sin. He mentions that it is important for 
us to understand that we are contradictory and have weakness, but conflicting nature 
should not be considered as sinful. As he also claims, “we want to avow that man has 
arrived at this condition not through his ‘guilt’ and ‘sin’ but rather through a series of 
errors of reason, that if  his nature seemed dark and hateful to him to that degree, it 
was the fault of the mirror, and that that mirror was his creation, the very imperfect 
creation of human imagination and powers of judgment” (HAH 133). The reason why 
people feel themselves evil is because they accept the existence of the pure and 
absolute God, which is inculcated by Christianity, and assume their imperfection as 
evil by contrasting their contradictory nature from God. But Nietzsche argues that it is 
erroneous for humankind to regard itself sinful and then count on Christian doctrine 
for expecting a redeemed life. In this respect, Nietzsche criticises the notion of evil 
which is based on Christian moral judgement: “To be evil is to be ‘not moral’ 
(immoral), to practice bad habits, go against tradition, however reasonable or stupid it 
may be” (HAH 96). Nietzsche, for instance, argues that Christianity distinguishes the 
mind from the body, condemns human sensation which is naturally within our nature 
and inverts it into evil according to Christian morality: “The passions become evil and 
malicious if  they are regarded as evil and malicious... Must everything that one has to 
combat, that one has to keep within bounds or on occasions banish totally from one’s 
mind, always have to be called evil” (D 76). But this judgement of evil, in Nietzsche’s 
view, is invalid and perverse. He contends that we need to recognise that “there are no 
sins in the metaphysical sense; but, in the same sense, neither are there any virtues; 
we recognize that this entire realm of moral ideas is in a continual state of fluctuation, 
that there are higher and deeper concepts of good and evil, moral and immoral” (HAH 
56). There is no absolute moral judgement regarding good and evil, for Nietzsche.
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What we abide by Christian morality, i.e. the conceptions of good and evil, are 
produced according to the interpretation of Christianity.
Christianity counsels us to accept what it preaches and live by following the 
conceptions of good and evil in the doctrine of Christianity, but Nietzsche argues that 
the notions o f good and evil “make sense only in reference to men” (HAH 28). 
Nietzsche’s view o f evil is different from the interpretation of Christianity. Augustine 
argues that evil is from human nature and it emerges when man acts against God’s 
will, whereas Nietzsche considers the notion of evil as the invention of humans: it is 
one of the things that humankind names and brings into being. (Higgins 2006: 410). 
Nietzsche regards evil as the frightful energies of human nature, “the Cyclopean 
architects and pathmakers of humanity” (HAH 256) that drives us to interpret our 
nature, and then see if we are able to transform or destroy ourselves, which is decided 
by our determination. As he claims: “No one knows how far circumstances, pity, or 
indignation may drive him; he does not know the degree of his inflammability. 
Miserable, mean conditions make one miserable; it is usually not the quality of the 
experiences but rather the quantity that determines the lower and the higher man, in 
good and in evil” (HAH 72). We are unable to reflect upon ourselves and understand 
whether we are weak or strong unless we experience many incidents that cause us 
conflict, contradiction and suffering. We need to understand that good and evil cannot 
be measured according to Christian doctrine. In contrast, they depend on how we 
view and understand our nature; in other words, we judge ourselves according to our 
value and self-interpretation.
Augustine claims that the only virtuous way o f life is to believe in God and follow 
what God says according to Christian doctrine, but Nietzsche refuses to accept it. He
criticises Augustine who advocates the eternity of God in accordance with Platonism, 
arguing that Christianity dominates human culture as “the annihilation of the decaying 
races” (WP 862). Christianity brings humanity to the state of psychological decadence 
wherein we believe in the existence of God but undermine our own. As he says, “the 
idea of a God disturbs and humiliates as long as it is believed, but given the present 
state of comparative ethnology, its origin can no longer be in doubt; and with insight 
into that origin, the belief disappears... But if the idea of God disappears, so too does 
the feeling of ‘sin’ as a transgression against divine precepts, as a stain on a creature 
consecrated to God” (HAH 133). There is no need for humanity to feel shameful 
because of original sin, as shown in Christian doctrine. For Nietzsche, the truth of 
human nature is that everyone has weaknesses of character but there is no sin. We are 
the ones who help ourselves overcome weakness and transform ourselves for the 
better.
In response to the Christian God, Ansell-Pearson comments that Nietzsche’s intention 
is “to encourage modem human beings to cultivate the only attitude he believes can 
redeem the world in the absence o f a centre-point or a God, and restore innocence to 
the flux of life” (1994: 45). Nietzsche suggests we get rid of the conceptions of God 
and sin, and live intellectually and independently when we no longer rely on Christian 
doctrine but ourselves. We should firstly understand that we are not sinful and then
develop us by way of self-reflection. As Nietzsche explicates,
The man who wants to gain wisdom profits greatly from having thought 
for a time that man is basically evil and degenerate: this idea is wrong, 
like its opposite, but for whole periods of time it was predominant and its 
roots have sunk deep into us and into our world. To understand ourselves 
we must understand it; but to climb higher, we must then climb over and 
beyond it. (HAH 56)
According to Nietzsche, what brings us to cultivate ourselves is the understanding that
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there is no certain judgement on human nature like the conceptions of sin, good and 
evil, and we know we are responsible for justifying our conduct and living 
independently. When people habitually rely on Christianity as the way of life, they are 
unable to perceive their own power with which they are endowed as human beings, 
and do not know how to rely on it intellectually. As Nietzsche argues: “Only a very 
few people can be independent: it is a prerogative of the strong. And when 
independence is attempted by someone who has the right to it, but does not need it, 
we have proof that this man is probably not only strong, but bold to the point of 
recklessness” (BGE 29). Though Nietzsche understands that only few individuals are 
able to reach independence and achieve a free spirit, he stresses the importance of 
individuality in our striving toward that goal. He tells us that individuality is decided 
by how we are capable o f understanding our nature, liberate ourselves from the 
restriction of tradition and morality on humanity, and willingly raise ourselves by
means of our own strength. As he suggests,
The strength o f a person’s spirit would then be measured by how much 
‘truth’ he could tolerate, or more precisely, to what extent he needs to 
have it diluted, disguised, sweetened, muted, falsified... Perhaps 
harshness and cunning furnish conditions more favourable for the 
development of strong, independent spirits and philosophers than taking 
things lightly which we prize in scholars, and with good reason. (BGE 
39)
For Nietzsche, the development o f humanity cannot be attained by relying on 
Christian doctrine and seeking for redemption; on the contrary, it can only be attained 
when a man is willing to develop himself and understand what his nature is. This man, 
according to Nietzsche, needs to see if he is able to overcome himself through the 
processes of self-contradiction, suffering and misunderstanding, and then transforms 
himself to be independent. In contrast to Augustine who regards obeying one God and 
asking for salvation as the only way to develop humankind, Nietzsche emphasises that
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self-interpretative development is essential to us. He shows us an alternative way to 
understand human nature: we have to create our way of life without relying upon 
Christian doctrine.
Karl Marx’s commentary on Ludwig Feuerbach can be compared to Nietzsche’s on 
Augustine. The atheist and humanist Feuerbach has a profound impact on Nietzsche 
and Marx.31 Feuerbach in The Essence o f  Christianity argues, “God is the manifested 
inward nature, the expressed self o f a man” (12-13). He claims that the Christian God 
is “essentially but universally man -  man stripped of his individual limitations, man as 
a species-being, man as an expression of the essentially human” (Kamenka 46). 
Feuerbach criticises Hegelian dialectic and espouses that Christianity is an absolute 
religion not for Hegel’s reason but for our self-consciousness, as he regards religion 
“a function o f the emergence o f self-consciousness” (Van Harvey 12-13). For 
Feuerbach, Incarnation which is promoted in Christian doctrine is to express “the 
atheistic insight that humanity’s well-being is more important than God’s” (Harvey
27). Marx gives a favourable response to Feuerbach’s atheism. As Kamenka remarks:
The young Karl Marx, within two years o f the publication of the Essence 
o f Christianity, drew the concrete conclusion on which so much o f 
Feuerbach’s popularity rested: ‘The criticism of religion ends in the 
teaching that man is the highest being for man, it ends, that is, with the 
categorical imperative to overthrow all conditions in which man is a 
debased, forsaken, contemptible being forced into servitude.’32 (16)
The y-oung Marx agrees with Feuerbach, admiring him as “a true conqueror o f the old 
philosophy” (Harvey 10), but this opinion changes later on. In his “Theses on
31 In Conversations with N ietzsche  (1987), Ida Overbeck recalls how Feuerbach has influenced 
Nietzsche long ago before Schopenhauer: “I f ‘The Concept o f God as Man’s Generic Nature” and other 
essays written by Feuerbach are read in Nietzsche’s spirit, one will understand what their way o f  
thinkin g contributed to his superman. This Nietzschean central idea drew its nourishment here, more 
than from all natural-scientific argumentation” (114).
32 This commentary is from Marx’s “Zur Kritik der Hegelschen Rechtsphilosophie” [Towards the 
Critique o f  the Hegelian Philosophy o f  Right], written in 1843 and published in the
Deutsc h-franzdsische Jahrbucher [German-French Yearbooks] o f  1984.
98
Feuerbach”, Marx points to Feuerbach’s inability to put his ideal but abstract concept 
of religion and humanity into real life through practice: 33 “Feuerbach wants 
sensuous objects, really distinct from the thought objects, but he does not conceive 
human activity itself as objective theoretical activity...he regards the theoretical 
attitude as the only genuinely human attitude, while practice is conceived and fixed 
only in its dirty-judaical manifestation” (Theses I). Marx advocates that all social life 
is fundamentally practical (Theses VIII), and thus he in The German Ideology 
disapproves Feuerbach who is unable to see “how the sensuous world around him is, 
not a thing given direct from all eternity, remaining ever the same, but the product of 
industry and o f the state of society” (62).
Feuerbach, according to Marx, stays firmly in “the realm of theory” and sees human 
beings “not in their given social connection, not under their existing conditions of 
life” but stops “at the abstraction ‘man’ and get no further than recognising ‘the true, 
individual, corporal man’ emotionally” (64). Thereby, Marx comments that Feuerbach, 
who locks himself in the realm o f his theory, can only consider himself as an “object 
of the senses” but never “sensuous activity” (63-64). Up to a point, Feuerbach can be 
considered similar to Augustine. Though Feuerbach’s atheistic argument of the 
Christian God inspires Nietzsche and Marx to rethink humanity and the values 
promoted by Christianity, Marx argues that Feuerbach cannot give an effective view 
to help developing humanity. On the contrary, Feuerbach remains himself in his 
contemplation with his “isolated surmises” (62). Augustine brings us to rely on 
Christian doctrine for salvation, but he ignores the potential to beware of our 
self-reliant ability. Feuerbach provides us with an atheistic view to see God as man,
33 Marx’s “Theses on Feuerbach” is included in the supplementary texts in The German Ideology, pp. 
121-123.
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but he is also unable to practice his theory in reality, as Marx gives a crucial point: 
“The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point is to 
change it” (Theses XI). For Marx, as for Nietzsche, we cannot solely be interpreted 
and categorised in a mental and abstract thought; on the contrary, we need to 
transform ourselves through daily practice and the ability to create in order to 
understand what we are.
Discussing Nietzsche and his concept of salvation, Giles Fraser comments that 
Nietzsche’s concept of the death o f God is necessary to make salvation possible for 
humankind (30). For Nietzsche, humans have to find their way without following 
Christianity. Nietzsche’s concept enables us to grasp that we can live in the world in 
such a way that we will not be destroyed by the reality of human life, no matter how 
unbearable it could be (67). As Fraser continues, Nietzsche’s message reveals a 
crucial point: “ [W]e must give up all hopes of being saved and that we must find the 
courage to live life as it is. Salvation...is the attempt to imagine that there is some 
other form of life for us to have, a life free from the restrictions of embodiment, a life 
without pain, without growing old and without death” (72). Fraser comments that 
Nietzsche’s attack on Christianity is about the founding of a new conception of 
religion. Weaver Santaniello claims that Nietzsche offers a new conception of God, 
which is not the God claimed by Christianity. He argues that Nietzsche concentrates 
on how we know we are the creators of our lives: “The divine element of life does not 
resemble a judge or lawmaker, does not reward or punish, does not offer salvation in 
other worlds, but relates to humans in this one” (94) Santaniello comments that 
Nietzsche’s concern is with humanity and his essential insight is that “the gods we 
create are reflections o f ourselves and our society. The origin of values has never 
come from above, as religion often teaches, but from humans” (104). Nietzsche
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argues that humanity is able to depend on itself experiencing life with courage and 
affirmation. William Lloyd Newell provides a similar commentary on Nietzsche. He 
explains why Nietzsche condemns Christianity. It is because Christianity offers the 
false humanitarianism that makes us feel distressful (176). In addition, Newell 
explicates Nietzsche’s affirmation o f his concept of religion and human nature. As 
Newell claims, “Nietzsche has made men’s and women’s essence their existence. 
One’s essence is not determined by God or by the imposition of absolute norms, not 
by reason’s ideas and laws, but by what one makes of oneself’ (182). Moreover, 
“Nietzsche’s faith was in human nature, and it was a deep and abiding faith. Virtue 
consisted in conforming, not to external laws, but to one’s own truth. Creativity 
consisted also in being oneself; this was the divine element in human nature” (185), 
he comments that Nietzsche opens a new and affirmative perspective on humankind, 
claiming the possibility o f being more creative and independent in the world.34
The three approaches to Nietzsche’s view of human nature that I have explored above 
show Nietzsche’s key arguments in his philosophy: to break with the traditional 
standpoint o f human nature, to accept human nature is contradictory and evolving, 
and to understand that humanity is developed through self-interpretation and 
self-cultivation. Whereas Darwin considers humankind as an organism and 
emphasises the importance o f natural selection for human evolution, Nietzsche 
emphasises the importance of self-awareness, arguing that human evolution does not 
refer to biological but cultural evolution. Freud argues that we should admit and 
release our natural instinct, and advocates the importance of psychoanalysis. 
Nietzsche’s definition of instinct is subtler than Freud’s. Nietzsche’s concept of
34 N ew ell’s som e ideas are selected from Rose Pfeffer’s D isciple o f  Dionysus (1972, Lewisbury, PA: 
Bucknell University Press, pp. 250, 265.) in discussing Nietzsche’s Dionysian faith.
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instinct is about the limits o f consciousness in culture. He claims that we have to 
understand our instinct in order to create our affirmative life by breaking the 
restriction of consciousness. Augustine asserts that we have to repent and ask for 
salvation by relying on God and Christian doctrine, Nietzsche claims that God is dead 
and we should depend on ourselves. Additionally, Nietzsche argues that there is no sin 
and we need to create our values. As distinct from Darwin, Freud and Augustine, 
Nietzsche’s focus is on how humanity relies on its will to power for experiencing life 
and attaining its development. His intention is to delineate the importance of 
self-understanding and independence, the core o f being an affirmative and developed 
individual. “Those o f us who are destined to be independent and to command must in 
return set ourselves our own tests -  and set them at the proper time” (BGE 41).
It is undoubtedly the case that Nietzsche understands we might have the privilege of 
being different from animals because o f our ability to overcome our limitations. It is 
also undeniable that Nietzsche admits that not everyone can conceive of this privilege 
because of the boundaries o f humanity. Only those few who want to be themselves, 
overcome the selves and accept their fate could possibly find the way to independence 
and individuality, according to Nietzsche. To sum up, human nature is uncertain and 
contradictory, but it is crucial for humans to willingly find the way out of the 
domination of Christian tradition and morality, in order to overcome nihilism. The 
thesis starts with Nietzsche’s question of the self, arguing his idea of the development 
of the self. How the self develops through self-reflection and then approaches 
individuality is Nietzsche’s main concern. His view of humanity examined in this 
chapter is the first step to see human nature in many aspects. The second step is to 
shift focus from humanity in general to culture and morality, analysing why Nietzsche 
attacks tradition and Christian morality and stresses individuality. I illustrate the
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dilemma of morality by comparing Nietzsche’s concepts of morality and individuality 
in On the Genealogy o f  Morals in comparison with John Stuart Mill’s, which is the 
theme I am going to argue in next chapter. As Nietzsche in Daybreak suggests to us an 
unusual way o f seeing the world: “Open your theatre-eye, the great third eye which 
looks out into the world through the other two!” (D 509) Let us prepare to see the 
conception o f Christian morality afresh with our third eyes.
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Chapter 3 
The Dilemma of Morality
Having discussed Nietzsche’s view of human nature, I focus on how to disclose the 
dilemma of morality in society. The dilemma is this: we no longer need the traditional 
Christian conception o f morality that emerges from culture and custom, and which 
dominates and restricts our conduct. But we need a new way of life, which is 
established in an autonomous conception, for self-development, self-integration and 
bettering our lives, and this new way according to Nietzsche does not need to be 
regulated by any formula o f morality. This is the second step on the journey of 
self-cultivation to individuality. Nietzsche names himself the immoralist, breaking all 
standards of Christian morality, as he argues: “Insofar as we believe in morality we 
pass sentence on existence” (WP 6). His strategy is to attack the historical conception 
of morality in the traditional sense, which degrades the value of the self and leads us 
to decadence and nothingness. Nietzsche’s new ‘immoral’ conception, in contrast, 
embraces a new social order which aims at affirming the meaning of life and breaking
with any dogma of Christian morality. As Ansell-Pearson claims,
[...] Nietzsche wishes a new (aristocratic) social order to cultivate in 
order to invert and challenge the Christian-moral tradition and its secular 
successors. It is Nietzsche’s insights into history and culture which 
determine his conception of great politics -  a conception of politics 
which seeks to overcome morality and the moral view of the world and 
posit a vision of the animal ‘man’ and ‘beyond good and evil.’ (1994:
122)
Nietzsche on this view intends to call for a new self-conscious social order which 
differs from the morality that historically emerges from Christianity.
This chapter compares John Stuart Mill’s idea o f morality (in his essays Utilitarianism
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and On Liberty) with Nietzsche’s moral perspective in On the Genealogy o f Morals. 
The reason why I choose to compare Mill with Nietzsche is because they both 
perceive a crisis in modem culture, raise the problems of morality and stress the 
primacy of the individual. But on the other hand, their concepts of morality vary from 
each other. Mill criticises Christian morality that builds up a one-sided social 
judgement and provides us the misconceptions of truth and religion. He additionally 
observes that the mediocre majority misuse morality as a tyrannical means to spread 
despotism and restrict individuality.
In response to Christian morality, Mill corrects the erroneous conception of morality 
in tradition, proposing a new ‘moral’ conception, in accordance with his notion of 
individuality. John Robson shows us how Mill views morality: “man has sympathetic 
as well as selfish feelings, and morality depends upon the former, not as Bentham and 
James Mill thought, upon the latter” (135). Robson claims that Mill, a utilitarian, is 
primarily concerned with the individual: “The individual must not be shut up within a 
controlled and restrictive system o f social morality; he must be free to choose his own 
destiny in the light o f his moral views -  consideration always being given to the 
happiness and equal development o f others” (127). Mill regards the end of utilitarian 
morality as not “an abstract formula” but “a state of being” (Robson 129). At this 
point, Mill accordingly develops an individualistic utilitarianism whereby he argues 
that morality is fundamentally “an individual and human, not a logical problem” 
(Robson 129-130). M ill’s attempt is to advocate human rights in society, expecting to 
establish a self-developed society based on utilitarian morality. As Maurice Cowling 
argues, Mill has a strong wish to persuade and create “a society which is morally 
homogeneous and intellectually healthy” to achieve his utilitarian liberalism (28). 
Mill claims that the theory of utility is the standard of life, and happiness is the
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ultimate end o f his utilitarianism.35
Both Mill and his precursor Jeremy Bentham are concerned with classical utilitarian 
theories, but Mill afterward rejects Bentham’s narrow concept of utility. He redefines 
and enlarges his own thought o f utilitarianism. “Although John Stuart Mill agrees 
with his father and Bentham that pleasures and satisfactions have intrinsic properties 
and also relational properties, including causal and intentional properties, he differs 
with them in regarding these latter as relevant to the evaluation of pleasurable 
experiences” (Wendy Donner 15). Donner goes on to pinpoint the divergence between 
Mill and Bentham. She argues that M ill’s theory can be regarded as “a sophisticated 
form of hedonism because its theoretical associationist psychological foundation is set 
out in terms o f pleasures or pains” (18). Mill, in this respect, criticises the weakness of 
Christian morality and argues that utilitarian morality is essential to protect individual 
liberty in society. Cowling argues that M ill’s concept of individual liberty differs
crucially from Bentham’s:
For natural rights Mill had as much dislike as Bentham. Pursuit of 
individual liberty for Mill is not, by itself and without regard to its 
consequences, a proper end of social action. Individuals must be left as 
free as possible from social pressure, not because they have a right to 
consideration o f this sort, but because, if  they are not left free, society 
may find it more difficult than otherwise to achieve the ends for which it 
exists. Individual freedom must be maximized, not because diversity of 
opinion is desirable in itself, but because, without diversity of opinion, 
men are unlikely to approach nearer to truth than they have done hitherto.
(41)
In this respect, Mill explores why the utilitarian conception of morality is important
35 Mill claims that his theory o f  utility is the directive rule o f  human conduct and the ends o f  
utilitarianism are happiness and freedom from pain. He also names it a theory o f  life or o f  happiness 
and it is grounded in the utilitarian conception o f  morality for the welfare o f  all humankind. Though 
M ill’s ultimate end o f  utilitarianism is to achieve the universal happiness for all sentient beings, he 
argues that it could only be attained when human character would be elevated to nobleness (U 
137-142).
106
and how people can rely on it for achieving freedom and happiness. But Nietzsche 
does not accept M ill’s utilitarian idea, arguing that Mill is unable to release himself 
from the domination of Christian morality. As Nietzsche claims: “The insipid and 
cowardly concept ‘man’ a la Comte and Stuart Mill, perhaps even the object of a 
cult -  It is still the cult o f Christian morality under a new name” (WP 340). Mill on 
the one hand tells us that people should be free to do what he likes in his own 
concerns, but he argues that people should concern and not harm others as an 
obligation. This argument, on the other hand, restricts his concept of individual liberty. 
Nietzsche criticises Mill who neglects the uniqueness of every person but intends to 
establish a new norm of morality that he calls utilitarian morality.
By Nietzsche, M ill’s individualistic utilitarianism limits the development of humanity. 
In contrast, Nietzsche proposes an advent of the sovereign individual endowed with 
creativity and self-transformation. Nietzsche attacks Christian morality, arguing that it 
not only undermines humanity but also brings us into endless decadence by 
inculcating the negative attitude toward life. Nietzsche delineates his standpoint of 
Christian morality, breaks the traditional restrictions of Christian morality, and attacks 
the bad influence o f Christian morality upon humankind. His aim is to address a new 
autonomous judgement on human conduct that liberates from the domination of 
Christian morality, and concentrate on the affirmation o f life. Javier Ibanez-noe points 
out that Nietzsche know what the task he has when he attacks Christian morality, “the 
task for Nietzsche is not the destruction of tradition but rather the building of a new 
tradition in the face o f the breakdown o f the tradition grounded in the Christian God” 
(71). Nietzsche argues that we need to become the masters of moral standards to 
overcome the restriction of Christian morality. Nietzsche attacks modem culture and 
Christian morality from a sceptical and radical perspective. As Thiele contends,
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Nietzsche’s indictment o f morality arises not because it seeks to impose 
order, but because o f the typical motivations for this imposition...Yet 
Nietzsche evidences a profound ambivalence toward the ethical drive. He 
does not seek the abolition of all (moral) values, but rather aims at their 
‘transvaluation.’ He does not aim to condemn all moral actions, but to 
offer different, and better, reasons for pursuing them. (1995: 61)
Through the concept o f transvaluation, according to Thiele, Nietzsche seeks to 
provide a new way of judging morality. Nietzsche asserts that Christian morality does 
not guide humankind to live morally but to live with pessimism. The purpose of his 
condemnation o f Christian morality is not to destroy tradition and advocate a new 
norm of morality as Mill does, but to show how humans are able to perceive their 
pessimistic condition and overcome it in order to live confidently with free spirit. As 
Solomon and Higgins argue, “Christianity’s repudiation of nature, particularly human 
nature, is a further target of Nietzsche’s attack... the Christian worldview encourages 
the idea that our psychological makeup, which naturally seeks self-assertion and 
self-enhancement, is pernicious” (90), Nietzsche is aware that Christian morality has 
promoted a degraded vision o f humanity. He rejects this self-denying vision but 
proposes the importance of self-awareness and self-development.
To begin with, I shall briefly discuss some ideas about morality in order to understand 
the connection between morality and human identity. Living as social beings, we are 
held responsible for our action and conduct. Morality is usually taken to be the 
fundamental standard that we depend upon to judge action and conduct. Stocks in 
Morality and Purpose claims that “the moral will is the self-conscious will” (31) and 
“the moral attitude is essentially a concern for the rightness of action” (77). To put it 
simply, morality provides a means o f judging the behaviour of people. To know how 
to judge the rightness o f action and have proper moral attitudes is important. As Joel 
Kupperman points out, “morality is a social device to minimize certain sorts of
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behaviour, especially behaviour that threatens the security of members of the 
community” (28-29). This social device is not only for conducting us, but stands as 
“an important element o f cohesion, in strengthening a sense of community and of a 
shared outlook” (Kupperman 26). On this view, the aim of morality is to maintain a 
harmonious society where each person can be equally protected. In The New Golden 
Rule: Community and Morality in a Democratic Society Amitai Etzioni claims it is 
undeniable that we expect to live in a good society, but a good society needs to 
establish a social order that should be “aligned with the moral commitment of the 
members”(12). Morality has to do with core values. We accept these values, for the 
most part, and we accept the role these values play with regard to judging our 
behaviour. But moral judgements are not fixed and absolute. We can correct them 
according to the demands o f different cultures and social structures. For example, it 
might be commendable for a woman in the eighteenth century to be obedient to her 
parents and husband. But it is a sign o f self-respect when a woman today openly 
expresses her opinion. Morality helps us understand how to appreciate, to respect, and 
to develop ourselves. This is the basis of morality that sustains society. It is necessary 
to understand and reinterpret the conception of morality as the means to establish a
better society. As Stocks says,
[T]he basis o f moral judgment and the root of moral values is a similar 
but quite general conception of will and action as a continuing form 
finding its changing embodiment in the changing situations of life...In all 
action there is effort, for effort is the law of life; but the conception 
provides a criterion by which the effort may be justified in itself, not 
merely for what it brings. (66-67)
Whether the consequence we expect is fulfilled or not, Stocks claims that morality 
should be justified by itself. It is possible to change the moral rules in different eras 
but it is impossible to deny that morality is required to better society. In a word, 
morality provides a fundamental means for us to reflect on ourselves.
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There are serious problems o f morality revealed in modem culture. Regarding the 
problems of morality raised by Mill and Nietzsche, they offer two important points, 
though they use different ways to express their ideas. The first point is how Christian 
morality dominates human mind by offering an absolute idea, like the conceptions of 
the Almighty God, original sin, redemption and salvation, and then restricts us in 
one-sided standpoint of culture and moral values. Most people lack the concept, 
“diversity of opinions”, addressed by Mill and the perspective argued by Nietzsche. 
The second point is that we, under the domination of traditional Christian morality, 
are not aware of the need for the development of the self and the importance of being 
an individual. Grayling in What is Good? The Search fo r  the Best Way to Live argues 
that Mill and Nietzsche “are both products of that same century, both inheritors of the 
changes that led to it, and both passionately concerned to identify and describe the 
best life. And there are significant points of contact, despite the great difference in 
manner of expression” (160). M ill’s criticism of Christian morality differs from 
Nietzsche’s. Mill is concerned with individual liberty, and uses this conception to 
advocate the necessity o f a utilitarian morality. Nietzsche on the contrary emphasises 
the importance of individuality, arguing that humanity can be raised when we are able 
to create and rely on our values without following any formula of morality. In what 
follows, we will see how they analyse the problems of morality and show us their 
different concepts of morality and individual.
3.1 Mill’s Conceptions of Morality and Individual
In Utilitarianism, Mill states the concept o f utility:
In the golden rule of Jesus o f Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the
110
ethics o f utility. To do as one would be done by, and to love one’s 
neighbour as oneself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality.
As the means o f making the nearest approach to this idea, utility would 
enjoin, first that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, 
or the interest, or every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with 
the interest o f the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which 
have so vast a power over human character, should so use the power as to 
establish in the mind o f every individual an indissoluble association 
between his own happiness and the good of the whole. (U 148)
The aim of utilitarianism is to achieve the welfare of humankind. Mill argues that the 
spirit of utilitarianism is to naturally love others as oneself, as in Jesus’ teaching, and 
personal happiness could be achieved by the moral standard grounded in the concept 
of utility. According to Mill, utilitarian morality is not only the means to achieve 
personal happiness but also the end o f human action. It can provide the rules and 
precepts of human conduct for protecting all humankind and the whole sentient 
creation in the universe from being harmed (U 143). Mill’s theory of utility envisions 
the achievement of the universal happiness of all humanity. I will explore how Mill 
reveals his concern with humanity and individuality, and his insight into customary 
morality.
Mill argues: “Among the works o f man, which human life is rightly employed in 
perfecting and beautifying, the first in importance surely is man himself’ (L 66). Mill 
stresses that man is distinctive and his individual liberty should not be neglected. As 
he explains,
If it were felt that the free development of individuality is one of the 
leading essentials o f well-being; that it is not only a coordinate element 
with all that is designated by the terms civilisation, instruction, education, 
culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of all those things; 
there would be no danger that liberty should be undervalued, and the 
adjustment o f the boundaries between it and social control would present 
no extraordinary difficulty. (L 63)
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Mill asserts that the free development of individuality is fundamental to develop 
humanity and enhance the progress o f society; therefore, he argues that we should 
maintain it for achieving human happiness. He also argues that this idea should be 
applied to all humankind who is equal to each other, and therefore people should 
primarily regard others as themselves and do not have any intention to harm anyone. 
As he states: “It is desirable, in short, that in things which do not primarily concern 
others, individuality should assert itself. Where, not the person’s own character, but 
the traditions or customs o f other people are the rule of conduct, there is wanting one 
of the principal ingredients o f human happiness, and quite the chief ingredient of 
individual and social progress” (L 63). On the basis, Mill addresses that we need 
utilitarianism to protect happiness o f all humanity, and attacks Christian morality 
which restricts human individuality. He raises two problems of morality and amends 
them. The first problem is the misunderstanding of truth and religion. For Mill, the 
fundamental principle o f utilitarianism is to protect everyone equally from being hurt. 
With regard to this, utilitarianism requires everyone to be “as strictly impartial as a 
disinterested and benevolent spectator” (U 148) in observing others and the world. 
This is the ideal conception o f utility. But in reality, according to Mill, we habitually 
allow ourselves to be limited by custom, culture and tradition: “Men are not more 
zealous for truth than they often are for error, and a sufficient application of legal or 
even of social penalties will generally succeed in stopping the propagation of either” 
(L 34). Ignorance and fear direct us to injustice and prejudice.
Taking heretical opinions as an example, Mill reminds us of the misunderstanding of 
truth:
Those in whose eyes this reticence on the part of heretics is no evil,
should consider in the first place, that in consequence of it there is never
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any fair and thorough discussion of heretical opinions; and that such of 
them as could not stand such a discussion, though they may be prevented 
from spreading, do not disappear. But it is not the minds of heretics that 
are deteriorated most, by the ban placed on all inquiry which does not end 
in the orthodox conclusion. The greatest harm done is to those who are 
not heretics, and whose whole mental development is cramped, and their 
reason cowed, by the fear o f heresy.. .Truth gains more even by the errors 
of one who, with due study and preparation, thinks for himself, than by 
the true opinions o f those who only hold them because they do not suffer 
themselves to think. (L 3 8)
Mill argues that it is one-sidedness that prevents us from accepting this 
many-sidedness (L 52). In this example, Mill argues that most people do not accept 
heretical ideas, but none o f us can deny these ideas contain a part of truth. The 
one-sidedness is due to our passive acceptance of orthodox opinions. But the 
assumption derived from the orthodox side is in fact one-sided. In consequence, we 
are unable to see things impartially and achieve truth because we are limited by this 
one-sided assumption.
Most people neglect the meaning o f truth due to weakness of mind. As Mill argues,
Truth, in the great practical concerns of life, is so much a question of the 
reconciling and combining o f opposites, that very few have minds 
sufficiently capacity and impartial to make the adjustment with an 
approach to correctness, and it has to be made by the rough process of a 
struggle between combatants fighting under hostile banners. (L 54)
The world is full o f opposites if  it is regarded from the standpoint of dualism. For 
instance, the colours white and black are opposites. But the idea of opposites is 
derived from comparison and reflection. They might be irrelevant if they are observed 
from a different point of view. This point is that we rarely open ourselves enough to 
accept a diversity of opinions. It is better to understand truth from different sides, as 
Mill argues. Regarding the concept of diversity which is argued by Mill and the 
cultural relativists, I shall clarify their different views of it. Cultural relativism is “the
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principle that an individual human's beliefs and activities should be interpreted in 
terms of his or her own culture” (Wikipedia).36 William Kent elucidates that cultural 
relativism is “a response to variety” but holds “an empirical responsibility to the 
diversity”. As Kent goes on, cultural relativism is not considered “an escape from 
multiplicity” but “an attempt to handle multiplicity” (196), and their standpoint of the 
concept of diversity is different from M ill’s. While many liberals including Mill 
accept “differences o f opinion only as a device for attaining and holding on to truths 
which eventually will be really and absolutely true”, as Kent argues, cultural 
relativism accepts “diversity as something good in itself, not as just a means toward 
its own elimination” (196-197). Kent likewise claims, for the cultural relativists, 
“there is an idea abroad which has become more widespread through the ages. It holds 
that what you value and what you believe always has a certain suitability for what you 
are, and that there is no single pattern to which all men should be forced to conform” 
(197). In this respect, Mill regards diversity as necessary to promote what he argues; 
but the cultural relativists accept it for its own good and do not use it as a means to 
advocate their thought. Accordingly, remaining too limited and fixed in one-sidedness 
will not only entrap us in self-centredness, but also prevent us from considering the 
purpose of utilitarian morality: the welfare o f all humanity.
Furthermore, a similar situation is shown in the misunderstanding of religion. Mill 
claims that Christian morality is “a doctrine of passive obedience; it inculcates 
submission to all authorities found established; who indeed are not to be actively 
obeyed when they command what religion forbids, but who are not to be resisted, far 
less rebelled against, for any amount of wrong to ourselves” (L 56). Christian morality
36 Cultural relativism was established by Franz Boas in the first few decades o f  the 20th century and 
then popularised by his students. Boas did not use the term often but it became common among 
anthropologists after his death in 1942. (Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cultural relativism)
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forces people to “take them [Christian doctrines] in and make them [people] conform 
to the formula”, teaching people to have a habitual respect for the doctrine without 
any feeling “which spreads from the words to the things signified” (L 47-48). People 
passively follow written doctrines as truisms but rarely apply them to concrete 
experience. Mill does not reject Christianity but rather considers it a partial doctrine 
that has been modified and adapted to reveal only a part of truth. The Christian
doctrine hence is never equivalent to the moral spirit of Christ:
[M]any essential elements o f the highest morality are among the things 
which are not provided for, nor intended to be provided for, in the 
recorded deliverances o f the Founder of Christianity, and which have 
been entirely thrown aside in the system of ethics erected on the basis of 
those deliverances by the Christian Church. And this being so, I think it a 
great error to persist in attempting to find in the Christian doctrine that 
complete rule for our guidance, which its author intended it to sanction 
and enforce, but only partially to provide. (L 57)
People distance from each other and cause a lot of conflict and misconduct because of 
their one-sided misunderstanding o f truth and religion. Mill argues that this could be 
corrected if a diversity o f opinions is accepted.
Morality is a self-conscious judgement o f human conduct; therefore, it can be
corrected if we are conscious of the error. As Mill states,
I acknowledge that the tendency o f all opinions to become sectarian is not 
cured by the freest discussion, but is often heightened and exacerbated 
thereby.. .But it is not on the impassioned partisan, it is on the calmer and 
more disinterested bystander, that this collision of opinions works its 
salutary effect...there is always hope when people are forced to listen to 
both sides; it is when they attend only to one that errors harden into 
prejudices, and truth itself ceases to have the effect of truth, by being 
exaggerated into falsehood. (L 58)
The erroneous standard of morality can be amended if we are willing to keep 
ourselves open to experience, impartially criticising different opinions and conduct.
115
As Mill argues, “there are many truths of which the full meaning cannot be realized, 
until personal experience has brought it home” (L 49). Self-consciousness will not be 
developed by following tradition and custom but it can be through personal 
experience: “Human nature is not a machine to be built after a model, and set to do 
exactly the work prescribed for it, but a tree, which requires to grow and develop 
itself on all sides, according to the tendency of the inward forces which make it a 
living thing” (L 66). Thus, the attitude toward truth should be cultivated out of 
recognition o f  our natural dispositions and our natural diversity. As Mill comments, 
“only through diversity of opinion is there, in the existing state of human intellect, a 
chance of fair play to all sides to the truth” (L 54). Those who37 are open to different 
opinions, for Mill, are able to realise the meaning of truth beyond the limits of 
customary morality.
The second problem that Mill indicates is a moral-political problem: the tyranny of 
the majority that habitually spreads despotism and diminishes individuality. As Mill 
states, “society between equals can only exist on the understanding that the interests 
o f all are to be regarded equally” (U 165). A healthy democratic society ought to 
respect and protect all its citizens’ security and individuality. But in reality this is not 
the case:
[TJhere is also in the world at large an increasing inclination to stretch 
unduly the powers o f society over the individual, both by the force of 
opinion and even by that o f legislation: and as the tendency of all the 
changes taking place in the world is to strengthen society, and diminish 
the power of the individual, this encroachment is not one of the evils 
which tend spontaneously to disappear, but, on the contrary, to grow 
more and more formidable. (L 18)
37 Mill here does not say that all humans are able to accept a diversity o f  opinions. Though people act 
according to their personal preferences, M ill conceives that only a few people with originality o f  mind 
are able to open to different opinions and recognise the importance o f  individuality, as he argues that 
originality is “a valuable element in human affairs” (L 71).
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Morality becomes a legal means to dominate people for the purpose of stabilising 
social power. Such “power itself is illegitimate...It is as noxious, or more noxious, 
when exerted in accordance with public opinion, than when in opposition to it” (L 21). 
The struggle for power thereby ruins the harmony between individual and society. If 
society becomes more able to strengthen its power by misusing morality, dominating 
and punishing people for disobedience, the disastrous consequence is the entrapment 
of the soul. The more despotism prevails, according to Mill, the less individuality it 
allows. “The political positions for which Mill is famous -  delimitating the power of 
government and asserting the need to maintain a high degree of individual social 
freedom -  are characteristic preoccupations of his writing at all times throughout his 
life” (Cowling 43).
Mill likewise argues,
The majority, being satisfied with the ways of mankind as they now are,
(for it is they who make them what they are), cannot comprehend why 
those ways should not be good enough for everybody; and what is more, 
spontaneity forms no part o f the ideal of the majority of moral and social 
reformers, but is rather looked on with jealousy, as a troublesome and 
perhaps rebellious obstruction to the general acceptance of what these 
reformers, in their own judgement, think would be best for mankind. (L 
63-64)
Tradition and custom prevent people from perceiving the need for individual liberty. 
In consequence, people let themselves be controlled by customary morality. This is 
the tyrannical poison o f despotism that Mill refers to: “The despotism of custom is 
everywhere the standing hindrance to human advancement, being in unceasing 
antagonism to that disposition to aim at something better than customary, which is 
called, according to circumstances, the spirit of liberty, or that of progress or 
improvement” (L 78). It is necessary to use moral standards to preserve basic personal
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liberty through moral standards, according to Mill. Mill also claims: “Every 
despotism does not produce its worst effects, so long as ‘individuality’ exists under it; 
and whatever crushes individuality is despotism, by whatever name it may be called, 
and whether it professes to be enforcing the will of God or the injunctions of men” (L 
71). Thus, the despotism of the tyranny of the majority is the chief obstacle to the 
achievement of genuine individuality. To keep an impartial attitude toward
individuality is to return to utilitarian morality. As Mill goes on,
That mankind are not infallible; that their truths, for the most part, are 
only half-truths; that unity o f opinion, unless resulting from the fullest 
and freest comparison o f opposite opinions, is not desirable, and diversity 
not an evil, but a good, until mankind are much more capable that at 
present of recognizing all sides o f the truth, are principles applicable to 
men’s modes of action, not less than to their opinions. (L 63)
Mill knows that we would misjudge due to the limits of our consciousness and habits, 
and we are limited by the despotism of the tyranny of the majority. He also thinks 
social conflicts stimulate us to accept a diversity of opinions and enhance the 
possibility of healthy social life. But he asserts the necessity of utilitarianism because 
the ultimate aim of utilitarianism is developing individuality: “Not only does all 
strengthening o f social ties, and all healthy growth of society, give to each individual 
a stronger personal interest in practically consulting the welfare of others; it also leads 
him to identify his feelings more and more with their good, or at least with an ever 
greater degree o f practical consideration for it” (U 165). Thus, awareness of 
individuality will create a harmonious bond between individual and society and hence 
be of benefit to humankind in general.
Isaiah Berlin in his essay “John Stuart Mill and the Ends of Life” praises Mill for his 
exceptional awareness of the human problem and his optimistic belief in the 
development o f humanity:
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What he did see before him was the spectacle of some men, civilized by 
any standards, who were kept down, or discriminated against, or 
persecuted by prejudice, stupidity, ‘collective mediocrity’; he saw such 
men deprived o f what he regarded as their most essential rights, and he 
protested. He believed that all human progress, all human greatness and 
virtue and freedom, depended chiefly on the preservation of such men 
and the clearing o f paths before them. (197)
Berlin regards Mill as a humanist pursuing an ideal of freedom. For Mill, according to 
Berlin, human happiness is an ideal end o f life “ [a] realization of one’s wishes” (181). 
This ultimate end of utilitarianism is to realise honestly what freedom is and how it 
benefits all humanity. M ill’s humanistic idealism can be seen in his thought of religion: 
“He revered Christ as the best man who ever lived, and regarded theism as a noble, 
though to him unintelligible, set o f beliefs... He was, in fact, a Victorian agnostic who 
was uncomfortable with atheism and regarded religion as something that was 
exclusively the individual’s own affair” (Berlin 204). We may consider Mill as a 
secular and untraditional Christian who searches for an ideal in religion, society and 
humanity, which is in accordance with his own moral standard. Thus, we can say that 
Mill’s concept of freedom is his hope for humanity, for he regards freedom as “a 
condition in which men were not prevented from choosing both the object and the 
manner of their worship. For him only a society in which this condition was realized 
could be called fully human” (Berlin 206). This is Mill’s ideal of society based on 
utilitarian morality, and his ambition is to fulfil the principle of utility.
As Roger Crisp also comments, Mill believes that “these customary obligations are 
securely grounded on the principle o f utility... [and] the failure to fulfil them may well 
result in harm to others” (182). Mill encourages us to realise our capacity for 
self-development through personal practice. “For autonomy to count as a constituent 
of individuality and so o f welfare, it must be exercised in the development of one’s
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own potentialities” (Crisp 196). His conception of utilitarianism aims at developing 
individuality, which brings humans to automatically consider the welfare of others 
and see it as a way for fulfilling human happiness. “Without individuality, there is no 
life of higher pleasures. In that sense, at least, individuality is the highest of all 
pleasures” (Crisp 199). After all, the self-development of individuality is the highest 
notion that Mill addresses in his theory o f utility.
Don Habibi compares M ill’s theory o f utility to human growth. He argues that “Mill’s 
aim was to impress upon people the value o f growth. He left it up to the individual to 
decide how and in what direction to grow” (47), Mill maintains a higher standard 
which is for the individuals in “an elite class” (35) but not for the common people. 
Mill “perceives the ignorance and intolerance of the masses as a threat to individuality, 
liberty, and growth”, while conversely he regards democracy as “a system designed to 
promote the good of the people” (ibid.). The rare individuals, for Mill, are able to 
conceive of the errors in traditional morality and act upon utilitarian principles. Mill 
expects to inculcate his concept o f individuality into an elite class, inspiring them to 
develop themselves first and others later (ibid.), and morality grounded in Mill’s 
utilitarianism is the means that helps individuals fulfil the principle of utility, as 
Habibi argues,
For Mill, cultivating our human capacities and elevating others are the 
most worthwhile and profitable activities. They are so valuable because 
they lead to the refinement o f our moral faculties and to higher forms of 
happiness. They are the means by which we build and achieve social 
advancement. It is this process of growth that moves us toward the 
ultimate kind o f satisfaction and fulfillment. (77)
Mill offers the possibility o f happiness and fulfilment through self-development and 
the consciousness o f individuality. Habibi concludes that Mill wants to help people 
attain the highest level o f happiness: “He charted a path of ‘human development in its
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richest diversity’ for reaching our ultimate destination. He tried to guide us to this 
path, though he never provided a map. It was up to each of us to make our own path 
and find our own ultimate destination. He sought to convey this message through his 
growth ethic (250-251). M ill’s intention is to guide us to be conscious of the capacity 
of our growth.
Utilitarian morality is a self-conscious standard that measures human conduct. Mill 
claims that utilitarianism “could only attain its end by the general cultivation of 
nobleness o f character, even if  each individual were only benefited by the nobleness 
of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from 
the benefit” (U 142). In M ill’s view, utilitarian morality helps humankind elevate 
itself and protect individual liberty, in order to pursue for the ultimate end of 
utilitarianism, i.e. the welfare and the universal happiness of all humanity. According 
to Mill, utilitarian morality is the means to attain human happiness and promote the 
progress of society. But I argue that M ill’s utilitarianism, including his concept of 
accepting a diversity o f opinions, should not be considered as the obligatory means 
for humankind to attain human development. I agree with Mill who claims that every 
person is distinctive and criticises customary morality that hinders us from being an 
individual. But Mill argues: “Human beings owe to each other help to distinguish the 
better from the worse, and encouragement to choose the former and avoid the latter” 
(L 84). Regarding this point, I do not agree that Mill sees this attitude as an obligation 
for all humanity.
According to M ill’s understanding o f  individuality, people are able to help each other 
as part of their nature, but this behaviour cannot be regulated as compulsory but must 
be voluntary. As Mill continues, i f  a person displeases us, we “may express our
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distaste” and “stand aloof from a person as well as from a thing that displeases us” but 
we shall not “feel called on to make his life uncomfortable”. Moreover, “the worst we 
shall think ourselves justified in doing is leaving him to himself, if we do not interfere 
benevolently by showing interest or concern for him” (L 88). I do not mean that 
treating others equally is wrong, but I point out that Mill’s viewpoint is questionable 
because he ignores that human nature is flexible but insists solely on this one precept, 
that is, treating others equally, as an obligatory rule that all of us should follow in 
order to achieve happiness, the ultimate end o f his utilitarianism. I argue that Mill 
does not need to ‘overemphasise’ his concepts as a principle that we ‘shall’ follow. On 
the contrary, concerning others’ need is part o f our nature; we do not need to regulate 
it because it changes according to different people and situations. We can provide our 
suggestion to others and help them but we cannot say they have to accept our help 
because we think it is right and helpful. We are unable to know precisely what others 
feel but only feel ourselves; the fact is that everyone is different. The uniqueness of 
humanity is what Mill ignores when he emphasises the purpose of his utilitarianism. 
What makes a person feel good might be bad to others, for example, as Mill tells us: 
“The same things which are helps to one person towards the cultivation of his higher 
nature, are hindrances to another. The same mode of life is a healthy excitement to 
one, keeping all his faculties of action and enjoyment in their best order, while to 
another it is a distracting burthen, which suspends or crushes all internal life” (L 75). 
In this respect, to feel good or harmful must be measured not according to the givers 
who provide help and thinks his conduct is good but according to every receiver 
stance.
Mill’s conception of not hurting others and making their lives uncomfortable (L 88) is 
according to his point o f view, but I have to say this view is partial. Though Mill says
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that we should maintain our individual liberty, and argues that the term ‘duty to 
oneself’ means self-respect or self-development (L 87), his insistence on maintaining 
individual liberty and equality however becomes a blind spot that limits his view of 
humanity in his utilitarian conception. In other words, MilL seemingly uses his notion 
of individuality as a powerful means to advocate and convince the necessity of a new 
moral formula: utilitarianism. Regarding this, this is the reason why Nietzsche 
criticises Mill’s utilitarianism is because Mill establishes a new standard of good and 
evil that he considers as a good formula for people. As Nietzsche comments on the 
mediocre Englishman like Darwin, Spencer and Mill: “they do not even start out in 
any propitious relationship to ‘rules’. In the end they have more to do than merely to 
perceive, and that is to be something new, to signify something new, and to represent 
new values” (BGE 253). In this way, there is not much difference between Mill’s 
utilitarian morality and Christian morality because both ignore the difference between 
individual humans and inculcate people what is right and wrong according to their 
own value and judgement. As John Gary argues that Mill’s doctrine of liberty “is 
weakened...if it has to depend on M ill’s Comtist view o f the progressive stages of 
human society, or on his claims for utilitarianism as a religion of humanity” (123).
In addition, Nietzsche criticises Mill for misleading us to assume that humans should 
strive for happiness and avoid pain, according to Mill’s theory of utility. But for 
Nietzsche, this is a misconception o f humanity and life. As Solomon and Higgins 
argue, “Nietzsche rejected the basic theoretical underpinnings of utilitarianism -  in 
particular, the utilitarian presupposition that one should aim to maximize pleasure and 
minimize pain, which struck Nietzsche as absurd”; “Pleasure and pain are experienced 
together” for Nietzsche, and “the most effective strategy for minimizing pain, 
blunting one’s sensibility, makes one ill-equipped to experience pleasure” (166).
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Nietzsche does not agree that humankind should strive to get rid of pain and approach 
happiness as Mill argues. On the contrary, Nietzsche asserts that pleasure and pain can 
only be understood personally according to the self-interpreting ability, as he 
explicates, “a violent stimulus is experienced as pleasure or pain is a matter of the 
interpreting intellect, which, to be sure, generally works without our being conscious 
of it; and one and the same stimulus can be interpreted as pleasure or pain” (GS 127). 
However we interpret pleasure or pain, Nietzsche claims that it is a necessary stimulus 
that helps humankind to understand life through experience and develop itself without 
being dominated by tradition and morality. The purpose of Nietzsche’s attack on 
Christian morality is not “to remove m en’s chains, but rather to force men, under a 
heavier burden, to attain to a higher rank” (Karl Jaspers 95). This burden means that 
men can no longer depend on any formula of morality but men themselves so as to 
attain their development and live independently. Different from Mill who claims 
individualistic utilitarianism for the welfare of humanity, Nietzsche provides a new 
reflection for interpreting morality and the value o f individuality.
Nietzsche’s concern with culture and individuality leads him to spurn the desire to 
construct a rule-based ethics in place o f customary morality. As Conway in Nietzsche 
and the Political claims: “The laws o f an omni-inclusive ethical community would 
express only the commonalities and banalities o f the individuals involved, rather than 
their unique strengths and virtues” (1997: 30), Christianity inhibits us from perceiving 
that we are unique and distinctive from each other. Regarding this point, Nietzsche 
raises the question: “What kind o f people would choose to (or have to) live this way?” 
(Solomon 53) Nietzsche perceives that Christian morality has deeply influenced 
human history, and attempts to break its bad effects on humanity. He sees the cultural 
illness transmitted through Christian morality, and proclaims that there is a need of “a
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critique o f moral values, the value o f  these values itself should first o f  all he called 
into question” (GM Preface: 6). Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy o f  Morals will show us 
how he condemns Christian morality. He strives to show us how we intellectually 
reexamine the values that stem from tradition and Christian morality and overcome 
the sick condition through self-realisation. My analysis of the Genealogy will be 
divided into two parts. The first part analyses how Nietzsche considers Christian 
morality as a slave morality, and criticises its domination of humanity. The second 
part discusses how Nietzsche examines his account o f the individual, showing a 
possibility of overcoming nihilism and living with a free spirit beyond the domination 
of tradition and morality.
3.2 Nietzsche’s Conceptions of Morality and Individual
In his criticism of Christian morality, Nietzsche firstly attacks Christian morality 
which tyrannises humanity by providing the conception of God that separates 
imperfect man from the perfect and omnipotent Being, and inverting the notions of 
good and bad to the notions o f good and evil for polarising humanity. Nietzsche 
argues that the noble and the slave had existed as the ruler and the ruled of society in 
the pre-moral time, and people lived and affirmed life with energy according to the 
aristocratic noble morality which existed in human history before Christian morality. 
At that time, good means “the noble, the powerful, the superior, and the high-minded”, 
the ones who “felt themselves and their actions to be good” and bad, in contrast, 
means “everything low, low-minded, common, and plebeian” (GM I: 2). The notions 
of good and bad are originally no connection to Christian moralistic value-judgement. 
However, the Jews and Christians bring the conceptions of God and redemption, 
inculcating the poisonous ideal to human consciousness with their monotheistic
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“priestly mode of evaluation” (GM I: 7) in order to tame humankind, as Nietzsche 
criticises the Jews and Christians who use “an art o f the most intelligent revenge” to 
reverse and transvalue the original concepts of good and bad in order to defeat their 
enemies. They emphasise the contrast between the noble and the slave according to
their moral values of good and evil:
It has been the Jews who have...dared to undertake the reversal of the 
aristocratic value equation (good=noble=powerful=beautiful=happy 
=blessed) and have held on to it tenaciously by the teeth of the most 
unfathomable hatred (the hatred of the powerless). It is they who have 
declared: ‘The miserable alone are the good; the poor, the powerless, the 
low alone are good. The suffering, the deprived, the sick, the ugly are the 
only pious ones, the only blessed, from them alone is there salvation. You, 
on the other hand, the noble and the powerful, you are for all eternity the 
evil, the cruel, the lascivious, the insatiable, the godless ones. You will be 
without salvation, accursed and damned to all eternity!’ (GM I: 7)
Christianity contrasts the slave with the noble and makes the slave feel resentful38 of
being ruled by the noble according to Christian value-judgement o f good and evil.
Under the domination o f Christian morality, the typified slave morality, the slave is
motivated by his repressed resentment to finally revolt in morals and declare the war
between the noble and the slave in order to preserve itself: “The slave revolt in morals
begins when ressentiment itself becomes creative and ordains values: the ressentiment
of creatures to whom the real reaction, that o f the deed, is denied and who find
compensation in an imaginary revenge” (GM I: 10). The slave begins to consciously
react against its enemy through resentment, as Nietzsche argues: “Let us [the slave] be
different from the evil, that is, good! And the good man is the one who refrains from
violation, who leaves revenge to God, who lives as we do in seclusion, who avoids all
evil and above all asks little o f life, as we do, the patient, the humble, the just” (GM I:
13). As a result, there is a continuous contrast between the noble and the slave in
38 As Nietzsche explicates, “the reversal o f  the evaluating gaze -  this necessary orientation outwards 
rather than inwards to the s e l f ’ is the essential characteristic o f  resentment. (GM I: 10)
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human history.
The slave attempts to avenge himself on the noble by conceiving of himself good and 
contrasting with the noble, and blaming on the noble, the evil. In this way, the conflict 
between noble morality and slave morality then turns to be a ceaseless spiritual battle 
in which the resentment helps slave morality transform itself to overpower noble
morality, as shown in the conflict between the Romans and the Jews:
The Romans were the strong and noble men, stronger and nobler than 
they had ever been on earth, or even dreamed themselves to be...The 
Jews conversely were the priestly people of ressentiment par excellence, 
with an innate genius in matters o f popular morality...consider before 
whom one bows today in Rome as before the epitome of all the highest 
values -  and not only in Rome, but over almost half the world, wherever 
man has been tamed or wants to be tamed -  before three Jews, as one 
knows, and one Jewess. . .This is most remarkable: there is no doubt that 
Rome has been defeated. (GM I: 16)
In the battle of the noble and the slave, the slave imagines himself as “an after-image 
and counterpart” of the noble (GM I: 10), and spiritually inverts himself from the 
enemy of the noble to a ‘good’ man in his consciousness. On the contrary, the noble 
who is basically dull and takes his power and superiority for granted falsifies “the 
image of those despised” and is spiritually attacked and defeated by his enemy with 
imagery revenge. Slave morality, according to the contrast between the Romans and 
the Jews, transforms itself to spiritually defeat noble morality in the battle. In 
consequence, as Nietzsche explicates: “The ‘masters’ are done away with; the 
morality of the common man has won” (GM I: 9), Christian morality successfully
• TOdefeats the noble morality, and then civilises human culture. But Nietzsche does not
39 Nietzsche does not deny that it is Christian morality that makes humans become more interesting 
animals, as he argues: “Human history would be a much too stupid affair were it not for the intelligence 
introduced by the powerless [priests]” (GM I: 7). Nietzsche here claims that the priests’ evaluation o f  
morality which reverse noble morality, and the slave’ reaction to morals that make humankind think 
about its development and the knowledge o f  good and evil.
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regard this consequence is healthy to humanity; oppositely, he claims that Christianity 
is a tyranny which spreads a poison rapidly everywhere to undermine humanity: “The 
‘redemption’ of humanity (from the ‘masters’, that is) is proceeding apace; everything 
is visibly becoming more Jewish or Christian or plebeian (what does the terminology 
matter!). The progress o f this poison through the entire body o f mankind seems 
“inexorable” (GM I: 9). By negating the noble, Christianity makes the slave imagine 
not only being good for self-preservation but also being able to spiritually defeat his 
enemy. This resentful attitude is harmful to people and causes them to become weak 
and weary in facing life, according to Nietzsche. Thus: “We weak men are, after all, 
weak; it would be good if  we refrained from doing anything fo r  which we lack 
sufficient strength” (GM I: 13), the fact is that the slave who spiritually overcomes the 
noble is, in real life, incapable o f competing and defeating the noble. Christian 
morality continuously contrasts the slave with the noble by way of making the slave, 
who lacks strength to affirm life, keep conflicting inwards with resentment. The battle 
between the noble and the slave will never be finished, under the influence of 
Christianity, and people are unaware that they turn to be a tame, weak and pessimistic 
thinking animal-man who is deceived by consciousness and controlled by Christian 
morality. In consequence, man finally lives without strength and even loses 
confidence to affirm life and develop the self. As Nietzsche argues that the human 
being is bred by culture to be a civilised and domestic animal (GM I: 11); in other 
words, we are accustomed to clinging to what we are taught by history, custom and 
morality, judging humanity according to the conceptions of good and evil in 
Christianity. Christian morality, the slave morality, “is obsessed with the category of 
evil, and its virtues are for the most part banal and mere obedience” (Solomon 52). In 
order to make people obedient, Christianity invents the conceptions of good and evil, 
and uses them as the means to control humanity. “In every oligarchy -  the whole of
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history teaches us this -  the desire for tyranny always lies hidden” (GM III: 19). The 
intention of Christianity, for Nietzsche, is to tyrannise humanity and make people 
obedient under the doctrine of Christian morality.
Nietzsche likewise condemns Christianity for devaluing humanity by inventing the 
concepts of original sin and guilt, and regards human beings as sinful creatures. In the 
pre-historical time, humans are cultivated by the morality of custom to have 
conscience, which is used for regulating and measuring human conduct in society, 
through harshness and punishment. “In this picture o f human evolution, conscience is 
not viewed as some kind of metaphysical entity unique to each individual, but as a 
moral faculty which is the product o f a historical labour of culture or civilisation” 
(Ansell-Pearson 1994: 135). In this way, the morality o f custom makes the 
animal-man to adapt to society, to follow regulations and to behave as a communal 
being with memory and a sense o f responsibility. The concept of guilt in earlier ages 
is different from that in modernity. It derives ultimately from the conception of debt 
(GM II: 4). Man wants to show he is not only different and superior to other animals 
but also is able to designate him self as “the being who estimates values, who 
evaluates and measures, as the ‘measuring animal’” (GM II: 8), and thus uses the 
concept of guilt as a means for measuring himself against another. The relationship 
between debtor and creditor, according to Nietzsche, is regarded as a contractual 
matter. In this process, both debtor and creditor are responsible to each other for 
making their promises (GM II: 5). The debtor gives the possessions to the creditor in 
order to guarantee his promise. Conversely, the creditor feels pleased to make the 
debtor suffer and is able to demand everything from him. In this respect, the 
relationship between debtor and creditor implies an obliged, habitual but coerce 
interaction which precedes “society” in the modem sense. The relationship between
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debtor and creditor becomes a legal and communal obligation that in turn gives rise to 
“the moral conceptual world o f ‘guilt’, ‘conscience’, ‘duty’, ‘sacred duty’ which 
emerges from the human society containing torture and cruelty (GM II: 6).
This is how humanity is morally trained through violence and coercion in society. But 
Nietzsche argues that the situation changes and worsens when Christianity provides 
an inerasable sense of indebtedness to God with the concept of original sin, and 
regards humans as sinful herd animals. As Nietzsche claims: “In ‘God’ he [human] 
apprehends the ultimate opposing principle to his actual and irredeemable animal 
instincts, he himself reinterprets these animal instincts as a debt towards God” (GM II: 
22). Inculcated by Christianity, people feel ashamed o f their animal-like nature which 
is in contrast to the perfection o f God, and believe that they can only release from the 
suffering of life and be redeemed by obeying the doctrine of Christianity. This longing 
for redemption nevertheless causes humankind to negate the self and lose the ability 
to create and affirm life: “On his way to becoming an ‘angel’, man has bred for 
himself that dyspepsia and furred tongue, as a result of which not only the joy and 
innocence of the animal have become repugnant to him but even life itself has lost its 
savour” (GM II: 7). Christianity misleads humans to feel guilty for their sin and 
restrain their animalike instincts as an obligation for the purpose of being saved. This 
fixed moral form of evaluation which judges people equally as “unhappy, arrogant, 
and repulsive creatures who are completely incapable of casting off a profound 
dissatisfaction with themselves, with the earth, with life as a whole” (GM III: 11), in 
Nietzsche’s view, inculcates the concept o f sin and uses it as a means to offer a 
life-negating and pessimistic attitude towards human nature for formulating the 
morality of herd in human culture. “The most important characteristic of the morality 
of the herd is that it negates all distinctions and all differences between human
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beings...The morality o f the herd is an ideology o f equality. For that reason it 
cultivates culpability: the subordination under a highest authority to whom everyone 
is equal” (Tongeren 395) Under the domination of the morality of herd, man on the 
one hand wants to express his instinct but on the other hand forces himself to suppress 
it in and through his subjection to Christianity. In consequence, man contradicts 
himself and succumbs to Christian morality as a tame and unhealthy animal-man by 
repressing the instinct inwards. As Nietzsche explains, “man’s suffering from man, 
from himself, this as a result o f a violent separation from his animal past, of a leap 
which is also a fall into new situations and conditions of existence, of a declaration of 
war against the old instincts, which previously constituted the basis of his strength, 
pleasure, and fearfulness” (GM II: 16).
Following Christian precepts, people assume that they should inhibit animality in 
order to be good. Nietzsche contends that it is this obstinate misconception that makes 
people continuously afflict in self-contradiction and emerge bad conscience. As he 
states,
The man who is forced into an oppressively narrow and regular 
morality... this animal which is to be ‘tamed’, which rubs himself raw on 
the bars of his cage, this deprived man [....] who had no choice but to 
transform himself into an adventure, a place o f torture, an uncertain and 
dangerous wilderness -  this fool, this yearning and desperate prisoner 
became the inventor o f ‘bad conscience’. (GM II: 16)
Bad conscience, for Nietzsche, is seen to be a self-torturing sickness for humanity. 
Nietzsche considers bad conscience as a serious illness that stems from Christian 
morality and represses the human capacity and confidence to affirm life. Nietzsche, 
on the other hand, views bad conscience a necessity that stimulates humankind as the 
potential to start reflecting and fashioning the self through the process of 
self-conflicting and self-struggling, like pregnancy, to enhance humanity. For
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Nietzsche, as Guay argues, bad conscience can possibly render human character and 
human action “a matter o f self-determination” and perceive how we, “although 
natural beings, could nevertheless come to hold ourselves to self-originating but 
nevertheless objective standards” (362). Accordingly, we may say the self is possible 
to be cultivated and developed by means of bad conscience, according to Nietzsche, 
but the prerequisite condition is that man is conscious of his need for enhancing the 
self.
Both Mill and Nietzsche elucidate how Christianity dominates and limits humanity. 
Mill criticises Christian morality which forces people to passively obey a fixed 
formula without permitting a diversity o f opinions. Compared with Mill, Nietzsche 
too objects that it tyrannically polarises human nature by its bipolar conceptions of 
good and evil and misleads us to believe we were bom with inerasable sin and can 
only be redeemed by relying on its precepts. Christianity misguides us to assume life 
is replete with endless suffering and the only way to release ourselves from suffering 
is to follow Christian morality and ask for redemption. Nietzsche argues that 
Christianity does not develop humanity but keeps them indefinitely in the restriction 
of culture and tradition. Mill and Nietzsche attack Christian morality and argue the 
concept of individuality; however, their responses are different. “Mill and Nietzsche 
also shared a belief in the idea o f exceptional individuals. Nietzsche’s ‘Superman’ 
ideal is a familiar feature o f his thought, even in caricature. It is a more decided notion 
than Mill’s picture o f a refined, reflective and high-feeling Aristotelian ‘great soul’” 
(Grayling 160). Mill corrects Christian morality by advocating a new and ideal norm 
of morality, i.e. utilitarian morality. He argues that utilitarianism is essential and 
necessary for protecting individual liberty from being dominated by Christian 
morality. What Mill does is direct us to view and follow another necessary ideal moral
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regulation, which he believes is better than Christian morality. Mill expects to have a 
harmonious and balanced society based on the principle of utilitarian morality, and 
claims that this principle would help individuals discover their way of life. For Mill, 
utilitarianism is considered as the precondition for developing individuality.
Nietzsche does not assert any formula o f morality as Mill does, as Kaufmann 
comments, “Nietzsche’s generic conception of morality is best understood in terms of 
a brief contrast with the rival utilitarian definition” (1974: 212). Nietzsche claims that 
Christianity inculcates a monotheistic asceticism with the goal of controlling human 
history without allowing “other interpretations” and “other goal”. This ascetic ideal 
“reproaches, negates, affirms, confirms exclusively with reference to its 
interpretation” (GM III: 23). Nietzsche points out that all the conceptions taught by 
Christianity are its absolute and petty interpretation of human nature and life that 
Christianity uses for dominating humanity. He also explicates that sin “has been the 
greatest event so far in the history o f the sick soul: it represents the most dangerous 
and fateful trick of religious interpretation” (GM III: 21). Nietzsche does not agree 
that human nature should be measured and judged according to Christian conceptions 
of good and evil, and rejects that man can only be redeemed through Christian 
precepts. In contrast, he contends that Christianity ignores the possibility of 
individuality and limits the human potential to affirm life by inculcating an inflexible 
and pessimistic interpretation to our culture and building up another unattainable 
reality above earth. As Tongeren says, it is a reality “in which there is no change but 
eternity, in which there is no struggle but only peace” (398). Christian morality which 
is “concealed beneath the cloak o f holy intentions”, for Nietzsche, “has thus carved its 
fearful and unforgettable inscription into the whole history of mankind; and, 
unfortunately, into more than just its history (GM III: 21). Nietzsche here unfolds how
133
Christianity controls human history according to its fixed and absolute interpretation 
and judgement on humanity.
As a result, Christianity denies the self and negates the affirmation of reality as it is. 
Perceiving the sick condition in which man lives, Nietzsche brings us to view 
Christian morality in a different way, in order to release ourselves from its dominant 
conceptions o f good and evil and become independent through self-interpretation. As 
he argues, “Perspectival seeing is the only kind of seeing there is, perspectival 
‘knowing’ the only kind o f ‘knowing’; and the more feelings about a matter which we 
allow to come to expression, the more eyes, different eyes through which we are able 
to view this same matter, the more complete our ‘conception’ of it, our ‘objectivity’, 
will be” (GM III: 12). Mill who stresses the domination of Christian morality on 
humanity and the need for utilitarian morality, which is considered by Mill as a means 
to protect individual and enhance humanity for achieving happiness; nevertheless, 
Nietzsche is concerned to promote the potential to interpret and transform ourselves 
through self-reflection and self-overcoming. The key to develop humanity and be 
individual, from Nietzsche’s standpoint, is not to follow any mode of morality but to 
know we are able to create values and cultivate ourselves through self-reflection 
without relying on the negative mode of evaluation in Christianity. “Nietzsche finds 
that degenerate concepts arise from the negative evaluation of the earth. He suggests 
that an alternative response to the earth first requires a higher valuation of the subject 
than as a vehicle for a moralising cognition over which it has no control” (Peter 
Murray 176). Nietzsche wants to revalue the concepts in Christianity, and his criticism 
of Christian morality envisages a possible condition for developing the self and 
experiencing life with self-realisation and responsibility. Nietzsche emphasises “a 
certain kind o f cultivation, an exquisiteness of taste, a way of bearing and thinking
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about oneself’ (Solomon 45), claiming that individuality is possible when we are able 
to liberate ourselves from the restriction o f Christian value and judgement.
The concept of individuality is paramount for Nietzsche. The moral problem 
“concerns the perfection, not o f society, nor o f the masses of men but of the great 
individual” (Josiah Royce 270). As Nietzsche says, “we find as the ripest fruit on their 
tree the sovereign individual, the individual who resembles no one but himself, who 
has once again broken away from the morality of custom, the autonomous 
supra-moral individual” (GM II: 2). He indicates the concept of the sovereign 
individual: an original individual who is capable of constantly overcoming itself and 
stands independently without being confined to any norm of morality. In ancient ages, 
the morality o f custom cultivated people by way of harshness and coercion and made 
them behave morally. In this process o f cultivation, Nietzsche envisions the 
self-interpreting individual as the ripe but late fruit: “To be able to vouch for oneself, 
and to do so with pride, and so to have the right to affirm oneself -  that is, I have said, 
a ripe fruit, but also a late fruit” (GM II: 3). The individual is able to interpret his 
conduct through self-overcoming and is responsible for it beyond the level o f the 
morality of custom. He has autonomy and affirms his life with power and freedom. 
However, the potential to individuality in modernity has been impeded when people 
regard Christian morality as an indispensable way for living. Nietzsche contends that 
the civilised human beings in modernity, under the influence of Christianity, have lost 
the ability to be self-reliant and self-supporting but live pessimistically as tame herd 
animals.
Conway, in Nietzsche and the Political, argues that modem man lives with bad 
conscience, which as “a fiercely vigilant homunculus responsible for reckoning one’s
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debts and obligations, represents the final -  and most forbidding -  barrier to genuine 
sovereignty” (1997: 19). Christianity tames humans by means of its precepts and 
prevents them from being able to live affirmatively with a free spirit. Modem culture 
is harmful to the self without providing the conceptions of individuality and 
life-affirmation; modernity becomes a disgrace to all humankind (GM I: 11). Christian 
morality is to obstacle the individual; it denies the value of the self and leads people to 
nihilism. In consequence, modernity reveals a perilous sign of the degenerate morality 
in which the affirmative value o f the self and life has been taken away. “The 
Genealogy's fundamental aim is to re-present our slavish self-interpretation in terms 
of original sin as not necessary...and thereby to open the possibility of our existing 
otherwise, as redeemed from a sense o f ourselves as requiring divine redemption” 
(Stephen Mulhall 44). Nietzsche strives to prevent individuality from being 
diminished by social normalization and moralization (Thiele 1990: 40) and provides 
us with a powerful impetus to reexamine morality and rethink the value of the 
individual. Nietzsche emphasises the possibility of individuality through 
self-realisation and self-overcoming. Thus in the sovereign individual “we find a 
proud consciousness, tense in every muscle, o f what has finally been achieved here, of 
what has become incarnate in him -  a special consciousness of power and freedom, a 
feeling of the ultimate completion o f man. (GM II: 2).
Mill claims the importance o f individual liberty, elucidating that it has to be 
maintained in accordance with the theory o f utility. In contrast, Nietzsche holds that 
individuality is attained through personal reflection and examination. As 
Ansell-Pearson comments, “an essential part o f Nietzsche’s thinking beyond good and 
evil is that a virtue has to be the personal invention of each individual” (1994: 136). 
Furthermore, Nietzsche understands that being the self-interpreting and autonomous
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individual is not a necessity for everyone. It is, according to Nietzsche, for those few 
who “can only attain ‘value’ by placing themselves in the service of culture (which for 
him [Nietzsche] means the cultivation of great or true human beings) and by 
representing, in some sense, the ascending forces o f ‘life’” (Ansell-Pearson 1994: 11). 
For Nietzsche, the self cannot be developed when we still rely on Christianity and 
expect for being guided and redeemed by tradition and Christian morality. “The sense 
of guilt towards the divinity has continued to grow for several thousands of years, and 
always in the same proportion as the concept of sense of god has grown and risen into 
the heights” (GM II: 20). Nietzsche argues that we habitually allow ourselves to 
believe and regard the conceptions o f guilt and redemption, which are inculcated by 
Christianity to human history, as an essential and compulsory way of life. Christianity 
offers us a pessimistic attitude towards life, but Nietzsche suggests we view life 
alternatively and rely on ourselves. The value of life depends on how we are able to 
evaluate it by our interpretation and be willing to affirm it. Nietzsche claims that the 
potential to develop the self and be an individual with freedom is not according to 
how we absolutely obey Christian morality but how we intellectually reflect ourselves 
and experience life through self-overcoming. Individual freedom, for Nietzsche, 
means self-mastery beyond any norm of morality: “the manly instincts that delight in 
war and victory have gained mastery over the other instincts -  for example, over the 
instinct for ‘happiness’...The free man is a warrior” (TI 9: 38). In this way, freedom 
for the individual is the consequence o f self-affirmation. Nietzsche’s remark on 
freedom, as Schacht argues, is associated with the assumption of responsibility for 
what one does (1983: 307). In other words, the individual can overcome and master 
itself and thus affirms life with assurance.
In Nietzsche and the Political, Conway also argues that Nietzsche’s concept of
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self-overcoming aims to “gain for oneself of freedom from the limitations of one’s 
age, in order that one might command an expanded range of affective engagement and 
expression” (1997: 65). For Nietzsche, self-overcoming is a road for
self-transformation to individuality with an alternative attitude toward human and life. 
Self-overcoming is not to devalue the current self but to constantly create a new self 
derived from the current one. The original self is weak because it is under the 
domination of Christian culture. The importance is to awaken and transform the 
repressed self to be original in the process o f self-reflection. The individual makes 
himself a promise for his “next self arises only in the practice of one’s refusal of one’s 
current self’ (ibid.: 67). In this way, the individual is able to transform him or herself 
through internalisation. With regard to the conception of self-development, there is 
the way that Nietzsche recommends: to turn the soul inside out (ibid.: 69). One has 
firstly to recognise him self and then raises one’s soul in order to renew the self, as 
claimed by Conway, “as a volcanic eruption augments the landscape it disfigures, so 
self-overcoming increases the dimensionality and surface area of the soul, allowing 
for an expanded range o f capacities and expressions” (ibid.). This unceasing process 
is harsh but necessary for attaining self-development. Simply put, the individual 
guards himself as a warrior who “lives only to test himself in battle” (ibid.), in order 
to reveal his responsibility for life and existence through his way of life.
Ansell-Pearson, in Nietzsche Contra Rousseau: A study o f  Nietzsche’s moral and 
political thought, also offers a comparative commentary on Nietzsche’s concept of the 
sovereign individual. He argues that both Rousseau and Nietzsche want to “offer a 
teaching on how to live one’s life which is in accordance with nature” (1991: 102). 
But Nietzsche offers an exceptional teaching: “there is neither a fixed and immutable 
human nature for the individual to live in accordance with, nor an eternal moral order
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on which one could base a deduction of the social and political. Rather, it is the law of 
life that everything must overcome itself again and again without final goal or 
ultimate purpose (ibid.: 102). Ansell-Pearson points out Nietzsche’s concern for 
self-overcoming and considers it the law of life that Nietzsche claims. 
Self-overcoming is considered self-reflection that challenges and develops the self. 
This is an autonomous process for the individual because he alone is responsible for 
his own conduct. Nietzsche is concerned with a new culture that is free from Christian 
tradition and morality. We are never self-critical and independent, according to 
Nietzsche, if we follow Christian morality. “Nietzsche’s originality lies in his attempt 
to demonstrate the necessity o f a revaluation o f the value o f morality by showing that 
it is the result o f a particular historical labour of culture, and hence is shown to be 
neither universal nor natural” (ibid.: 104). Ansell-Pearson argues that Christian 
morality blocks modern people from achieving an authentic conception of 
individuality, and bad conscience in modem culture causes people’s resentment. This 
is how Christian morality dominates and manipulates us. But the concept of the 
sovereign individual reveals the possibility to be supramoral: man is able to “become 
a reflective being concerned with the moral origins of actions” only through “the 
cultivation of self-knowledge” (ibid.: 138). The sovereign individual lives on 
affirming himself at any moment with a free spirit. He is different from others because 
he is the ripest but latest product o f human history. After all, in Nietzsche’s view, the 
sovereign individual stands as a promise o f his arrival and his responsibility for life 
and represents a new era o f culture for human history. As Ansell-Pearson tells us: “For 
Nietzsche the arrival o f the autonomous individual should not be regarded as an 
occasion for establishing a communal ethic on a rational foundation, but rather for 
producing aristocratic sovereign individuals who are unique, and who bear a will to 
self-responsibility” (ibid.: 140). The sovereign individual is not a symbol for social
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community. It is rather Nietzsche’s attempt to assert the value of the self through 
self-overcoming. “The sovereign individual displays courage and independence, for it 
enters into social relationships with others on the basis of a proud awareness of its 
sovereignty over itself, and o f its distinction from others” (ibid.: 141). The sovereign 
individual manifests a new social and cultural structure and Nietzsche’s conception of 
individuality is the basis o f this new culture.
Nietzsche’s attack on Christian morality is “against all fixated and derived 
phenomena of generally accepted morality and points beyond to the source of 
morality itself in a universally valid ought” (Jaspers 103). Nietzsche raises the 
problems of morality but leaves them to all o f us for pondering and reflecting on 
ourselves. This is the task o f all human beings: to overcome the animality of human 
nature through self-reflection, to raise the self and to affirm life. As Schacht 
comments: “What moralities fundamentally convey, on Nietzsche’s view, are norms 
of human life (1983: 428). Condemning the domination of Christianity over human 
culture and providing the concept o f an original and exceptional individual who 
accepts responsibility for his own existence, Nietzsche elevates humanity by implying 
that we live in an unhealthy condition, and suggests we recover our confidence and 
experience life with affirmation. His notion o f morality is his contribution to 
humankind in modem culture: to remind us of the importance of the self and 
life-affirmation. In his criticism, Nietzsche chooses a sceptical view to expose the 
problems of morality and claims his moral judgement of modem culture and his 
stance on individuality. His moral judgement cannot be categorised by any formula of 
morality, and his notion o f individuality reveals the potential to human development 
and better human culture. Nietzsche clearly evinces a deep concern regarding the 
development o f humanity and the value o f individuality. From his viewpoint of
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human nature in chapter two to his criticism of Christian morality in this chapter, we 
can see how Nietzsche develops his perspective of humanity, morality and culture. In 
the next chapter, I examine Nietzsche’s later works in comparison with Emerson’s 
essays and analyse the stance that Nietzsche adopts to draw attention to the 
conception of life-affirmation in m odem culture.
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Chapter 4 
An Internalised Path to Individuality
In an entry from his late notebooks from 1885-1888, Nietzsche says:
I wish men would begin by respecting themselves: everything else 
follows from that...This is something different from the blind drive to 
love oneself: nothing is more common, both in the love of the sexes and 
in that duality named ‘I ’, than contempt for what one loves, fatalism in 
love-. (Notebook 1888, 14: 205)
This exemplifies Nietzsche’s view o f humankind. On the one hand, he proclaims the 
difference between blind self-love and self-respect and on the other hand, he stresses 
the importance o f self-respect. We can respond to his wish in two ways. The first is to 
find out if we can evade the blind drive that seduces us into loving ourselves for our 
own benefit, and start instead to respect ourselves, as autonomous and responsible 
individuals. The second is to regard Nietzsche’s claim as only his wish and thereby 
ignore the possibility o f fulfilling this wish. I prefer the first option. Nietzsche 
distinguishes self-love from self-respect on account of his understanding of humanity 
on two levels. At one level, Nietzsche points out that humankind automatically loves 
itself. At another level he emphasises that self-respect is more important than self-love, 
for self-respect helps to develop humanity to a higher level of self-realisation. But we 
need to bear in mind that Nietzsche does not say that self-respect is for everyone. 
Only those rare individuals with the capacity for self-realisation and self-overcoming 
would be able to perceive it, knowing how important self-respect is. For those 
individuals, self-realisation develops the self to a higher level, and self-overcoming 
helps to liberate the self from the domination of Christian culture, morality, and 
restricted consciousness. I examine how people who realise themselves well could 
possibly respect themselves as individuals; this is the third step on the journey of
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self-cultivation. In this chapter, I explore Nietzsche’s concept of individuality by 
comparing seven essays o f Emerson with some of Nietzsche’s late works: Twilight o f  
the Idols, The Anti-Christ and Ecce Home. Nietzsche’s Writings from the Late 
Notebooks are also discussed.
There are two reasons why I choose to offer a comparative analysis of Emerson and 
Nietzsche. First, Emerson and Nietzsche both claim the importance of autonomy and 
individuality and Emerson’s thought has a great influence on Nietzsche from the time 
of his youth. There is evidence that indicates Nietzsche’s high opinion of Emerson’s 
thought. For instance, Nietzsche quoted a lot Emerson’s essays when he was 
seventeen in 1862.40 In “Nietzsche’s Earliest Essays: Translation of and Commentary 
on ‘Fate and History’ and ‘Freedom o f Will and Fate’”, George Stack claims that 
Nietzsche regards Emerson as his “soul-brother”, that he read and reread Emerson’s 
essays and then specifically copied out quotations from Emerson’s essays “in 
preparation for the composition o f Thus Spoke Zarathustra” (1993: 153). There is a 
close intellectual affinity between Nietzsche and Emerson. As Stack continues, 
Nietzsche’s early essays evidently show that he has been inspired in reading 
Emerson’s essays:
The title of the first essay, “Fate and History,” is a synthesis of two of 
Emerson’s essays, “Fate” and “History.” The second essay, “Freedom of 
Will and Fate,” takes up a theme of Emerson’s that will reverberate 
throughout Nietzsche’s writing from his earliest published works to later 
works such as Twilight o f  the Idols. That these essays of Emerson were a 
stimulating, but recent discovery o f the young Nietzsche is shown by the
40 Anthony Graybosch (1995) in M etaphilosophy  26, 1-2: 158-161, gives his commentary in reviewing 
Nietzsche and Emerson: An E lective Affinity. (1992) By George Stack. Ohio, Athens: Ohio University 
Press. With his historical evidence, Stack indicates that Nietzsche heavily copies the ideas from 
Emerson’ essays and frequently writes down “Das ist recht!” in the marginal space, showing his 
approval o f  the selected passages. Likewise in “Emerson’s Influence on N ietzsche’s Concept o f  the 
Will to Power”, George Stack (1989: 175) stresses this point, claiming that it is clearly shown in 
Stanley Hubbard’s Nietzsche und Em erson  (1958).
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misspelling o f his name (“Emmerson”) and the not yet confident control 
of his ideas. (1993:153)
In Nietzsche and Emerson: An Elective Affinity, Stack depicts more explicitly the 
connection between Emerson and Nietzsche who never met or corresponded with 
each other: “Emerson had an unknown quasi-disciple in Germany who read him 
avidly in his youth and who returned to his writings for enjoyment, inspiration, or 
stimulus of his own thought over a long period of time. Nietzsche rarely travelled 
without his Emerson” (1992: 3).
Nietzsche’s admiration o f Emerson is shown clearly in one of his letters (7 April 1866)
to Carl Von Gersdorff, which proves that Nietzsche is inspired by Emerson’s essays,41
Dear friend, once in a while there come those hours of quiet 
contemplation when, with joy and sadness mixed, we hover over our 
everyday lives, like those lovely summer days stretching themselves 
comfortably over the hills, as Emerson describes them so well. It’s then, 
as he says, that nature achieves perfection; and we -  we are then free of 
the curse o f our ever watchful will, we are then pure eye, contemplative 
and disinterested. In this most desirable o f moods I’m taking pen in hand 
to answer your kind letter, which is so full o f good ideas. (Letters 1)
Nietzsche never ceased to admire Emerson throughout his life. In The Gay Science,
for instance, Nietzsche praises Emerson so highly, saying that he is one of those who
are “worthy of being called masters o f prose” (GS 92). Nietzsche too expresses this
admiration in Twilight o f  the Idols. For Nietzsche, Emerson is “a man as instinctively
feeds on pure ambrosia and leaves alone the indigestible in things” and his spirit “is
always finding reasons for being contented and even grateful; and now and then he
verges on the cheerful transcendence o f that worthy gentleman” (TI 9: 13). Emerson
represents the spirit o f American Renaissance and Transcendentalism. The
conceptions o f individualism and self-reliance are the main doctrines advanced in
41 This information is according to David M ikics (2003: 1) in The Romance o f  Individualism in 
Emerson and Nietzsche. (Athens: Ohio University Press)
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Emerson’s essays. According to Emerson, it is through self-reliance that man is able 
to understand the significance o f life and behave autonomously, a view echoed in 
Nietzsche’s concept o f individuality.
The second reason why I choose Emerson is that his critical attitude toward 
conventional Christian doctrine is similar to Nietzsche’s attack on Christianity. 
Emerson becomes highly critical o f Christian doctrine, resigns his pulpit and turns to 
his own form of belief in God. Though the way he argues is different from Nietzsche, 
Emerson is no doubt a thinker who questions traditional Christianity and instead 
espouses self-support, self-culture and self-experimentation -  ideas that Nietzsche, 
too, upholds. I choose Nietzsche’s three books written in 1888 in order to stress his 
concern with the development o f humanity and the affirmation of life through the 
notions of self-experimentation and the revaluation o f all values expressed in his final 
works. In Twilight o f  the Idols, Nietzsche criticises tradition and received ideas in 
philosophy, stressing that humanity has to be incessantly developed and overcome 
through self-realisation. The Anti-Christ, likewise, represents Nietzsche’s most critical 
stance toward Christianity. He opposes Christian doctrine and redefines the meaning 
of Jesus’ teaching. Nietzsche proclaims the decadence of Christianity and the need for 
the revaluation o f all values. Nietzsche in Ecce Homo on the one hand conceives of 
humanity and culture, deploying his analysis step by step in his work. On the other 
hand he perceives, intends to reinterpret and better understand life through 
self-reflection.
In this chapter, my discussion will be divided into three sections. To start with, the 
first section examines the understanding of religion by discussing Emerson’s “The 
Divinity School Address”, “The Over-Soul” and Nietzsche’s The Anti-Christ.
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Emerson and Nietzsche both break with the false impression of Jesus in Christianity, 
i.e. the concept o f redemption through his incarnation, and reinterpret the significance 
of his life. The second section will concentrate on Emerson’s “Self-Reliance”, 
“Experience” and Nietzsche’s Twilight o f  the Idols, exploring the understanding of the 
mind and the soul, which brings the individual to overcome his limited nature in order 
to be a man with self-knowledge. Emerson’s “Fate”, “Heroism” and “Circles” and 
Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo will be examined in the last section, which is concerned with 
examining how man knows the self from inside and seeks to envisage how man can 
develop to live as a self-reliant and autonomous individual.
4.1 An Exploration of Religion
Man is instructed by Christian doctrine to believe that God is the Almighty and that 
man needs firstly to repent his innate sinfulness in order to be saved. In this respect, 
Jesus is defined as the redeemer who comes to save all human beings. But Emerson 
and Nietzsche both break with this erroneous doctrine of Christianity and both 
provide a new interpretation o f the significance o f God and Jesus. In this section, I am 
going to explore how Emerson and Nietzsche reinterpret God and Jesus. For Emerson, 
God is redefined not “the Almighty God” but immanent God, “the Over-Soul”, living 
in humanity itself. To begin with, I discuss some critics’ interpretations of Emerson’s 
religious outlook. David Smith in “ ‘The Sphinx Must Solve Her Own Riddle’: 
Emerson, Secrecy, and the Self-Reflexive Method” provides an approach to 
understanding Emerson’s concept o f secrecy, religious nondualism and self-reflexive 
turn. At first, Smith argues that the aim o f Emerson’s thought is “not to discover 
something hidden or to produce a more comprehensive formula” but “to lead the 
reader to a more simple and complete way o f inhabiting the territory on which he or
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she already stands” (837). Smith makes two points in response to Emerson’s thought. 
The first point is the concept o f secrecy,42 according to Smith’s understanding, which 
is used by Emerson to reveal his essential notions of God and man. Smith claims that 
Emerson provides an abstract concept indicating that many secrets in relation to God 
and man are hidden in a world that it is unable to be defined by man. Emerson’s 
self-reflexive turn is the means that he employs in order to “explore and 
performatively resolve this kind o f secret” (841). By tracing the development of 
Emerson’s notion of religion, Smith contends that Emerson “glimpses a chance for 
‘wisdom’” which guides us in learning how to identify ourselves when we are in the 
condition of uncertainty (847). Clearly, as Smith suggests, a new and positive attitude 
toward life and religion is given through Emerson’s thought in which man can find 
energy and wisdom that help to understand himself.
The importance o f Emerson’s nondualism is the second point emphasised in Smith’s 
article: “The essential art o f nondual spirituality, in turn, is to learn to finesse this 
paradox -  to learn to become who we are or to recover what was never lost and can 
never be attained” (852). According to this view, Emerson’s nondualist concept based 
on his notion of a self-reflexive turn awakens man to the knowledge that he is in 
connection with God and the universe. Thus: “The self, ceasing the struggle to grasp 
itself as an object of consciousness, finds itself, in its emptiness, in every detail of the 
world to which it belongs” (855). Moreover, Smith claims that it is better to 
understand Emerson’s thought from different perspectives, as he indicates that it is not 
his implication that “this self-reflexive method is the key to everything Emerson had 
to say” (857). From what he has stressed, Smith gives a positive response to
42 The concept o f  secrecy that Smith discusses is originated from the phrase “open secret” in a passage 
o f Emerson’s journal (1960-1982: 4.87). M y focus is not the phrase but Smith’s viewpoint o f  
Emerson’s thought o f  religion.
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Emerson’s thought on religion.
David Robinson, too, argues that Emerson brings us a new perception of God in 
“Emerson and Religion” . He on the one hand introduces the family and theological 
background from which Emerson’s view on religion emerged, and on the other hand 
explained how Emerson was interested in Asian religion, particularly Hinduism. 
Robinson starts with the observation that “the belief in the presence and power of the 
soul is the core o f Ralph Waldo Em erson’s religious thought and the vital principle of 
his entire intellectual achievement” (151). Emphasising the development of the soul 
expressed in Emerson’s essays, Robinson argues that his essays “indicate a striking 
kinship between Emerson’s thinking and some o f the fundamental concepts of 
Hinduism and other Asian religions; their roots are more in the traditions of 
Neoplatonism and Christian mysticism, as Arthur Versluis has shown”(165).43 
According to Robinson, Emerson uses both Western and Eastern traditions in order to 
“forge a universal religion, incorporating the truths from both” (165). Robinson 
claims that Emerson’s reformation o f the concept of God is concerned with 
manifesting a profound statement o f affirmative faith, though he is also concerned 
that this thought might provoke the trouble that his readers are tempted to give up the 
idea of a personal deity (165). Robinson, however, suggests that the notion of the 
Over-Soul is better considered “a source o f energy, an enabling power, of which each 
individual is a particular manifestation” (165). Robinson’s view of Emerson’s thought 
can be summed up as follows: “His [Emerson’s] religious vision offers one of the 
most challenging and original modem approaches to the question o f religious faith” 
(174). From Robinson’s viewpoint, we understand that Emerson’s perception of God,
43 This point is discussed in Arthur Versluis’s Am erican Transcendentalism and Asian Religions 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), pp. 54-61.
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as distinct from the orthodox Christian view, provides an inspirable vision that guides 
humankind to search for the answer in quest of God and of itself.
Unlike Smith and Robinson who affirm Emerson’s new interpretation of God, 
Lawrence Buell gives a more controversial argument. He argues that Emerson shows 
a religious radicalism that challenges both the commentators in his time and in our 
time. Buell firstly indicates that Emerson’s view was considered a “slippery slope to 
atheism” by nineteenth-century conservatives (161). Buell then indicates that 
Emerson’s thought continues to trouble contemporary writers who refuse to accept it.
Thus, Sharon Cameron, according to Buell,
[is] the scholar who has written most astutely on Emersonian 
impersonality, [but] is driven to accuse him of bad faith, because 
impersonality denies the intractable first-personness of a person’s 
utterance, denies ‘the responsibility a person should take for his words’.
She presses the point so insistently because she finds it impossible to 
believe that Emerson means what he claims. (162)
Here lies Buell’s point: “We have yet to grasp the full significance of this, his most 
contrarian act of intellectual radicalism: his insistence both on a God-in-me and on the 
‘impersonality’ of the divine” (162). Buell at one level contends that Emerson’s 
thought of God could be challenged and disapproved since, as he says, “no amount of 
historicizing can normalize the intractable peculiarity of Emerson’s aversion to 
imagining the divine in personal terms” (167). At another level, Buell does not 
disavow Emerson’s thought o f God. On this view, Buell claims that Emerson is not a 
normal person for he is able to “express the felt unreality o f workaday existence that 
most thinking people sometimes feel but prefer to repress” (168).
Buell likewise emphasises how Emerson is awakened to a keen interest in Asian 
religions, which have influenced Emerson in his religious worldview. However,
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according to Buell, Emerson does not have any “intention of converting to 
Hinduism -  or any other religion”, though he admires Asian religions, especially 
Hinduism. “His [Emerson’s] interest was eclectic and synthetic: to extract 
quintessential wisdom from the ‘inspired’ writings of all faiths” (179). Emerson urges 
us to rethink how we can achieve “a moral or spiritual universalism” (198). In the 
following, I am going to explore how Emerson reinterprets the meaning of “God”, the 
Supreme Being, and claims that humankind is able to perceive the existence of God 
within itself if the mind is open to this view.
Emerson begins with the observation that the sentiment of virtue is the essence of all 
religion (Address: 109). Even though we distinguish between different religions, such 
as Hinduism, Judaism, Christianity, Buddhism, Taoism, Islam, Emerson claims that
the essence of all religion is the same. His perception of the issue runs as follows:
A more secret, sweet, and overpowering beauty appears to man when his 
heart and mind open to the sentiment o f virtue. Then he is instructed in 
what is above him. He learns that his being is without bound; that to the 
good, to the perfect, he is bom, low as he now lies in evil and weakness.
That which he venerates is still his own, though he has not realized it yet.
He ought. (Address: 108)
Emerson is concerned with emphasising the importance o f virtue, which raises the 
mind to a higher level o f awareness. He takes Jesus as an example for understanding 
his perception o f God. For Emerson, Jesus realises how God incarnates himself in 
man and represents himself anew in the world (Address: 113). Emerson, at this point, 
explains why Jesus comes to the world and speaks o f miracles: “he felt that man’s life 
was a miracle, and all that man doth, and he knew that this daily miracle shines as the 
character ascends” (Address: 113). Jesus does not come to show he is a redeemer who 
teaches doctrine, as recorded in Christianity. Jesus, appreciating the worth of all 
humanity, arrives to declare God and reveal the eternal revelation through his
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incarnation, according to Emerson (Address: 114). He comes to the world in order to 
serve man with his holy thought, i.e. showing God is, not external to, but within 
humanity (Address: 115). Emerson continues: “A true conversion, a true Christ, is 
now, as always, to be made by the reception o f beautiful sentiments” (Address 115). 
Jesus is an embodied representation o f the religious sentiment for all humankind.
In Emerson’s view, historical Christianity, nevertheless, falsifies God as well as Jesus 
in the erroneous doctrine. First, Christianity exaggerates the notion of “the person of 
Jesus” (Address: 114). Jesus is a person who comes to the world showing what God is 
and where God can be found. In contrast, Christianity places too much emphasis on 
the person named Jesus who is crucified and reincarnated. In this respect, Christianity 
follows and inverts Jesus’ words as recorded by his disciples. It misleads us into 
forgetting God in man into accepting the conceptions of innate sin and the need for 
redemption. The miracles o f Jesus, shown in Christian doctrine, have been considered 
fathomless events that are too difficult to be understood by human beings. Jesus’ aim 
in coming to the world is not to provide a doctrine for humans to follow but to show 
them how to find God and communicate with Him as Jesus does. In the light of 
Emerson’s standpoint, Jesus represents the universal nature of the human soul: “The 
soul knows no persons. It invites every man to expand to the full circle of the universe, 
and will have no preferences but those o f spontaneous love” (Address: 114). 
According to this view, the conception o f Jesus has been twisted by Christian doctrine 
which has already cut off the direct connection between man and God. Man is 
deceived by Christianity into believing the scriptured doctrine rather than the truth 
represented through Jesus. “To aim to convert a man by miracles is a profanation of 
the soul”, says Emerson (Address: 115). Emerson argues that Christianity converts the 
truth that Jesus attempts to show to us through his conduct, miracles and life.
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Christianity offers an erroneous view to distinguish Jesus from us:
You shall not be a man even. You shall not own the world; you shall not 
dare and live after the infinite Law that is in you, and in company with 
the infinite Beauty which heaven and earth reflect to you in all lovely 
forms; but you must subordinate your nature to Christ’s nature; you must 
accept our interpretations, and take his portrait as the vulgar draw it. 
(Address: 115)
Jesus does not aim at showing the difference between him and other human beings, in 
Emerson’s view, but wishes to remind them o f their greatness, which is the same as 
Jesus has. To claim more precisely, Emerson is convinced that human beings have the 
same soul as Jesus has, which connects them to God. Because of its emphasis on such 
profanity, for Emerson, Christianity has destroyed man’s belief in God.
The second error is that Christianity does not guide the human mind to open itself to 
see true faith beyond the limits o f language and consciousness. Rather it restricts 
human potential through its emphasis on the need to obey Christian doctrine as stated 
by the preaching and teaching o f priests, churches, and missionaries. In contrast,
according to Emerson,
[t]he spirit only can teach. Not any profane man, not any sensual, not any 
liar, not any slave can teach, but only he can give, who has; he only can 
create, who is. The man on whom the soul descends, through whom the 
soul speaks, alone can teach. Courage, piety, love, wisdom, can teach; 
and every man can open his door to these angels, and they shall bring him 
the gift o f tongues. But the man who aims to speak as books enable, as 
synods use, as the fashion guides, and as interest commands, babbles. Let 
him hush. (Address: 117)
In view of Emerson’s elaboration, his purpose to redefine and correct the meaning of
preaching and teaching is shown. Emerson continues,
[I]t is my duty to say to you that the need was never greater of new 
revelation than now ...The soul is not preached. The Church seems to 
totter to its fall, almost all life extinct. On this occasion, any
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complaisance would be criminal which told you, whose hope and 
commission it is to preach the faith o f Christ, that the faith of Christ is 
preached. (Address: 117)
Here we can recognise how Emerson criticises the way o f preaching and teaching in 
Christianity. Preaching is essential and good when we can conceive of true faith in 
accordance with the view indicated by Emerson: “The test o f the true faith, certainly, 
should be its power to charm and command the soul, as the laws of nature control the 
activity of the hands -  so commanding that we find pleasure and honor in obeying” 
(Address: 118). True faith never makes man obliged but leaves him naturally happy 
and peaceful. Emerson is not suggesting that traditional preaching should be rejected 
and abolished as he also mentions that Christianity has provided us the Sabbath and 
the institution o f preaching (Address: 126). Emerson questions the meaning of 
preaching which has been converted in Christianity. In other words, if we attend to the 
sermon preached by the priests, we respond in a manner that is automatic and makes 
us pleased with no pressure and obligation. “The true preacher can be known by this, 
that he deals out to the people his life, - life passed through the fire of thought” 
(Address: 119).
The true preacher, for Emerson, is able to reinforce man’s belief in God and connect 
man with God. However, Emerson sees an opposed situation in the preaching of 
priests: “But now the priest’s Sabbath has lost the splendor of nature; it is unlovely; 
we are glad when it is done” (Address: 118). It seems to Emerson that historical
Christianity sets a false example, as he claims,
But, with whatever exception, it is still true that tradition characterizes 
the preaching of this country; that it comes out of the memory, and not 
out of the soul; that it aims at what is usual, and not at what is necessary 
and eternal; that thus historical Christianity destroys the power of 
preaching, by withdrawing it from the exploration of the moral nature of
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man; where the sublime is, where are the resources of astonishment and 
power. (Address: 121)
The significance o f preaching, as Emerson observes, has been misinterpreted and 
destroyed in Christianity. When man cannot be raised up through preaching, he feels 
restricted and faithless: “Now man is ashamed of himself; he skulks and sneaks 
through the world, to be tolerated, to be pitied, and scarcely in a thousand years does 
any man dare to be wise and good, and so draw after him the tears and blessings of his 
kind” (Address: 121). This perverted understanding o f Christianity drives humans into 
a state of misery in which they cannot be inspired and enlightened.
Denouncing the errors that emerge from Christianity, Emerson’s ambition is to correct 
them. Emerson does not encourage others to follow him blindly and slavishly: “Thank 
God for these good men, but say, ‘I also am a man.’ Imitation cannot go above its 
model. The imitator dooms him self to hopelessly mediocrity. The inventor did it 
because it was natural to him, and so in him it has a charm” (Address: 123). Emerson 
is concerned with conveying the unlimited power of the soul which is, he holds, to be 
found in everyone. As Makarushka argues that Emerson’s naturalistic and unmediated 
understanding of religion helps him “reconsider the role o f religion in society not in 
relation to institutional power but as an expression of individual empowerment” (4). 
Emerson aims at correcting the errors found in religion, and awakening in us the need 
for enlightenment, when we can conceive o f his conception of God. In “The 
Over-Soul”, Emerson, different from traditional Christianity explicates the meaning of 
God:
When we have broken our god o f tradition and ceased from our god of 
rhetoric, then may God fire the heart with his presence. It is the doubling 
of the heart itself, nay, the infinite enlargement of the heart with a power 
of growth to a new infinity on every side. It inspires in man an infallible 
truth. (The Over-Soul: 221)
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Man is better able to find God, in Emerson’s view, if he can sever himself from 
tradition and doctrine. God is not separated from man but is in man himself. God is 
within humanity. But, is humankind indeed conscious of the need to break with the 
conception of the god o f tradition and rhetoric in order to find God, as Emerson 
suggests? Do we, in other words, really understand Emerson’s implication, believing 
that we can find God, who is actually in us? In my opinion, it is possible to find God 
if we open the mind and help ourselves understand Emerson’s concept of God.
Emerson claims that the creative source o f human beings is the Over-Soul, as stated in
the following passage,
The Supreme Critic on the errors o f the past and the present, and the only 
prophet of that which must be, is that great nature in which we rest as the 
earth lies in the soft arms o f the atmosphere; that Unity, that Over-Soul, 
within which every m an’s particular being is contained and made one 
with all other. (The Over-Soul: 206)
This “Over-Soul”, for Emerson, refers to his reinterpretation of the meaning of God. 
Emerson then goes on with his conception o f the soul in humankind: “We live in 
succession, in division, in parts, in particles. Meantime within man is the soul of the 
whole; the wise silence; the universal beauty, to which every part and particle is 
equally related; the eternal One” (The Over-Soul: 207). We are not merely living 
beings who have a physical body, but we are the soul that associates us with God and 
the universe. The soul implied by Emerson is the universal nature that connects every 
part of the universe, including human beings, as a whole, i.e. the Emersonian 
conception of eternity. As Emerson says, “this deep power in which we exist and 
whose beatitude is all accessible to us, is not only self-sufficing and perfect in every 
hour, but the act o f seeing the thing seen, the seer and the spectacle, the subject and 
the object, the one” (ibid.).
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We can see how Emerson elaborates the relation between the soul and man in the 
following passage:
[T]he soul in man is not an organ, but animates and exercises all the 
organs; is not a function, like the power o f memory, of calculation, of 
comparison, but uses these as hands and feet; is not a faculty, but a light; 
is not the intellect or the will, but the master of the intellect and the will; 
is the background o f our being, in which they lie, - an immensity not 
possessed and that cannot be possessed. (The Over-Soul: 208)
The soul, according to this view, cannot be seen and measured as a part of our body, 
i.e. an organ. It permeates the body, guiding the mind and the will to respond 
intuitively. We can perceive the soul is in us as spiritual nature, but we are unable to 
possess it. Take love, hope and courage, for instance; we can possess none of them. 
We cannot define what love is but we set examples to express the nature of love as a 
matter of practice. Similarly, it is impossible to define the soul with language because 
language can cause misunderstanding. The soul invisibly and eternally exists in 
humankind though it cannot be defined and measured. The soul awakens us to 
conceive that “we are wiser than we know”. The nature of the soul can be manifested 
by Revelation (The Over-Soul: 214). Revelation is “the discourse of the soul” (The 
Over-Soul: 215) and a communicative connection between man and God. In order to
elucidate the notion o f Revelation, Emerson takes Jesus as an example:
Jesus, living in these moral sentiments, heedless of sensual fortunes, 
heeding only the manifestations o f these, never made the separation of 
the idea of duration from the essence o f these attributes, nor uttered a 
syllable concerning the duration o f the soul. It was left to his disciples to 
sever duration from the moral elements, and to teach the immortality of 
the soul as a doctrine, and maintain it by evidences. The moment the 
doctrine of the immorality is separately taught, man is already fallen.
(The Over-Soul: 216)
Jesus never thinks that he is separated from God. Jesus knows that he is connected
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with God and all beings in the universe as the whole. “Jesus speaks always from 
within, and in a degree that transcends all others. In that is the miracle” (The 
Over-Soul: 218). The soul itself knows that it is naturally connected with the 
Over-Soul. It is not necessary to explain the soul with language.
According to Emerson, Jesus does not come to show he is different from humankind. 
On the contrary, Jesus comes to set a living example for humans, helping them also to 
open the mind and conceive that they and Jesus are the same: “We are all discemers 
of spirits. That diagnosis lies aloft in our life or unconscious power... [T]he wisdom of 
the wise man consists herein, that he does not judge them; he lets them judge 
themselves and merely reads and records their own verdict” (The Over-Soul: 217). At 
this point, Emerson suggests that the soul will decide for itself even though people 
might feel it too difficult to understand that the soul “is superior to its knowledge, 
wiser than any o f its works” (The Over-Soul: 219). Simply put, humans are free to 
decide if they want to believe that they and Jesus are the same. It depends on the 
soul’s choice. At the beginning o f “The Over-Soul”, Emerson claims: “Our faith 
comes in moments; our vice is habitual” (The Over-Soul: 205). The implication is that 
we can grasp the moment when faith comes, though our vice is so habitual that it 
cannot be removed from human nature. If we understand what Emerson states and 
perceive true faith that he addresses, we not only know that we are not sinful, but also
are able to find God by the true faith. Here is Emerson’s understanding of true faith:
The faith that stands on authority is not faith. The reliance on authority 
measures the decline o f religion, the withdrawal o f the soul. The position 
men have given to Jesus, now for many centuries of history, cannot alter 
the eternal facts. Great is the soul, and plain. It is no flatterer, it is no 
follower; it never appeals from itself. It believes in itself...The saints and 
demigods whom history worships we are constrained to accept with a 
grain of allowance. Though in our lonely hours we draw a new strength
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out o f their memory, yet, pressed on our attention, as they are by the 
thoughtless and customary, they fatigue and invade. The soul gives itself, 
alone, original and pure, to the Lonely, Original and Pure, who, on that 
condition, gladly inhabits, leads and speaks through it. (The Over-Soul:
223)
True faith, for Emerson, is attained by the soul which always pervades man. As 
Emerson claims, we need wise people, for instance, saints, prophets, poets and genius, 
who can inspire us to perceive the soul. Emerson advises us not be deceived by the 
limited mind to make an error. To idolise wise people and follow them is erroneous, 
for man will be unable to expand his mind perceiving the soul if he is accustomed to 
following whether doctrine or wise people. Conversely, man will find God and 
perceive his union with God when he is awakened to a higher level of consciousness 
by the soul inside himself. So, if  we want to find God, we have to look inside and find 
him within ourselves. To speak more precisely, there is no alternative means that helps 
us find God. Emerson argues that we will feel calm and pleased only when we know 
it is the soul that directs us to find God, as he claims that man “has not the conviction, 
but the sight, that the best is the true, and may in that thought easily dismiss all 
particular uncertainties and fears, and adjourn to the sure revelation of time the 
solution of his private riddles” (The Over-Soul: 221).
Christianity teaches man to search for God in doctrine in which he will never possibly 
find God. Emerson points to the errors o f Christianity, declaring that the soul has 
already united with God, i.e. the Over-Soul. The man who can conceive of God is the 
simplest: “Ineffable is the union o f man and God in every act o f the soul. The simplest 
person who in his integrity worships God, becomes God; yet for ever and ever the 
influx of this better and universal self is new and unsearchable. It inspires awe and 
astonishment” (The Over-Soul: 221). The soul connects man and God on condition
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that man knows who he really is: “I the imperfect, adore my own Perfect” (The 
Over-Soul: 224). At one level, man is imperfect on account o f the limits of language 
and consciousness. At another level, he is perfect because he has the greatest infinite 
soul inside himself. The key point o f finding God is whether man is wise enough to 
understand that the self with the physical body is imperfect but the self with the soul
inside is perfect. As Emerson claims,
I am somehow receptive o f the great soul, and thereby I do overlook the 
sun and the stars and feel them to be the fair accidents and effects which 
change and pass. More and more the surges o f everlasting nature enter 
into me, and I become public and human in my regards and actions. So 
come I to live in thoughts and act with energies which are immortal. (The 
Over-Soul: 224)
The soul, interpreted by Emerson, expands our mind to a circumstance in which we 
could understand humanity and know how to find God, as in the moment “all history 
is sacred”, and “the universe is represented in an atom” (The Over-Soul: 224). The 
soul, after all, awakens us to perceive God, the Over-Soul, within ourselves.
Emerson represents his convinced belief in the soul that awakens humankind to 
independence and self-reliance. His works, in this respect, are strongly opposed to the 
false impression of God conveyed by Christianity. As Makarushka argues: “The 
identity of ‘within and above’ is emblematic o f Emerson’s understanding of the origin 
and nature of religion” (1), Emerson indicates the unity of the Over-Soul and the soul 
which denotes the unity o f God and humankind, i.e. God is within humanity. 
Makarushka goes on saying, “if  the origin and nature o f religion can be attributed to 
human inwardness, then the authority and truth o f religious experience must also to be 
sited in an internal rather than in an external source” (1). Emerson provides an 
untraditional approach, which reveals his “rejection of religious orthodoxy” 
(Makarushka 2). He seeks to foster an inward awareness and envisages a new
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possibility o f communicating with God through the human soul. Like Emerson, 
Nietzsche criticises Christian doctrine and reinterprets the significance of God and 
Jesus, in order to emphasise the importance of being an individual with 
self-knowledge. But Nietzsche never intends to convince humankind and does not 
perceive the unity between man and God. Emerson and Nietzsche aim to declare the 
concept o f individuality, but their perspectives on religion are different. The 
resemblance between them lies in is their shared concern with humanity and 
self-development, although their religious views of point are not the same. In 
“Emerson’s Words, Nietzsche’s W riting”, Timothy Gould argues that they both are not 
merely original thinkers but also thinkers o f originality: “they are thinkers who 
demand their own original position in the intellectual world, and thinkers who 
demand of us an original relation to them (23). Makarushka too claims, “both 
Emerson and Nietzsche represent a claim o f individual freedom over against the 
power of institutional religious claims, they address those who speak from the 
margins offering encouragement and affirmation” (4). If Gould’s and Makarushka’s 
commentaries are correct, in what follows, we will see how Nietzsche, like Emerson, 
in The Anti-Christ reinterprets the meaning o f God and Jesus and attacks Christianity 
in his original perspective.
In The Anti-Christ, Nietzsche argues that God, “who is fundamentally a word for 
every happy inspiration o f courage and self-reliance,” has been given a new 
conception by the Jewish priesthood in the history o f Israel, becoming “an instrument 
in the hands of priestly agitators who henceforth interpret all good fortune as a reward, 
all misfortune as punishment for disobedience o f God, for ‘sin’” (A 25). In 
Nietzsche’s understanding, Christianity provides a false concept of God in order to 
create a “moral world-order”. The meaning o f the moral world-order is “[t]hat there
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exists once and for all a will o f God as to what man is to do and what he is not to do; 
that the value of a nation, o f an individual is to be measured by how much or how 
little obedience is accorded the will o f God” (A 26). The priests, in this respect, decide 
“the value of things” by appealing to “the kingdom of God”, persuading us to follow 
“the ruling power o f the will o f God, expressed as punishment and reward according 
to the degree of obedience”, which leads man to a circumstance where “he [the priest] 
calls the means by which such a state is achieved or perpetuated ‘the will o f God’ with 
cold-blooded cynicism he assesses nations, epochs, individuals according to whether 
they were conductive to the rule o f priests or whether they resisted it” (A 26). The 
notion of sin in the priesthood, permeating through humankind, dominates society and 
culture. “From now on”, as Nietzsche claims, “all things of life are so ordered that the 
priest is everywhere indispensable” (A 26). Yet the situation, after the rule of the 
Jewish priesthood, does not become better but rather worse when Christianity arises 
and takes over the role o f domination. The concept o f God in Christianity is converted
into a corrupt notion:
The Christian conception o f God -  is one of the most corrupt conceptions 
of God arrived at on earth... God degenerated to the contradiction o f  life, 
instead of being its transfiguration and eternal Yes\ In God a declaration 
of hostility towards life, nature, the will to life! God the formula for every 
calumny of ‘this world’, for every lie about ‘the next world’! In God 
nothingness deified, the will to nothingness sanctified! (A 18)
Following the Jewish priesthood, as Nietzsche argues, Christianity not only continues 
to dominate human society and culture by the concept of sin and punishment, but also 
negates the will o f life, leading humans to a decadent circumstance in which they are 
unable to affirm life but have a void and unfulfilled expectation of the next world 
after death. Under the domination o f Christianity, people are led to embrace a state of 
decadence in which they are taught to rely on Christian morality and wait for 
redemption and salvation. In this respect, Jesus has been defined as the redeemer in
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Christian doctrine in order to maintain and reinforce its domination over humankind.
Nietzsche criticises the falsification o f the idea o f redemption in Judeo-Christian 
morality that misguides us to embrace nothingness by proclaiming a false concept of 
immortality. As Nietzsche says: “The great lie o f personal immortality destroys all 
rationality, all naturalness o f instinct -  all that is salutary, all that is life-furthering, all 
that holds a guarantee o f the future in the instincts henceforth excites mistrust. So to 
live that there is no longer any meaning in living: that now becomes the ‘meaning’ of 
life” (A 43). In Christian consciousness, the crucified Christ is the redeemer who is 
incarnated to redeem us from sin through his death on the Cross. At this point, 
Nietzsche reinterprets the meaning o f Jesus’ incarnation. When Emerson regards Jesus 
as the one united with God and all beings in the universe, Nietzsche rather regards 
him as the only Christian who manifests true faith with the glad tidings. First, 
Nietzsche reinterprets the meaning o f the glad tidings, uttered by Jesus, in his 
statement: “True life, eternal life is found -  it is not promised, it is here, it is within 
you : as life lived in love, in love without deduction or exclusion, without distance” (A
29). Nietzsche furthermore explicates what true Christian faith is as follows:
[T]he kingdom of Heaven belongs to children; the faith which here finds 
utterance is not a faith which has been won by struggle -  it is there, from 
the beginning, it is as it were a return to childishness in the spiritual 
domain.. .Such a faith is not angry, does not censure, does not defend 
itself; it does not bring ‘the sword’ -  it has no idea to what extent it could 
one day cause dissention. It does not prove itself, either by miracles or by 
rewards and promises, and certainly not ‘by the Scriptures’: it is every 
moment its own miracle, its own reward, its own proof, its own ‘kingdom 
of God’. Neither does this faith formulate itself -  it lives, it resists 
formulas. (A 32)
Here, Nietzsche offers an alternative reading o f both the Christian faith and the figure 
of Jesus. Nietzsche’s true faith, different from Christian faith, is similar to Emerson’s,
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although they use different ways to explain it. They both claim that true faith is not to 
follow Christian God and doctrine. Emerson argues that true faith comes naturally 
without any command and obligation. According to Emerson, true faith should blend 
with all beings in the universe, such as “the light o f rising and of setting suns”, “the 
flying cloud”, “the singing bird” and “the breath of flowers” (Address: 118), which 
makes humankind feel pleased and peaceful. For Nietzsche, the conception of true 
faith does not rely on the Christian God, waiting for salvation after death. According 
to Nietzsche, true faith is to know how to be a better and autonomous individual 
through self-reflection. Then we will realise we are never sinful as claimed in 
Christian doctrine and we never need to ask for redemption and salvation after death. 
It is unnecessary and impossible to measure true faith by following any formula; true 
faith appears itself calmly and naturally in every moment. Therefore, it is impossible 
to attain true faith by following Christian doctrine and scripture. If man wants to 
attain true faith, the key point is to be simple like children.
Second, Nietzsche considers that Jesus does not come to “redeem mankind” but to 
“demonstrate how one ought to live” (A 35). This is similar to Emerson’s view. Jesus, 
in other words, is a free spirit who comes to indicate a concept through his incarnation,
as Nietzsche claims,
The concept, the experience ‘life’ in the only form he knows it is opposed 
to any kind o f word, formula, law, faith, dogma. He speaks only of the 
inmost thing: ‘life’ or ‘truth’ or Tight’ is his expression for the inmost 
thing -  everything else, the whole o f reality, the whole of nature, 
language itself, possesses for him merely the value o f a sign, a metaphor.
(A 32)
The incarnation demonstrates Jesus to humans, expressing a way of life which can be 
attained by practical experience. Showing what life is and what truth is, Jesus 
indicates a possible path to the kingdom o f God if  man is willing to see and work on it.
163
This is the reason why the concept o f Jesus, the redeemer, is in Christian history. For 
Nietzsche, “the concept ‘the Son o f M an’ is not a concrete person belonging to history, 
anything at all individual or unique, but an ‘eternal’ fact, a psychological symbol 
freed from the time concept” (A 34). However Nietzsche does not regard Jesus as a 
person like all humankind. Nietzsche instead calls Jesus “the bringer of glad tidings” 
(A 35). Nietzsche distinguishes Jesus from all humankind, claiming that Jesus is “the 
Evangel” (A 33) who brings glad tidings and practises as a true Christian. In respect 
of Nietzsche’s reinterpretation o f Jesus’ incarnation, Makarushka claims that 
Nietzsche has his “ambivalence towards Jesus” (27). Unlike Emerson who is 
convinced that man is united with Jesus and God, Nietzsche has his view of Jesus. As 
Makarushka says, “I argue that N ietzsche’s interpretation remained caught in the 
paradox of the ambiguity o f the Incarnation. The reality o f the god/man signifies the 
immanence of transcendence and remains an enigma” (27). I agree with Makarushka’s 
commentary, but I also argue that Nietzsche intends to interpret Jesus’ incarnation in 
order to understand how much the incarnation means to him. Similarly, Nietzsche 
argues that the concept o f God is misinterpreted: “The same applies supremely to the 
God of this typical symbolist, [i.e. Nietzsche’s God], to the ‘kingdom of God’, to the 
‘kingdom of Heaven’, to ‘God’s children’” (Makarushka 27). What Nietzsche implies, 
obviously, is the aim of Jesus’ incarnation which guides humankind to be conscious of 
something within itself, i.e. “ [t]he profound instinct for how one would have to live in 
order to feel oneself ‘in Heaven’, to feel oneself ‘eternal’, while in every other 
condition one by no means feels oneself ‘in Heaven’” (A 33). In accordance with 
Nietzsche’s reinterpretation, after all, it is “a new way of living, not a new belief’ (A 
33) that Jesus shows in his life.
As noted above, Nietzsche claims that the true faith expressed in the glad tidings of
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Jesus formulates itself, whereas Christianity converts it to its own doctrine, as shown 
as follows:
Our age is proud o f its historical sense: how was it able to make itself 
believe in the nonsensical notion that the crude miracle-worker and 
redeemer fable  comes at the commencement of Christianity -  and that 
everything spiritual and symbolic is only a subsequent development? On 
the contrary: the history o f Christianity -  and that from the very death on 
the Cross -  is the history o f progressively cruder misunderstanding of an 
original symbolism. (A 37)
It seems to Nietzsche that man has been misled from true faith to a decadent condition 
by Christian morality and doctrine. Although Nietzsche’s reinterpretation of Jesus is 
different from Emerson’s, they both point to the crux that is not claimed in 
Christianity, i.e. Jesus does not come to redeem humankind but comes to show a new 
way for living, as Makarushka argues, “Nietzsche shared Emerson’s perception that in 
its richest and most developed expression religion is lived in the creative moments of 
individuals” (29). Nietzsche tells us: “Everyone is a child of God -  Jesus definitely 
claims nothing for him self alone -  as a child o f God everyone is equal to everyone 
else...To make a hero o f Jesus” (A 28). Nietzsche regards Jesus as the Evangel, the 
true Christian who affirmatively experiences his life with bravery and responsibility: 
“Honoring the fact that the ‘Evangel’ lived and died in this world, he [Nietzsche] saw 
the significance his life and death as an affirmation of human possibility in an 
eternally ambiguous world” (Makarushka 30). There are three steps that could help 
man be aware o f the domination o f Christianity, possibly liberating him from 
Christianity and making him self a hero o f Jesus.
First, man needs to conceive how he has been misled and dominated by Christianity. 
The perverted and absolute Christian faith, in Nietzsche’s view, dominates culture by 
providing a misleading concept o f God and Jesus’ incarnation. Christianity does not
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transmit true faith, a new way o f life in the world uttered by Jesus to all humans but 
leads them to engage in “a war to the death against every feeling of reverence and 
distance between man and man, against, that is, the precondition of every elevation, 
every increase in culture” (A 43). Consequently, culture has been profoundly 
contaminated by Christianity. The influence o f Christian morality causes us feel guilty 
on account o f the erroneous concept o f  sin stated in Christian doctrine, as Nietzsche 
argues, “I have drawn back the curtain on the depravity o f man. In my mouth this 
world is protected against at any rate one suspicion: that it contains a moral accusation 
of man...I understand depravity, as will already have been guessed, in the sense of 
decadence” (A 6). Humankind, in Nietzsche’s observation, is too weak to develop 
itself under the domination o f Christian morality. Accordingly, we allow ourselves to 
stay in the decayed culture which emerges from Christianity.
Second, humankind needs to remind itself o f the devastating power o f human 
animality, which is likewise a hindrance that prevents from knowing itself. None can 
decide what we want to be except us, as Nietzsche contends, “I call an animal, a 
species, an individual depraved when it loses its instincts, when it chooses, when it 
prefers what is harmful to it” (A 6). Nietzsche argues that we are not wise enough to 
make decisions when we are not conscious o f the intrinsic intellect, easily allowing us 
to be restricted by the limits o f custom and consciousness. He also points out the
contradictory weakness of humanity:
We know, our conscience knows today — what those sinister inventions of 
priest and Church are worth, what end they serve, with which that state of 
human self-violation has brought about which is capable of exciting 
disgust at the sight o f mankind — the concepts ‘Beyond’, ‘Last 
Judgement’, ‘immortality o f the soul’, the ‘soul’ itself: they are 
instruments o f torture, they are forms of systematic cruelty by virtue of 
which the priest has become master, stays master...Everyone knows this:
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and everyone none the less remains unchanged. (A 38)
For Nietzsche, man is habitually entrapped in self-contradiction. According to
Nietzsche, the decayed modem culture, in relation to Christian morality, does not
elevate humans but restricts them in custom and tradition. Nietzsche likewise implies
that there is no sign o f the development o f humanity. For Nietzsche, “ [mjankind does
not represent a development o f the better or the stronger or the higher in the way that
is believed today. ‘Progress’ is merely a modem idea, that is to say a false idea” (A 4).
In Nietzsche’s view, humanity needs to be elevated and developed: “Humanity has not
taken its first step here -  the instincts o f cleanliness are lacking” (A 46). Although
Nietzsche criticises human animality, he has his perspective on the possibility of
noble humanity shown in the rare individual who is able to live bravely and
independently.
Third, it is important to know how to experience life. When Nietzsche claims, “I 
consider life itself instinct for growth, for continuance, for accumulation of forces, for 
power: where the will to power is lacking there is decline. My assertion is that this 
will is lacking in all the supreme values o f mankind” (A 6), he clearly implies that 
civilisation does not guide us to affirm the self and life. Modem culture, which is 
deeply influenced by Christian morality, does not emphasise the importance of 
experiencing life but focuses on the conception o f original sin and the need for 
redemption: “Christianity has taken the side o f everything weak, base, ill-constituted, 
it has made an ideal out o f opposition to the preservative instincts of strong life; it has 
depraved the reason even o f the intellectually strongest natures by teaching men to 
feel the supreme values o f intellectuality as sinful, as misleading, as temptations (A 5). 
Nietzsche, in the very beginning o f The Anti-Christ, defines good, bad and happiness. 
“All that heightens the feeling o f power, the will to power, power itself in man” is
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good; “[a]ll that proceeds from weakness” is bad; and happiness is “[t]he feeling that 
power increases -  that a resistance is overcome” (A 2). The will to power is life itself. 
Nietzsche observes that Christianity never shows us the will to power, i.e. the energy 
of life: “The fate o f Christianity lies in the necessity for its faith itself to grow as 
morbid, low and vulgar as the requirement it was intended to satisfy were morbid, low 
and vulgar” (A 37). Life, as Nietzsche claims, should represent itself not through 
denial and cowardliness, but through bravery and practice. In the history of 
Christianity, Nietzsche claims that Jesus is the only Christian who proves life itself as 
a true Christian, as shown in his argument, “only Christian practice, a life such as he 
who died on the Cross lived, is Christian” (A 39). And Nietzsche continues: “Even 
today, such a life is possible, for certain men even necessary: genuine, primitive 
Christianity will be possible at all tim es ....N ot a belief but a doing, above all a 
not-doing o f many things, a different being” (A 39).
Here we can see the difference o f attitude between Nietzsche and Emerson. Emerson 
is convinced by the possibility that all humans can find God when they are willing to 
open the mind and let the soul direct them to God. But for Nietzsche, his view is not 
as certain as Emerson claims. Nietzsche has two responses to this point. On the one 
hand he understands it is very difficult to raise the mind to a higher level on account 
of the weakness of human nature. On the other hand, he claims that only certain 
individuals will have the potential to realise how to live like Jesus. But Nietzsche’s 
and Emerson’s stances on life are similar. They not only stress the importance of 
experience, but also manifest themselves to affirm life through their experience. For 
Nietzsche, he differs his perception o f life from Christianity, as is implied in his 
notion of the revaluation of all values. All values that emerge from Christianity, 
according to Nietzsche, should be revalued and reinterpreted in a new perspective. In
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other words, we do not need to wait for the kingdom of Heaven after our death, as 
claimed by the dogma o f Christianity. The kingdom of Heaven has been revalued and 
reinterpreted. As Nietzsche argues:
The ‘Kingdom of Heaven’ is a condition of the heart -  not something that 
comes ‘upon the earth’ or ‘after death’. The entire concept of natural 
death is lacking in the G ospel...The ‘kingdom of God’ is not something 
one waits for; it has no yesterday or tomorrow, it does not come ‘in a 
thousand years’ -  it is an experience within a heart; it is everywhere, it is 
nowhere. (A 34)
In this view, the kingdom of Heaven is never an ordinary, physical kingdom that we 
can see through our eyes. At one level, according to Nietzsche, the kingdom of 
Heaven is nowhere because it does not exist in the physical world. It is everywhere, at 
another level, because it has already been in the heart o f someone. The possibility of 
perceiving the existence o f the kingdom of Heaven depends on whether man is wise 
and aware enough to be conscious o f its existence. For Nietzsche, he appreciates the 
possibility of Jesus’ path, albeit he does not advocate it. As he contends: “Let us not 
undervalue this: we ourselves, we free spirits, are already a ‘revaluation of all values’, 
an incarnate declaration o f war and victory over all ancient conceptions o f ‘true’ and 
‘untrue’” (A 13). Nietzsche concentrates on the development o f the self and the notion 
of individuality. In his life, Nietzsche reveals the notion o f the revaluation of all 
values through his works. After all, the possibility o f being a hero of Jesus could be 
achieved on condition that firstly the individual conceives of his higher self through 
experience of life, and then the Christian values will be able to be converted.
In his essays, Emerson offers his own conception o f God, contending that man is 
unlimited and powerful when he opens his mind and realises that he is united with 
God and all beings in the universe by the soul. Nietzsche likewise emphasises a 
possibility of being an individual. Though it is obvious that Emerson and Nietzsche
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both reinterpret religion, criticise Christianity and emphasise the importance of 
individuality, we still can differ their views. Emerson is not only concerned with his 
concept o f individuality, but also concentrates on the unity between man and God. 
Nietzsche is mainly concerned with the concept of individuality, claiming that his 
hero, who is liberated from Christian doctrine, can be elevated to a higher level 
through self-overcoming and self-realisation. In what follows, I will explore how 
Gary Shapiro and Daniel Conway interpret Nietzsche’s The Anti-Christ.
As Gary Shapiro says in “Nietzsche’s Graffito: A Reading of The Antichrist”, many 
critics are disappointed by Nietzsche’s text because they think it less striking than his 
previous works. Many critics consider The Anti-Christ as a ragbag in which they are 
unable to find any new inspiring ideas that Nietzsche might offer. For instance, Eugen 
Fink comments that “Nietzsche collects what he has already said about the morality of 
pity and the psychology o f the priest -  but now he gives his thoughts an exorbitant, 
violent edge and wants to insult, to strike the tradition in the face, to ‘transvalue’ by 
valuing in an anti-Christian way” (quoted in Shapiro, 304).44 Shapiro declares his 
different stance on The Anti-Christ, arguing that it still contains some new and 
significant thoughts (306). In Shapiro’s view, The Anti-Christ is a work which offers a 
new way of reinterpreting Jesus: “All morality is a semiotic interpretation o f the body 
and society; if there is to be a transvaluation o f values it must proceed by offering a 
new reading of that which has been misread” (307). In The Anti-Christ, according to 
Shapiro, Nietzsche reshapes the image o f Jesus as “an anti-sign”, which is completely 
opposed to the image formulated by the gospel and the church. Here is Shapiro’s 
explanation: “The difference between Jesus and the church is that Jesus’ signs are 
used with a consciousness o f their inadequacy to their subject while the church
44 The original source is Eugen Fink’s N ietzsches Philosophie  (Stuttgart: Kohlhammer, 1960), p. 34.
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believes that the gospels are divinely inspired and hence adequate signs” (311). It is 
apparent that Nietzsche portrays a self-conscious Jesus throughout his work, in which
the notion of the revaluation o f all values is signified. As Shapiro concludes,
The Antichrist aims at being the antithesis of Christian graffiti by opening 
up a space for playful writings like Nietzsche’s own; it is meant to clear 
the walls for an exuberant position o f inscriptions which will break out of 
the narrow circle o f revenge in which writing under the sway of 
Christianity and morality has moved. (321)
In The Anti-Christ, as distinct from his other polemical works, Nietzsche implies an 
affirmative attitude toward life and a revalued viewpoint of Jesus, which is obviously 
neglected by Christianity.
In the light of Nietzsche’s revaluation o f all values, Conway {Dangerous Games 
\991)45 likewise stresses that N ietzsche’s The Anti-Christ helps us reconsider and 
redefine Nietzsche’s stance on Christianity. Firstly, Conway argues that The 
Anti-Christ is not only “a statement o f his [Nietzsche’s] celebrated revaluation” but “a 
performance, or embodiment, o f revaluation” as well (ibid.: 217). According to 
Conway, Nietzsche’s The Anti-Christ can be considered “an involuntary and 
unconscious memoir” which will never disappoint his readers (ibid.: 218). At this 
point, I agree with Conway’s desire to reinterpret Nietzsche in a new way. 
Disappointment, in my view, emerges from unsatisfied expectation. If we do not 
expect, then we cannot feel disappointed. Most Nietzsche’s readers expect too much 
when they read Nietzsche’s works from different periods, and it is better to keep in 
mind what Nietzsche always mentions in his thought: everything is changeable and is 
in flux. Therefore, it is unfair to say Nietzsche’s previous works are better than his
45 Conway’s criticism o f  N ietzsch e’s The A nti-Christ can be seen in chapter 6, Skirmishes o f  an 
Untimely Man: N ietzsche’s Revaluation o f  All Values” and chapter 7, “Standing between Two 
Millennia: Intimations o f  The Antichrist.”
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later works. Every work, for Nietzsche, is unique, incomparable and irreplaceable. 
Every work has its own distinctive idea to communicate. In The Anti-Christ, 
Nietzsche strives for a possible renewal o f values in modem culture, as described in
the Conway’s analysis:
Nietzsche apparently believes that ‘new’ values arise either from an 
originary act o f creation or from a reversal o f existing values. The former, 
‘active’ mode o f evaluation is available only to healthy peoples and ages, 
whereas the latter, ‘reactive’ mode o f evaluation characteristically falls to 
decadents, invalids, slaves, and anyone else who cannot afford the luxury 
of spontaneous self-expression, (ibid.: 182)
The Anti-Christ is a manifestation o f this new possible value distinct from the values 
established by Christianity.
Conway also points out that The Anti-Christ is not only a declaration of war on 
Christian morality, but also a work in which he transforms himself into a declaration 
of war (ibid.: 185). In this view, the readers at one level can see how Nietzsche 
represents his revaluation o f all values through The Anti-Christ, and at another level, 
they can observe that Nietzsche, standing as an embodied anti-Christ, himself 
performs in the declaration o f war on Christianity. If this is Nietzsche’s ambition, it 
could help to explain why The Anti-Christ is different from Nietzsche’s other works. 
Clearly, The Anti-Christ is rather a book o f “self-presentation” (ibid.: 201), aiming to 
“distinguish the truth o f Christianity from the life o f Christ and to expose the former 
as a wilful perversion o f the latter” (ibid.: 223), according to Conway’s commentary. 
Nietzsche, through his understanding o f the significance of Jesus, not only provides a 
way to rethink the meaning o f Christian doctrine, but also brings an unusual way to 
represent who he wants to be.
Secondly, Conway argues that Nietzsche is seen to be a decadent Antichrist rather
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than an anti-Christian (Dangerous Games 1997: 228). Nietzsche’s idea is never 
separated from his enmity toward Christianity; in other words, it appears that he is an 
unconventional priest who has an urge to preach a new value to humankind. “His 
[Nietzsche’s] performance o f revaluation reproduces in every respect the resentment 
and hatred for which he takes the priests to task. Despite his genuine contempt for 
Christian morality, he is not, strictly speaking, its other” (ibid.). Standing “at the 
crossroads o f modernity and its successor epoch,” Nietzsche is considered by Conway 
as an Antichrist who does not sever his connection with Christianity: “Whatever the 
ultimate merit o f N ietzsche’s appeal to dialectics, we are witness only to his 
complicity with Christian morality, and not to the logical transformation he 
supposedly instigates” (ibid.: 229). Nietzsche on the one hand attacks the decadence 
of Christian morality which permeates modem culture; on the other hand, his 
criticism of the decadence connects him tightly with the decadence of Christian 
morality. That is to say, Nietzsche cannot liberate himself from decadence because he 
not only knows he is different from the decadent spirit o f the age, but also understands 
that he exists in it. Conway claims that Nietzsche does not produce “the other of 
Christianity” but explores “a more resilient strain o f Christian morality”, which 
clearly implies that he is seen not only as a type o f Christian, but as a type of 
Christian priest as well (ibid.). For Nietzsche, “ [t]he self-overcoming of Christian 
morality is consequently enacted neither in a teaching nor a syllogism, but in a living 
human being, in whom the signature contradictions o f Christian morality have 
become incarnate” (ibid.: 203). It is too difficult to identify what role Nietzsche is 
playing in this respect; he might be a revolutionary Christian as Conway implies. But 
Nietzsche’s contribution to his and our time is surely undeniable. He raises crucial 
questions regarding the conception o f Jesus Christ and Christianity. Through his 
enmity against the decadence o f Christianity and his notion of the revaluation of all
values, Nietzsche in The Anti-Christ opens up a different and non-Christian way that 
helps to know what we really are and what God really is, though we may admit that 
his perspective o f humankind and God is not easy to be understood by most people.
Emerson and Nietzsche break with Christian doctrine, which has bad effects on
modem culture. As Makarushka comments,
In contrast to traditional Christianity’s separation of ‘the sacred’ from this 
‘secular’, Emerson’s transcendentalism allowed him to instantiate the 
sacred within the individual. To know that the sacred is within and to 
know that salvation is the task o f every individual is religious experience. 
Nietzsche also valorized the individual’s power to see the world as a 
harmonious whole, at one with the creative and dynamic will engaged in 
configuring a self and a world in spite o f fate. (23-24)
Though their ways o f expression are different from each other, they both explicate 
their concepts of Jesus and God, addressing the importance o f individuality. Emerson 
argues that Jesus is a person who comes to represent the soul that awakens us to know 
what God is and where God can be found. Jesus, according to Emerson, is the same as 
humankind when the mind perceives the unity o f man and God. According to 
Emerson, it is not Christian doctrine but the soul within humanity that connects us 
with God. Emerson declares that humankind should not follow Christian doctrine but 
rely on the soul within itself if  humankind wants to find God as Jesus does. For 
Emerson, everyone is the individual who can be like Jesus if he is willing to open the 
mind, realising he is united with God by the soul. Nietzsche gives a different 
interpretation of Jesus. Nietzsche does not consider Jesus the same as humankind; 
Nietzsche claims that Jesus is the only Christian who experiences life, even though he 
is crucified on the Cross. Lacking self-knowledge, most humans are unable to develop 
themselves, according to Nietzsche. For Nietzsche, those ‘certain men (i.e. 
individuals in the future) will know how to affirm life through experience, without
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being dominated by Christianity. In this way, Nietzsche separates man in general from 
Jesus, and claims that only the rare individual is able to be a hero like Jesus. Unlike 
Emerson’s belief in the unity o f God and man, Nietzsche concentrates on the way of 
life with the will to power, which has to break with the concept of Christian God and
doctrine. As Mararushka concludes,
Both Emerson and Nietzsche sought to redescribe religion and religious 
experience in order to empower individuals to speak for themselves, to 
take responsibility for creating aesthetic and moral values...Focusing on 
the spiritual and cultural malaise associated with the hegemony of the 
dominant Christian ideology, they provided alternative and competing 
paradigms for creating a religious self-understanding that emphasized 
freedom rather than obedience. (104)
Their concepts of God are different, but Emerson and Nietzsche both break with the 
prejudiced attitude towards God derived from Christianity, and emphasise the concept 
of individuality. In the next section, I analyse how they promote the possibility of 
attaining individuality through self-knowledge and self-development.
4.2 An Exploration of Mankind
In this section, I am going to explore a new understanding of the mind and the soul by 
comparing Emerson’s two essays “Self-Reliance” and “Experience” and Nietzsche’s 
Twilight o f  the Idols, in order to firstly stress their different perspectives on humanity, 
and then concentrate on how the soul can raise the mind to a higher level and perceive 
the significance of life. Edward Wagenknecht and Lawrence Buell explore what 
Emerson proposes in his “Self-Reliance”. Wagenknecht claims that “Self-Reliance” is 
the place in which we can easily find Emerson’s desire for spiritual insight (34). He 
also points out that Emerson not only believes in intuition, the power is seen as “the 
‘ark of God’ in every human breast, transcending the rational understanding” (34), but
175
also is convinced that “every man has a vocation and that his talent was his call” (39), 
which is emphasised in “Self-Reliance” . In Wagenknecht’s view, Emerson represents 
himself as “a spiritual man”, a person who insists upon “the integrity of the individual 
religious experience” (223), a person who despises “the sense” but wants to “live a 
complete life” (226). On the other hand, Buell elaborates more on Emerson’s 
“Self-Reliance”, starting with the observation that this essay “seemingly sets the 
highest value on egocentricity, yet also strives mightily to guard itself against the 
egotism it seems to license” (59).
First of all, Buell argues that Emerson considers self-reliance as “a personal life 
practice” which shows his conviction that “though everyone falls short of 
self-realization much o f the time, everyone has self-transformative capacity” (62-63). 
This is, in Buell’s view, a fundamental belief about humanity expressed in Emerson’s 
essays. Without question, Emerson retains his conviction o f human ability, i.e. 
self-reliance. Buell then claims that the notion of self-reliance, for Emerson, is a 
perception o f impersonal individuality that aims not only at elevating but also at 
energizing (66). This explains why Buell observes that “Self-Reliance” is too 
ambiguous a text to define Em erson’s stance, whether in advocating the value of 
egocentricity or defending against egotism. At one level, Emerson asserts the value of 
egocentricity for everyone. At another level, the ego, he suggests, is derived from the 
mind which stands in a higher level o f awareness, allowing the instinct and the soul to 
decide the path o f life, as Buell argues that it is the existence of a universal mind 
implied by Emerson (74). So, that is the reason why Buell claims that Emerson 
reveals a perception o f impersonal individuality. For Emerson, the universal wisdom 
is delivered not from the limited personal consciousness of egotism, but from the 
indefinite soul within humanity. Every person has to pursue his or her own solitary
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path toward an understanding o f the meaning o f life. Thus, Buell comments that 
Emerson’s self-reliance is “a lonely path that we choose only when driven to feel that 
‘imitation’ is worse” (71), and when we realise that, in Emerson’s view, it is 
individuality without egotism but egocentricity. Self-reliance is a way of life that is 
not only for Emerson him self but also for the individuals.
By defining genius at the beginning o f “Self-Reliance”: “To believe your own thought, 
to believe that what is true for you in your private heart is true for all men, - that is 
genius” (Self-Reliance: 175), Emerson aims at providing a new perception of 
humanity, which helps us raise the mind to awareness, beyond the limits of human 
nature, i.e. conformity in society, consistency o f habits, and personal temperament, in 
order to live with the soul as an integrated individual. Emerson’s definition of genius 
attempts to convince us o f the importance o f self-reliance which is not only a
privilege of genius but also possible of all human beings:
Society everywhere is in conspiracy against the manhood o f every one of 
its members. Society is a joint-stock company, in which the members 
agree, for the better securing o f his bread to each shareholder, to 
surrender the liberty and culture o f the eater. The virtue in most request is 
conformity. Self-reliance is its aversion. It loves not realities and creators, 
but names and customs. (Self-Reliance: 178)
Emerson observes that society is a place where self-reliance is not appreciated and 
conformity is required. Conformity is a means whereby society manipulates its 
members for the sake o f security. Emerson disapproves it because it hinders humanity 
from being independent. Therefore, the idea o f conformity, that is to say, the social
rule that restricts humankind in others’ opinions, is what Emerson opposes:
What I must do is all that concerns me, not what the people think. This 
mle, equally arduous in actual and in intellectual life, may serve for the 
whole distinction between greatness and meanness. It is the harder 
because you will always find those who think they know what is your
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duty better than you know it. It is easy in the world to live after the 
world’s opinion; it is easy in solitude to live after our own; but the great 
man is he who in the midst o f the crowd keeps with perfect sweetness the 
independence o f solitude. (Self-Reliance: 180-181)
In this view, Emerson does not wish to persuade us to evade society where 
nonconformity is often rejected and hide ourselves in solitude. He awakens us to this 
unhealthy attitude and thereby we understand that nonconformity is necessary for 
being an independent individual. In this respect, Emerson asserts that it is through 
self-reliance that humankind is able to hear the voice of God, perceiving the greatness 
of humanity, when the mind opens and awakens: “Nothing is at last sacred but the 
integrity of your own mind” (Self-Reliance: 178). No one, as Emerson asserts, can be 
responsible for our lives except us; therefore, we are able to create our lives without 
asking others’ permission, as he argues that his life is “for itself and not for a 
spectacle” (Self-Reliance: 178). In order to be ourselves, we not only have to remind 
us of being affirmative in ourselves, but also need to convince ourselves to bravely 
confront the human world, which is filled with the idea of conformity: “For 
nonconformity the world whips you with its displeasure. And therefore a man must 
know how to estimate a sour face” (Self-Reliance: 182). The notion of nonconformity, 
according to Emerson, is the essential factor that leads to independence and 
individuality.
Another limit of human nature that Emerson criticises is the self-imposed consistency 
of personal conduct, which restricts humankind in the limitation of the mind and 
prevents humankind from perceiving the soul. Consistency, as Emerson points out, is 
“a reverence for our past act or word because the eyes o f others have no other data for 
computing our orbit than our past acts, and we are loth to disappoint them 
(Self-Reliance: 182). In other words, Emerson implies that it is unwise to follow
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habits and memories rather than believe in ourselves. Here is his advice: “It seems to 
be a rule o f wisdom never to rely on your memory alone, scarcely even in acts of pure 
memory, but to bring the past for judgment into the thousand-eyed present, and live 
ever in a new day” (Self-Reliance: 183). Life, in his view, cannot be determined by 
fixed memories. Life is actually transformed at every moment through unexpected 
miracles that cannot be entirely understood by consciousness.
Likewise, Emerson makes his view clear: “Life has no memory. That which proceeds 
in succession might be remembered, but that which is coexisting, or ejaculated from a 
deeper cause, as yet far from being conscious, knows not its own tendency” 
(Experience: 301). Life, therefore, is constantly transfiguring itself as unfathomable 
surprises given by God. “Life is a series o f surprises, and would not be worth taking 
or keeping if it were not. God delights to isolate us every day, and hide from us the 
past and the future” (Experience: 299). For Emerson, consistency binds us in the 
world of conformity where we are too fearful and narrow-minded to trust the insight 
of the soul: “A foolish consistency is the hobgoblin of little minds, adored by little 
statesmen and philosophers and divines. With consistency a great soul has simply 
nothing to do” (Self-Reliance: 183). However, Emerson conceives that the mind can 
be raised beyond the limit of consistency, as he advocates: “Let a man then know his 
worth, and keep things under his feet” (Self-Reliance: 185-186). With regard to 
Emerson’s perception, it depends on how much humankind can open the mind and 
listen to the divine message delivered, through the soul, from God. The divine 
message, nevertheless, can be understood not by the consciousness but by the soul. In 
this respect, Emerson indicates that we should not merely attempt to achieve 
consistency but rather “should learn to detect and watch that gleam of light which 
flashes across his mind from within, more than the luster of the firmament of bards
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and sages (Self-Reliance: 176). We are, after all, great and unique if we are aware of 
our worth through self-trust and self-realisation, for then we will understand what 
Emerson says: Nothing can bring you peace but yourself. Nothing can bring you 
peace but the triumph o f principles” (Self-Reliance: 203).
In order to enhance self-trust and self-reliance, Emerson suggests that we had better 
beware of our temperament, which might habitually prevent us from discerning the 
true self. Taking grief as an example, Emerson argues that people are used to 
misunderstanding themselves through the distorting effect of passing moods: “People 
grieve and bemoan themselves, but it is not half so bad with them as they say. There 
are moods in which we court suffering, in the hope that here at least we shall find 
reality, sharp peaks and edges o f truth. But it turns out to be scene-painting and 
counterfeit” (Experience: 287). We are involved too much in those moods that make 
us unable to see the meaning they express. Emerson too mentions the death of his 
beloved son, which is painful but significant to him. By experiencing the torment of 
loss, Emerson finally knows that he will be calmer and stronger to face everything
happened in life, as he continues,
The only thing grief has taught me is to know how shallow it is. That, 
like all the rest, plays about the surface, and never introduces me into the 
reality, for contact with which we would even pay the costly price of sons 
and lovers.. .Nothing is left us now but death. We look to that with a grim 
satisfaction, saying, There at least is reality that will not dodge us. 
(Experience: 287-288)
People assume that they cannot bear the painful suffering caused by the loss of those 
they love. But Emerson rather regards suffering as a hard means that helps us observe 
life from a different aspect. It does not mean that Emerson is able to ignore the pain of 
losing his son; for Emerson, the loss has become a part of experience that he does not 
want to evade. Or we may say that Emerson chooses to overcome his pain, no matter
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how hard it is. So he does transform himself, through the pain, to realise the 
significance of life and death.
As Joel Porte argues, the loss o f his son pushes Emerson into darkness with “a ghastly 
dream in which he has miles to go before he is truly awake” (182). Yet Emerson does 
not let himself be defeated in desperation but resolves to recover again with “his own 
power of the mind” (Porte 184) through self-transformation. Life can only be 
interpreted and understood through personal experience, such as suffering and
happiness. As he claims,
Life is a train of moods like a string o f beads, and as we pass through 
them they prove to be many-colored lenses which paint the world their 
own hue, and each shows only what lies in its focus. From the mountain 
you see the mountain. We animate what we can, and we see only what we 
animate...The more or less depends on structure or temperament. 
Temperament is the iron wire on which the beads are strung. (Experience: 
288-289)
In this respect, Emerson argues that temperament influences the way we view life. 
But it is unwise and damaging if  we are dominated by it, letting it shadow the wisdom 
delivered by the soul. As Emerson writes, temperament is “a power which no man 
willingly hears any one praise but h im self’, and it consequently “puts all divinity to 
rout” (Experience: 290). It seems to Emerson that temperament is a way that helps to 
understand the manifestation o f life, as he says: “Illusion, Temperament, Succession, 
Surface, Surprise, Reality, Subjectiveness, - these are threads on the loom o f time, 
these are the lords o f life” (Experience: 309). Obviously, temperament is only a means 
for us in Emerson’s view; therefore, we need to let life express itself in which way it 
wants. “Life itself is a mixture o f power and form, and will not bear the least excess 
of either. To finish the moment, to find the journey’s end in every step of the road, to 
live the greatest number o f good hours, is wisdom” (Experience: 295). Life can only
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be perceived by the awakened mind through a spontaneous insight: “Life is not 
intellectual or critical, but sturdy” (Experience: 294). It is the soul within humankind 
that opens and liberates the mind in order to understand life: “[It is] the essence of 
genius, of virtue, and o f life, which we call Spontaneity or Instinct. We denote this 
primary wisdom as Intuition, whilst all later teachings are tuitions” (Self-Reliance: 
187). Through instinct, we are able to enjoy every possible moment of life: “In 
liberated moments we know that a new picture o f life and duty is already possible; the 
elements already exist in many minds around you o f a doctrine of life which shall 
transcend any written record we have” (Experience: 304).
But, do we believe that the meaning o f life can be perceived through the primary 
wisdom, i.e. instinct and intuition, letting the mind be awakened not by temperament 
and the limits of human nature but by the soul? It is not merely Emerson but everyone 
who is able to answer the question. We are responsible for everything we decide. 
Emerson never persuades anyone to follow him: “Insist on yourself; never imitate. 
Your own gift you can present every moment with the cumulative force o f a whole 
life’s cultivation” (Self-Reliance: 199). He gives his personal experience as an
example, showing his moderate attitude towards life,
I am thankful for small mercies. I compared notes with one o f my friends 
who expects everything o f the universe and is disappointed when 
anything is less than the best, and I found that I begin at the other extreme, 
expecting nothing, and am always full o f thanks for moderate goods. I 
accept the clangor and jangle o f contrary tendencies...The great gifts are 
not got by analysis. Everything good is on the highway. The middle 
region of our being is the temperate zone. (Experience: 296)
To expect nothing as Emerson suggests is not easy. But this is perhaps a good advice
which offers a new and grateful way to appreciate life. As he too observes,
Most of life seems to be mere advertisement o f faculty; information is
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given us not to sell ourselves cheap; that we are very great...So in 
accepting the leading o f the sentiments, it is not what we believe 
concerning the immortality o f  the soul or the like, but the universal 
impulse to believe, that is the material circumstance and is the principle 
fact in the history o f the globe. (Experience: 303)
Emerson encourages us to believe in the greatness of humanity when we experience 
every moment o f life, through the intuitive wisdom delivered by the soul. The more 
we see the meaning o f life, as the miracles given by God, the more we realise it is the 
cosmic power that enlightens us to conceive o f the greatness o f humanity. Emerson 
not only convinces us o f the importance o f self-trust and self-realisation which leads 
humankind to understand its own humanity, but also implies that it is in fact the 
principle of the universe that helps the mind be awakened through personal 
experience. It seems to Emerson that to be modest and grateful to the universe and 
God and be self-reliant to humanity are the main points that lead humankind to 
enlightenment. As he continues: “The spirit is not helpless or needful of mediate 
organs. It has plentiful powers and direct effects. I am explained without explaining, I 
am felt without acting, and where I am not. Therefore all just persons are satisfied 
with their own praise” (Experience: 303). Here, we may plainly see how Emerson 
stresses that man is initially great and unique if he understands that the soul within 
everyone is connected with the cosmic power, and both will work together to open the 
mind and perceive life by means o f instinct and personal experience. As Emerson 
suggests: “Trust thyself: every heart vibrates to that iron string. Accept the place the 
divine providence has found for you, the society of your contemporaries, the 
connection of events” (Self-Reliance: 177). After all, we can rely on our instinct and 
experience, which cannot be felt and comprehended by others, in order to live 
independently in the world.
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In his essays, Emerson stresses the importance of self-reliance and experience, 
declaring that it is the main point that helps to achieve a balance between the mind 
and the soul, in order to develop the self as an individual. Nietzsche too concentrates 
on the concept o f individuality. His perspective implied in Twilight o f  the Idols offers 
a possible means of approaching the question o f self-knowledge, seeing if man is able 
to take off the mask o f limited consciousness, reconcile himself with his human 
animality, and then follow his own instinct. Stack’s critique helps us realise that
Emerson’s influence on Nietzsche is significant:
The existential individualism that is a phase, albeit an important phase, in 
the development o f Nietzsche’s thought was a response to Emerson’s 
stress upon self-reliant, independent, strong individuals who eschew 
“public opinion” and dare to stand outside or above “the crowd” or “the 
masses.” And in Emerson, too, one finds that the capacity for genuine 
individual existence is quite often linked to a natural potentiality that 
some people have to a greater extent than most. (1993: 161)
Stack, in this view, tells us that it is prominent for Emerson and Nietzsche to affirm 
the significance of individuality. Emerson is convinced that man can be the individual 
with self-reliance if he is willing to. But Nietzsche knows how great the difficulty of
being a real individual is, as he claims,
The harshest daylight, rationality at any cost, life bright, cold, 
circumspect, conscious, without instinct, in opposition to the instincts, 
has itself been no more than a form of sickness, another form of 
sickness — and by no means a way back to ‘virtue’, to ‘health’, to 
happiness....To have to combat one’s instincts -  that is the formula for 
decadence: as long as life is ascending, happiness and instinct are one.
(TI2: 11)
It is, indeed, rare and difficult to find the way to Nietzsche’s “happiness” but he 
argues that the self can possibly be developed and overcome. In other words, the 
possibility can be attained when the individual conceives o f his need for combat, 
knowing how to identify him self in the decadent modem epoch.
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Emerson argues that it is necessity to affirm human potential to be great and 
self-reliant. As he argues: “Every man is an impossibility until he is bom; every thing 
impossible until we see a success” (Experience: 300). In this respect, Emerson holds 
courage is essential for the self-reliant individual, and has to be manifested through 
personal experience: “Act singly, and what you have already done singly will justify 
you now. Greatness appeals to the future” (Self-Reliance: 184). However, Nietzsche’s 
perspective on humanity is different. We can find that courage is also significant to 
Nietzsche. Though he realises human nature is limited and imperfect, Nietzsche does 
not deny the greatness o f humanity that Emerson is inclined to assert; on the contrary, 
Nietzsche’s idea o f  human nature could be seen as a reflection of his own expectation 
o f humanity, which is in fact too idealistic to be found in modem culture.
In Twilight o f  the Idols, Nietzsche argues why knowledge and consciousness restrict 
us. At first, he criticises philosophers whose dialectics and reason not only inhibit 
development but also lead us to falsify our conception o f the real world. As he 
explains,
One chooses dialectics only when one has no other expedient. One knows 
that dialectics inspire mistrust, that they are not very convincing. Nothing 
is easier to expunge than the effect of a dialectician, as is proved by the 
experience o f every speech-making assembly. Dialectics can be only a 
last-ditch weapon in the hands o f those who have no other weapon left.
(TI 2: 6)
Dialectics and reason, in Nietzsche’s view, are the means that philosophers use to 
convince. However, Nietzsche questions the purpose o f using dialectics and reason. 
Taking the conception o f ‘the real world’ as an example, Nietzsche argues that “the 
‘real world’ has been constructed out o f the contradiction to the actual world: an 
apparent world indeed, in so far as it is no more than a moral-optical illusion” (TI 3:
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6). Nietzsche considers the real world as an illusion that can neither be precisely
estimated by judgem ent o f consciousness, nor by senses. He likewise goes on,
I set apart with high reverence that name o f Heraclitus. When the rest of 
the philosopher crowd rejected the evidence of the senses because these 
showed plurality and change, he rejected their evidence because they 
showed things as if  they possessed duration and unity...But Heraclitus 
will always be right in this, that being is an empty fiction. The ‘apparent’ 
world is the only one: the ‘real’ world has only been lyingly added. (TI 3:
2)
Nietzsche agrees with Heraclitus who regards the world as appearance which cannot 
be judged by means o f consciousness. At this point, Nietzsche also observes that 
humankind is entangled in the decadence through the false conception derived from 
philosophy and Christianity: “To divide the world into a ‘real’ and an ‘apparent’ world, 
whether in the manner o f Christianity or in the manner of Kant is only a suggestion of 
decadence -  a symptom o f declining life” (TI 3: 6). For Nietzsche, we are restricted in 
an erroneous conception which denies life and restricts the mind. This is why 
Nietzsche strongly criticises m odem  culture.
In order to emphasise the view that life should not be denied but be affirmed, 
Nietzsche proclaims the importance o f  experiencing life by action as an artist, even in 
the tragic way: “The tragic artist is not a pessimist -  it is precisely he who affirms all 
that is questionable and terrible in existence, he is Dionysian” (TI 3: 6). Nietzsche is 
concerned with defining life in a new perspective, that is to say, in a natural and 
healthy way with “an instinct o f  life” (TI 5: 4). Life does not need to be denied by 
Christianity but to be affirmed with bravery and vitality: “The Church combats the 
passions with excision in every sense o f the word: its practice, its ‘cure castration. It 
never asks: ‘How can one spiritualize, beautify, deify a desire? ...B ut to attach the 
passions at their roots means to attach life as its roots: the practice o f the Church is
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hostile to life” (TI 5:1). N ietzsche claims that traditional philosophy and Christian 
morality mislead us to deny life. But on the other hand, he argues that the need of 
self-awakening that raises the mind to a higher level o f self-knowledge is important. 
Nietzsche also claims: “Even the bravest o f us rarely has the courage for what he 
really knows” (TI 1: 2). He implies that man is so limited and cowardly that he is 
unable to grasp his own motives; therefore, man habitually succumbs to the weakness 
of human nature when he is under the influence o f traditional philosophy and
Christian morality. Here is N ietzsche’s perspective o f knowing life:
One would have to be situated outside life, and on the other hand to know 
it as thoroughly as any, as many, as all who have experienced it, to be 
permitted to touch on the problem  o f the value o f life at all: sufficient 
reason for understanding that this problem is for us an inaccessible 
problem. When we speak o f values we do so under the inspiration and 
from the perspective o f life: life itself evaluates through us when we 
establish values. (TI 5: 5)
In this view, there are two main implications o f Nietzsche’s perspective on life. Firstly, 
it is better to detach one’s true self from the limited human mind, understanding that 
everything cannot be measured by reason and language. Secondly, life can be 
perceived when the individual knows himself, creating the value o f life through 
experience. In other words, there is no other way that knows the value o f life except 
experiencing life thoroughly. As Nietzsche says: “Nothing can be predicted, but with a 
certain heightening o f the human type a new  force may reveal itself o f which we have 
preciously known nothing” (Notebook 1885, 34: 125). Life, according to Nietzsche, is 
the force that inspires humankind to develop, in order to affirm life with action.
Nietzsche stresses the improvement o f humanity, questioning if  it can possibly be 
achieved by breaking with any conception o f morality in human history, such as 
Indian morality, “the morality o f breeding”, and Christian morality, the morality of
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taming”(TI 7: 5). Regarding himself as “an immoralist”, Nietzsche offers a new 
perspective on the improvement o f humanity. Thus: “every means hitherto employed 
with the intention o f making mankind moral has been thoroughly im m oral (TI 7: 5). 
However, we must be careful when we define Nietzsche’s metaphysical conception of 
immorality, which has to be interpreted at least to some extent in his own terms. To be 
immoral is not to act without due disciplines but rather to improve the mind and know
how to be a better individual with self-development. As he argues,
In so far as morality condemns as morality and not with regard to the 
aims and objects o f life, it is a specific error with which one should show 
no sympathy, an idiosyncrasy o f  the degenerate which has caused an 
unspeakable amount o f harm!... We others, we immoralists, have on the 
contrary opened wide our hearts to every kind of understanding, 
comprehension, approval. We do not readily deny, we seek our honour in 
affirming. (TI 5: 6)
To be immoral, for Nietzsche, is to experience life, affirming it through every 
circumstance as a Dionysian hero.
Understanding the limits o f the conscious mind, Nietzsche creates a battlefield in 
which the mind has to struggle and develop itself, in order to affirm life with the 
self-disciplined soul. As Thiele argues: “The battlefield is within the self, and the 
corpus o f knowledge supplies all the mysteries and intrigue of uncharted water” (1990: 
23). According to Thiele, Nietzsche creates a self-reflexive and self-overcoming 
battlefield: “The greatest struggles are not to be witnessed on the battlefield or in the 
sociopolitical arena, but in the rule of the self. The greatest victory is a well-ordered 
soul” (1990: 65). Nietzsche suggests that the mind needs to be developed to a higher 
level, through its inner struggle, in order to understand how to affirm life with courage. 
Furthermore, Nietzsche urges to establish a new conception, i.e. the reinterpretation of 
man and the world. Christianity dominates the human mind by spreading a false
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conception o f God and humanity. As he says, “Christianity presupposes that man does 
not know, cannot know what is good for him and what evil: he believes in God, who 
alone knows. Christianity m orality is a command: its origin is transcendental; it is 
beyond all criticism, all right to criticize; it possesses truth only if God is truth” (TI 9: 
5). Christianity imposes a doctrine that on the one hand devalues humanity and 
misleads man to believe in innate sin. The doctrine, on the other hand, controls the 
human mind by means o f  the conception o f Christian God. Christian doctrine 
inculcates the need for redem ption to the human mind, leaving us entrapped by the 
domination o f Christianity. At this point, Nietzsche explicates his view o f humanity as 
follows,
Man believes that the world itself is filled with beauty -  he forgets that it 
is he who has created i t . . .M an really mirrors him self in things, that which 
give him back his own reflection he considers beautiful: the judgement 
‘beautiful’ is his conceit o f  his species.. has humanized the world: 
that is all. But there is nothing, absolutely nothing, to guarantee to us that 
man constitutes the model for the beautiful. (TI 9: 19)
There are two levels that N ietzsche stresses in his argument. First, he reminds us that 
we create the beauty o f the world through imagination. What we see in the world is a 
reflection of our thoughts. Second, although he mentions that we can create through 
imagination, he argues that there is nothing that can be constituted by us. To explain 
more clearly, everything is transitory and illusory in Nietzsche’s view. But Nietzsche 
maintains his radically transformative attitude toward life, affirming every event that 
happens in it. Here, his affirmative stance on life is similar to Emerson’s. As Stack 
argues: “At first Emerson, and later Nietzsche, interpreted the essence of actuality in 
terms of a central human characteristic: striving, willing, a nisus towards power. 
Emerson, and Nietzsche after him, understands all life in terms o f an immanent 
“spiritual” movement towards the telos o f power” (1989: 190). They both conceive
that humankind can decide and create the significance o f life.
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Nietzsche too points out that life should be represented as art, even represented 
tragically: “Art is the great stimulus to life” (TI 9: 24). He observes that it is an 
honour to be brave and experience life like a hero, though the soul needs to struggle 
itself: “In the face o f tragedy the warlike in our soul celebrates its Saturnalias; 
whoever is accustomed to suffering, whoever seeks out suffering, the heroic man 
extols his existence by means o f tragedy” (TI 9: 24). Nietzsche conceives that only 
certain individuals who understand the weakness o f humanity can respond to life 
through self-overcoming. For example, Nietzsche reveals his admiration o f Goethe as 
follows,
He bore within him its strongest instincts: sentimentality, nature-idolatry, 
the anti-historical, the idealistic, the unreal and revolutionary...he did not 
sever him self from life, he placed him self within it; nothing could 
discourage him and he took as much as possible upon himself, above 
himself, within himself. W hat he aspired to was totality:; he strove against 
the separation o f reason, sensuality, feeling, will; he disciplined himself 
to a whole, he created  himself. (TI 9: 49)
From Nietzsche’s viewpoint, Goethe is an admirable individual who is responsible for 
his life; Goethe does not choose to evade any plight that happened in his life but 
experiences life wholeheartedly, creating his life with courage and vitality. This is also 
Nietzsche’s perspective on the individual, who is able to regard life as a battlefield. 
Nietzsche never guarantees that it is easy to win the war of the self; he only stresses 
the significance o f freedom o f the soul, as he proclaims, “war is a training in freedom. 
For what is freedom? That one has the will to self-responsibility. That one preserves 
the distance which divides us. That one has become more indifferent to hardship, toil, 
privation, even to life. That one is ready to sacrifice men to one s cause, oneself not 
excepted” (TI 9: 38). In other words, the war o f the self is necessary for 
self-transformation and self-realisation. In his critical view o f western culture:
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The entire West has lost those instincts out o f which institutions grow, out 
of which the fu ture  grows: perhaps nothing goes so much against the 
grain o f its modem spirit’ as this. One lives today, one lives very fast — 
one lives very irresponsibility: it is precisely this which one calls 
‘freedom’. That which makes institutions institutions is despised, hated, 
rejected. (TI 9: 39)
Nietzsche knows that it is really difficult to overcome the limits o f humanity in 
modem culture, but he insists that life should not be evaded but treated as a constant 
challenge. Thus:
[A] 11 priests and moralists have believed it was possible -  they have 
wanted to take mankind back, force  it back, to an earlier standard of 
virtue.. .even today there are parties whose goal is a dream of the 
crabwise retrogression o f  all things. But no one is free to be a crab. There 
is nothing for it: one has to go forward, which is to say step by step 
further into decadence. (TI 9: 43)
In Nietzsche’s view, life has to be honoured, even if  we remain at a decadent stage of 
existence: “Affirmation o f life even in its strangest and sternest problems, the will to 
life rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility through the sacrifice o f its highest types” (TI 
10: 5). At this point, Nietzsche offers his ideal o f an honourable individual, who is 
courageous and self-disciplined to confront life. As he argues, the most spiritual 
human beings not only can assume they are the bravest but also have the most painful 
experience. But it is also for this reason that “they honour life, because it brings 
against them its most formidable weapons” (TI 9: 17). As Nietzsche claims: “For all 
creators are hard. A nd it must seem bliss to you to press your hand upon millennia as 
upon wax, bliss to write upon the will o f  millennia as upon metal — harder than metal, 
nobler than metal. Only the noblest is perfectly h a rd ’ (TI 11). Only the rare individual 
can stand firmly, experiencing life with courage and affirmation as the great hero. As 
Thiele argues, our limited capacity for knowledge “does not determine the boundaries 
of reality, but the boundaries o f man — a particular species on a particular planet in a 
particular universe” (1990: 30), Nietzsche provides a self-reflexive perspective o f the
191
human mind, implying that it is humankind itself who is able to decide whether the 
self is to be developed and overcome. In following passages, let us conclude this 
section by discussing Conw ay’s critique o f Twilight o f  the Idols and my argument 
concerning it in comparison with Em erson’s essays.
Conway remarks that N ietzsche in his late work from 1885 to 1888 “consistently 
treats individual human beings as the embodied media through which an age or 
people expresses its native vitality” (Dangerous Games 1997: 67). Then Conway
defines Nietzsche’s “twilight o f the idols” as follows,
The idols in question are the dom inant values and sustaining ideals of 
modernity as a whole. The “tw ilight” o f these idols signifies an advanced 
stage o f decay, such that the age can express itself only in a 
self-destructive retreat from, and betrayal of, its founding ideals and 
values. The twilight o f the idols thus characterizes late modernity, the 
epigonic epoch in which modernity attains its debilitating 
self-consciousness, (ibid.: 82)
When Nietzsche introduces his idea o f  decadence, according to Conway, he never 
expects to change the decadence in m odem  culture; therefore, Twilight o f  the Idols is 
a reflection o f Nietzsche’s view o f modernity. I think Conway is right; Nietzsche is 
not like Emerson who asserts his optimistic thought o f humanity. In contrast, 
Nietzsche chooses to adopt an objective ever clinical stance, calmly observing that 
“we cannot reverse our decadence, though we can certainly and disastrously fool 
ourselves into believing otherwise” (ibid.: 90). When Nietzsche criticises modem 
culture as decadent, it is a reflection o f his ideal o f humanity, which cannot be 
fulfilled in modem culture. For Nietzsche, he knows some few individuals are great, 
but he also realises that it is too difficult for most people, especially his contemporary 
audience, to understand what he conceives. This is the reason why he claims: 
“Posthumous men — like me, for instance — are not so well understood as timely
192
m en...M ore precisely, we are never understood -  and hence our authority...” (TI 1: 
15). However, the crucial point is that Nietzsche resists decadent modernity. As 
Conway argues, “Nietzsche can do nothing to reverse or arrest the decay of modernity 
as a whole, but he believes that he can exert an indirect influence on the founding of 
the successor epoch by bequeathing his insights to those who can translate them into 
active legislation” (Dangerous Games 1997: 120). Nietzsche never intends to 
persuade others o f his perspective; on the contrary, he criticises modernity and 
maintains his own stance on life. This is his responsibility for being himself. As
Conway comments,
To Nietzsche and those like him, the twilight o f the idols constitutes an 
entr ’acte in which the resistance o f decadence can perhaps effect indirect 
political change.. .Because N ietzsche’s volitional resources excel those of 
“average” individuals, the tw ilight o f the idols affords him a modest 
window of opportunity within which he might act to exert an influence on 
the disposition o f the successor epoch. Indeed, he is an active nihilist 
because his insight into the economy of decadence frees him to 
squander -  rather than sacrifice -  his remaining volitional resources.
(ibid.: 117)
Nietzsche knows that modernity is decadence, but he maintains his adversary stance 
against it. At least, he develops him self and confronts the reality o f the modem age: 
“The age itself may be dying, but its besetting decay constitutes a thriving form 
(rather than an abject negation) o f Life” (ibid.: 93). For Nietzsche, the self has to be 
combated in order to raise the mind to the higher level o f awareness. Hence, the wars 
of humanity are crucial as “signs o f renascent vitality, but they will in fact mark the 
spasmodic reflexes o f a dying epoch” (ibid.: 93-94). Nietzsche is less assertive than 
Emerson when affirming the goodness o f human nature. He knows that it is vain to 
expect to bring about an improvement in the human mind merely by his words. The 
possibility is not decided by him, but by the few individuals who have self-realisation 
and self-knowledge. By showing the way to individuality, Nietzsche chooses to let us
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determine our own way o f  life, either ascending or descending. As Conway 
concludes,
He [Nietzsche] neither advocates a return to bygone standards o f nobility 
and civility nor fatuously anticipates the redemption o f his age. Simply 
waiting, whether in m onkish repose or in preparing oneself to receive the 
gift o f releasement, is as unacceptable to him as hastily implementing a 
half-baked scheme to revive an anemic epoch, (ibid.: 120)
Nietzsche, standing alone in isolation as a true individual with the soul, offers us a 
calmer, deeper and self-reflexive way to revalue and reinterpret humanity.
With respect to their concepts o f individuality, Emerson and Nietzsche proclaim the 
individual who is able to develop the self and experience life with bravery and 
affirmation: “What he [Nietzsche] sought, as Emerson had earlier sought, was a 
reinstating o f naturalness and natural surplus energy in an ultra-civilized, creative 
individual” (Stack 1989: 192). As I discussed above, they both affirm the significance 
of life. However, there are some points that I would like to argue in response to their 
different ideas o f humanity. Firstly, Em erson is convinced that all humans can aspire 
to self-reliance and independence when they follow the message delivered by the soul. 
He also encourages us to be modest, to believe in the greatness o f humanity, and to 
realise that it is the cosmic power from God that helps to awaken the mind. Nietzsche 
has a different idea o f humanity. Though he points out the possibility of being the 
individual with self-knowledge, he does not say that everyone can raise the mind to a 
higher level and that is why he claims that the individual does not exist now but is 
prepared for the future. From N ietzsche’s viewpoint, he conceives of the difficulty of 
having self-knowledge for man in general. Humankind, with human animality, is 
controlled by Christian doctrine that hinders itself from self-development. In 
Nietzsche’s argument, those people who are able to overcome themselves through
194
internalisation can open the mind to be the independent individuals. Different from 
Emerson who asserts the universal unity o f man and God by the soul, Nietzsche 
argues that everything is illusory, pointing out that it is humankind who creates the 
world through imagination, including God. Nevertheless, it is clear to see what 
Emerson and Nietzsche attempt to address, i.e. life should be affirmed and 
experienced through every circumstance. At this point, they criticise Christianity 
which denies life and dominates the human mind, providing humankind a new 
perspective o f life in m odem  culture. Furthermore, they do not want any follower, 
proclaiming that the individual needs to develop himself, approaching to a possible 
balance between the mind and the soul. M an needs to experience life and responds to 
it with his own effort. According to their affirmative stances on life, in the final 
section as follows, I am going to concentrate on how Emerson and Nietzsche perceive 
the significance o f life in connection w ith the concept o f individuality, and how they 
manifest themselves the meaning o f  life with it.
4.3 An Exploration of Life
My aim in this section is to explore how to understand life and live independently in 
the human world by analysing Em erson’s “Fate”, “Heroism”, and “Circles” and 
Nietzsche’s Ecce Homo. Edward W agenknecht claims that the Emersonian ideal is 
“that of the man who is free to do as he likes but who chooses to do what is right and 
in harmony with the Will o f God” (230), and Wesley Mott in “The Age o f the First 
Person Singular: Emerson and Individualism ” offers a similar view o f Emerson. Mott 
not only regards Emerson as a great philosopher-psychologist-poet o f the Self in 
America, but also argues that the gift that Emerson gives to his contemporaries and 
later generations is “his ability to ignite in others an empowering sense o f
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self-reliance (61). Mott also says that Em erson’s optimism, is “a hard-earned faith 
forged against the backdrop o f early illness, personal loss, and doubt” (92). He 
contends that Emerson shows a specific way to individuality through his 
self-experimentation, though Em erson has a hard time in his self-experimentation. But
Emerson is distinctive, as M ott claims:
He [Emerson] accepted the challenge o f flux implicit in each o f these 
traditions, confronting head-on the psychic and social destabilization that 
were intensified by the gross m aterialism  o f his age and the disruptive 
insights o f modem  science. But he remained an advocate of human 
dignity founded on the centrality o f  character. His enduring appeal is not 
that he endorsed certain ideologies but that he never lost faith in the 
potential o f the individual, the potential not to achieve final truths or 
successes -  and surely not to dominate others -  but to grow continually.
(92)
In Mott’s view, Emerson never succum bs to the difficulties in his life and never loses 
his faith in individuality. On the contrary, he chooses to overcome them by his belief 
in the self which is united with the im m anent God. Indeed, he adopts a positive and 
affirmative stance both on hum anity and on life, which is explicitly shown in his 
work.
Regarding Emerson’s thought, his contem poraries also offer their commentary, for 
example, William James and John Dewey.46 As William James argues, “This duty of 
spiritual seeing and reporting determ ined the whole tenor o f his [Emerson’s] life” (18), 
Emerson never ceases to assert his character and testing as a spiritual seeker. James 
also mentions that Em erson’s conviction that Divinity is everywhere makes Emerson 
be “an optimist o f the sentimental type that refuses to speak ill o f anything (22).
46 William James’ “Address at the Em erson Centenary in Concord is from M em ories an d  Studies, 
London: Longmans, Green & Co., 1911, and John D ew ey ’s “Ralph Waldo Emerson is from 
Characters and Events, vol. 1, N ew  York: Holt, Rinehart & Winston, 1929. Both are selected in 
Emerson: A C ollection o f  C ritica l E ssays.)
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More precisely, Emerson let him self represent the spirit o f the individual with vitality, 
as James delineates as follows,
Emerson’s belief that the individual must in reason be adequate to the 
vocation for which the Spirit o f the world has called him into being, is the 
source o f those sublime pages, hearteners, and sustainers of our youth, in 
which he urges his hearers to be incorruptibly true to their own private 
conscience. Nothing can harm the man who rests in his appointed place 
and character. Such a man is invulnerable; he balances the universe, 
balances it as much by keeping small when he is small, as by being great 
and spreading when he is great. (21)
Emerson is convinced that the notion o f  the individuality is essential; for this reason, 
he not only delivers it to others, but also practises it diligently himself as a true 
individual. Similarly, Dewey respects Emerson, regarding him as more than a 
philosopher: “To Emerson, perception was more potent than reasoning; the 
deliverances o f reception more demonstrative than the conclusions o f intentional 
p ro o f’ (25). Emerson proclaims his transcendental notion both in philosophy, 
literature and life. Emerson is unique in his articulation, as Dewey calls him the 
Philosopher o f Democracy, who delivers a philosophy “which religion has no call to 
chide and which knows its friendship with science and with art” (29). Emerson, after 
all, stands firmly, inspiring us with his vigorous mind and undiminished hope.
Now I shall elaborate on Em erson’s ideas o f man and the world. In the essay “Circles”, 
Emerson tells us: “The key to every man is his thought...The life o f man is a 
self-evolving circle, which, from a ring imperceptibly small, rushes on all sides 
outwards to new and larger circles, and that without end. The extent to which this 
generation o f circles, wheel without wheel, will go, depends on the force or truth of 
the individual soul” (Circles: 227). Here he implies two levels o f perception o f man 
and the world. First, he knows that man is able to decide everything by using his
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thought, and life is a dimension o f self-experimentation that enables and motivates 
man to identify who he really is. Second, he conceives that there is a higher power 
over the physical human body, i.e. the power o f the soul united with God and the 
universe. In Em erson’s view, life involves a circling without end by the power of the 
soul, which is seen under its universal aspect. For the soul, there is no end and no 
beginning; the soul is eternally united with everything in the world beyond any 
merely physical limit. W hen one’s life ends, one merely finishes the use of the 
physical body but the spiritual life continues. W hen the soul finds another physical 
body, a new life in a new physical body starts. The implication reveals Emerson’s 
conception o f reincarnation, as he claims, “Dante and Columbus were Italians, in their 
time; they would be Russians or Americans to-day. Things ripen, new men come” 
(Fate: 384). But Emerson knows that the conception o f reincarnation is never easy to 
accept, especially to those western people who are under the influence o f Christianity. 
In other words, Christian doctrine does not suggest the concept o f reincarnation but 
focus on the need for redemption in order to be eternally saved after death. Emerson 
gives a new concept o f the relation between the body and the soul. In so doing, he 
says: “Every spirit makes its house; but afterwards the house confines the spirit” (Fate: 
365). The spirit refers to the soul and the house refers to the physical human body, 
including the limited human mind. W hen we live in the world, how can we perceive 
that we are united with everything in the world, which cannot be measured by the 
physical senses? Though it is true that this concept challenges us, it however inspires 
us to learn how to open the mind and understand ourselves in a new way.
I argue Emerson’s conception in two parts. The first part is to clarify his two-level 
conception o f humankind. Compared with Nature, physically, human beings are too 
trivial and limited to fight against the power o f Nature, as Emerson depicts,
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But Nature is no sentimentalist, - does not cosset or pamper us. We must 
see that the world is rough and surly, and will not mind drowning a man 
or a woman, but swallows your ship like a grain of dust...The diseases, 
the elements, fortune, gravity, lightning, respect no persons. The way o f 
Providence is a little rude...Providence has a wild, rough, incalculable 
road to its end, and it is o f no use to try to whitewash its huge, mixed 
instrumentalities, or to dress up that terrific benefactor in a clean shirt and 
white neckcloth o f a student in divinity. (Fate: 364-365)
In Emerson’s view, we have to know that the world has its law, which can never 
possibly be predicted or manipulated by the human mind: “Whatever limits us we call 
Fate” (Fate: 372). Due to the physical limitations that make humankind unable to 
overcome fate with human power, Emerson suggests that “we must respect Fate as 
natural history” (Fate: 373), which stresses the importance of being humble; on the 
other hand he argues that “there is more than natural history” (Fate: 373), which refers 
to the second level o f the conception o f humankind. In other words, though it is true 
that man cannot dominate either Nature or fate with his limited power, Emerson 
claims that man is capable o f raising the mind spiritually, and conceiving o f his 
unlimited power that is not from the body but from the soul, in order to know how to
bravely live at any moment, even under the unpredicted threat of fate. As he explains,
T ’ is the best use o f Fate to teach a fatal courage. Go face the fire at sea, 
or the cholera in your friend’s house, or the burglar in your own, or what 
danger lies in the way o f duty, - knowing you are guarded by the 
cherubim o f Destiny. If you believe in Fate to your harm, believe it at 
least for your good. For if  Fate is so prevailing, man also is part o f it, and 
can confront fate with fate. If  the Universe have these savage accidents, 
our atoms are as savage in resistance. We should be crushed by the 
atmosphere, but for the reaction o f the air within the body. (Fate: 375)
Fate, as Emerson argues, actually plays the role o f a severe teacher who awakens us to 
feel the inner power o f the soul through its horrible and unexpected manifestation in 
the material world. Though man cannot control fate, Emerson asserts that man is able 
to leam how to defend himself, confronting the challenge posed by fate through
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human thought and experience: “Self-trust is the essence of heroism. It is the state of 
the soul at war, and its ultimate objects are the last defiance of falsehood and wrong, 
and the power to bear all that can be inflicted by evil agents” (Heroism: 237).
Emerson also emphasises that we have to open “the inward eye” in order to 
understand “the Unity in things” and “the omnipresence of law” (Heroism: 237). In 
this way, we can pass through the visible obstacles provided by fate, realising the
greatness o f the soul united with the universe:
This insight throws us on the party and interest o f the Universe, against 
all and sundry; against ourselves as much as others. A man speaking from 
insight affirms o f him self what is true o f the mind: seeing its immortality, 
he says, I am immortal; seeing its invincibility, he says, I am strong. It is 
not in us, but we are in i t . . .W here it shines, Nature is no longer intrusive, 
but all things make a musical or pictorial impression. The world o f men 
show like a comedy without laughter: populations, interests, government, 
history; ‘t is all toy figures in a toy house. (Fate: 376)
The more we are able to perceive the greatness o f the soul beyond our limited 
conscious human mind, according to Emerson, the more we understand that we can be 
in charge o f everything with the power o f the soul; thus, Emerson says: “We are as 
lawgivers; we speak for Nature; we prophesy and divine” (Fate: 376). It seems that 
Emerson believes in the heroic nature o f the individual, who can develop the mind 
and is responsible for himself: “Heroism works in contradiction to the voice of 
mankind and in contradiction, for a time, to the voice o f the great and good. Heroism 
is an obedience to a secret impulse o f an individual’s character” (Heroism: 236-237). 
For Emerson, this heroic nature is not a manner o f pride and arrogance but modesty 
and confidence that the individual naturally expresses. When the mind is opened to 
perceive the unity o f man and everything in the universe, man is able to conceive of 
the unlimited omnipresent power working within himself: “Omnipresence is a higher
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fact. Not through subtle subterranean channels need friend and fact be drawn to their 
counterpart, but, rightly considered, these things proceed from the eternal generation 
of the soul. Cause and effect are two sides o f one fact” (Circles: 233), and will know 
how to play with the game o f fate, which “then is a name for facts not yet passed 
under the fire o f thought; for causes which are unpenetrated” (Fate: 379).
Second, there is Em erson’s two-level perception o f the world. The world, in 
Emerson’s understanding, is too boundless and changeable to be perceived adequately 
by the mind: “The whole world is the flux o f matter over the wires o f thought to the 
poles or points where it would build” (Fate: 387). Emerson likewise implies: “There 
are no fixtures in nature. The universe is fluid and volatile. Permanence is but a word 
of degrees. Our globe seen by God is a transparent law, not a mass o f facts. The law 
dissolves the fact and holds it fluid. Our culture is the predominance o f an idea which 
draws after it this train o f cities and institutions” (Circles: 226). The world is illusory. 
How can we regain self-assurance and affirm life when we conceive that everything is 
in flux? There is no way that helps us escape from the unfinished anxiety o f facing the 
unpredicted and uncertain world. The only way we can do is to focus on ourselves, 
realising that we are also unlimited: “There are no fixtures to men, if  we appeal to 
consciousness. Every man supposes him self not to be fully understood...there is 
always a residuum unknown, unanalyzable. That is, every man believes that he has a 
greater possibility” (Circles: 228). Then man will be enlightened and encouraged by 
the soul to balance the power between man and the world. According to Emerson, the 
key problem is that humans are used to accepting the idea that they live in an 
unlimited world o f duality, forgetting the unity o f themselves and the world. This 
conception, in this aspect, causes them  to believe that they are divided from the world. 
But Emerson stresses the point that is ignored by us, i.e. the unity o f man and all
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beings in the universe. Man strives to dominate the world by his human power, but 
finally he feels frustrated and impotent on account of knowing that it is impossible to 
control the unexpected world. The limitation is what Emerson names “fate” .
Emerson sees the truth behind m an’s fear o f fate, attempting to convert the perception 
into a new understanding: “People wish to be settled; only as far as they are unsettled 
is there any hope for them ” (Circles: 237). That is to say, there is nothing in the world 
that we should feel afraid of. We might wonder if Emerson’s claim is so idealistic that 
he does not see how much people struggle when experiencing death, misery and 
suffering. Does he create an unattainable hallucination with his blind American 
confidence? In order to answer the question, we need to understand the terms ‘settled’ 
and ‘unsettled’ he uses. W hen Em erson says that we wish to be settled, he does not 
mean it is false; on the contrary, he explains that it is our natural reaction, our 
temperament when we feel frustrated by unexpected fate and desire to be settled in 
order to protect ourselves from being upset again. When he says that hope is there for 
us only if we are unsettled, he means that chance and possibility is always there for us 
to move ahead when we accept our temporary natural reaction but do not let it destroy 
our self-confidence. In response to unknown fate, Emerson argues that there are two 
ways that we can choose. The first is to detach ourselves from our frequent ups and 
downs and view them as self-test for training us to avoid repeated mistakes and 
manage situations better. The second is to withdraw or remain in our temperament and 
reject to encounter them again. If  we choose the first one, we can answer the question 
and attain what Emerson says, knowing that what he offers is not blind hope but a 
strength to accept life and move on. Emerson does not say we are not allowed to 
choose the second one, but our frustration o f life and ourselves is the consequence. As 
he also argues in the following,
202
Life is a series o f surprises. We do not guess to-day the mood, the 
pleasure, the power o f to-morrow, when we are building up our being. O f 
lower states, o f acts o f routine and sense, we can tell somewhat; but the 
masterpieces o f God, the total growths and universal movements of the 
soul, he hideth; they are incalculable. I can know that truth is divine and 
helpful; but how it shall help me I can have no guess, for so to be is the 
sole inlet o f so to know. (Circles: 237)
When we learn to be modest but grateful and confident to perceive everything that 
happens around us is meaningful to our development, in Emerson’s view, we will be 
guided and enlightened by the soul within ourselves to see through the significance of 
life manifested by God. Then we will not feel fearful and frustrated when we know 
everything in the material world is illusory but the soul is infinite and permanent.
Emerson does not denigrate the value o f humankind; on the contrary, he encourages 
us to experience life not with the limited mind but with the unlimited and infinite soul. 
As he explicates, “ I unsettle all things. No facts are to me sacred; none are profane; I 
simply experiment, an endless seeker with no Past at my back” (Circles: 236). When 
he raises the mind to a higher level, man will recognise that he can confront the 
unlimited world with his unlimited power from the soul, which is associated with God 
and the universe, in order to create every possibility in his life. Emerson provides a 
new conception o f the world. The world can be regarded as united with humankind 
where there is no conception o f difference and division. In other words, humankind 
determines the world with the power o f the soul, i.e. the power o f the universe. 
Emerson believes that it is not the physical but spiritual power that helps the mind be 
awakened and united with the world, which we can never predict and control. 
Emerson likewise argues that the universal power, which is beyond the understanding 
of the limited mind, can automatically manage the harmony between man and the 
world: “When there is something to be done, the world knows how to get it done”
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(Fate: 384), though people need to practise to perceive the universal power with the 
soul, as he elaborates as the follows,
All great force is real and elemental. There is no manufacturing a strong 
will. There must be a pound to balance a pound. Where power is shown 
in will, it must rest on the universal force...But the pure sympathy with 
universal ends is an infinite force, and cannot be bribed or bent. Whoever 
has had experience o f the moral sentiment cannot choose but believe in 
unlimited power. (Fate 377-378)
For Emerson, it is the courageous individual who balances himself and the world, as a 
hero: “The hero is a mind o f such balance that no disturbances can shake his will, but 
pleasantly and as it were merrily he advances to his own music, alike in frightful 
alarms and in the tipsy m irth o f universal dissoluteness” (Heroism: 236). Being a hero 
is to see through the meaning o f  life by means o f experience, without retreating from 
any plight in life. This is the way o f life that Emerson offers to us.
This is an unusual perception that inspires us to understand that the physically limited 
human creature is spiritually unlim ited when he opens the mind, perceiving himself in 
the unity with the unlimited power o f the universe: “Simple hearts put all the history 
and customs o f this world behind them, and play their own games in innocent 
defiance o f the Blue-Laws o f the world” (Heroism: 241-242). In this way, life will be 
affirmed with the possibility when we are awakened to know who we are, with the
purest soul. So Emerson claims,
The one thing which we seek with insatiable desire is to forget ourselves, 
to be surprised out o f our propriety, to lose our sempiternal memory and 
to do something w ithout knowing how or why; in short to draw a new 
circle. N othing great was even achieved without enthusiasm. The way o f 
life is wonderful; it is by abandonment. The great moment of history are 
the facilities o f  perform ance through the strength of ideas, as the works of 
genius and religion. (Circles: 238)
There is always hope for hum an beings, for Emerson, and we are able to be brave,
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creating the possibility o f  life at any moment. Though we might feel that Emerson is 
indeed optimistic in his interpretation o f humankind, it is undeniable that his firm trust 
in humanity and life does enlighten us to confront any obstacle in the journey of life, 
especially with his perception o f  the unity o f man, God and everything in the universe. 
Emerson urges us to understand the purpose o f life is to acquaint man with himself 
and the highest revelation is that God is in every man (Richardson 152). God, for 
Emerson, is “the most elevated conception o f character that can be formed in the mind. 
It is the individual’s own soul carried out to perfection” (Richardson 97). So, as 
Emerson argues, man lives with a belief in the soul within himself as well as a belief 
in God.
While Emerson expresses his assertive and optimistic stance on the humanity, 
insisting that every man makes his own religion and his own God (Richardson 97), 
Nietzsche represents his idea o f hum anity and the world in a different way. First of all, 
I would like to explore Stack’s view o f Em erson’s optimism. Stack speaks up for 
Emerson, claiming that Em erson’s optimism is neither naive nor superficial: “His 
optimistic faith in life and man was a reflection of a deep, personal religious faith 
combined with an effort to overcome sceptical doubts and affirm the value of 
existence despite its obvious flaws and imperfections” (1992: 41). Additionally, Stack 
gives his reference implying that Em erson’s notion o f the world associates 
Nietzsche’s notion o f the world. To say more precisely, Stack argues that it is Emerson 
who firstly suggests N ietzsche perceive “life is shot through with illusions” (1992: 28), 
since Nietzsche started to read Em erson’s essays in 1862. Stack points out that it is 
not Schopenhauer but Em erson who at first inspires Nietzsche to understand the 
concept of illusion.
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David Mikics takes a similar view: “Nietzsche learned the risk and promise of 
transformation from Emerson, not from Schopenhauer, who is usually named as 
Nietzsche’s major influence. Emerson and Schopenhauer are, in fact, Nietzsche’s two 
crucial philosophical fathers, though students of Nietzsche have usually granted 
Schopenhauer priority” (16). Stack argues that Emerson and Schopenhauer are both 
influenced by oriental philosophy, accepting the notion that life is illusory. But 
Emerson differs from Schopenhauer, not only encouraging humankind “to view life as 
a gift, as something ‘sacred’”, but also “to penetrate the veil o f illusion that covers life 
and force ourselves to look unblinking into the heart o f darkness o f reality” (1992: 29). 
In Stack’s commentary, N ietzsche’s ideals o f “becoming who we are”, “affirming our 
originality”, “asserting our uniqueness” and “exercising our self-legislating 
capacities” are associated with Em erson’s thought (1992: 53). Stack, accordingly, 
argues that Nietzsche chooses to view the world from his own individual perspective.
Taking their stances on science as an example, as Stack compares,
Emerson in a mild way and Nietzsche in a more intense way worried over 
the burgeoning culture o f  science... For Emerson, as for Nietzsche, matter 
is not the ultimate reality; rather, it is a phenomenon, a manifestation of a 
spiritual reality the essence o f which is a living power. Both embraced a 
dynamic, spiritual interpretation o f reality. (1992: 15)
In this view, we know that Emerson and Nietzsche are similarly concerned with power, 
i.e. the essence o f life, but they stress it in different ways. For Emerson, he asserts the 
theory o f immanence, “a belief that there is a spiritual force in nature that ‘seeks’ 
material embodiment” (1992: 14), and believes in the power o f the soul which is 
permanently connected with God and the universe. His optimistic belief in humanity 
is contained within the concept o f  immanence. Nietzsche, for his part, focuses on how 
to develop the self and affirm life through self-overcoming, although he does not deny 
what Emerson claims.
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Now I shall explore N ietzsche’s view o f man and the world in Ecce Homo. In “Behold 
Nietzsche” Michael Platt elaborates on his interpretation of Ecce Homo with regard to 
several crucial points. Comparing Nietzsche with Augustine, Montaigne, Descartes, 
Rousseau and Kierkeggard, Platt claims that Ecce Homo is Nietzsche’s apology, the 
work of self-portraiture where he chooses to present an account of his own life in 
solitude. In Ecce H om o , N ietzsche gives spiritual and positive guidance: “Nietzsche 
makes spiritual war against all anti-nature teachings, especially those of the priest and 
the Christianity that had ruled the world since antiquity” (Platt 231). In addition to the 
spiritual war, Platt maintains that Nietzsche takes nature as the theme o f this book. As 
Platt says, “fundamentally it is nature that calls one to be what one is and that in such 
a man as Nietzsche actually achieves what it wants to” (231). At least, Nietzsche 
offers himself as the representative o f nature, being who he is. Moreover, Platt tends 
to reinterpret N ietzsche’s implication when he says, “ [h]ave I been understood? - 
Dionysus versus the C rucified ’ (EH: Destiny 8). Platt means that it is at any rate 
questionable to regard Nietzsche as Dionysus; on the contrary, Nietzsche considers
himself as Jesus. Thus:
Dionysus and Christ, both gods, both suffer for man, but only Christ is a 
teacher and lover, as Nietzsche is; likewise his Zarathustra, whose 
greatest struggle is with regret, anger, vengeance and ressentiment, and 
whose greatest victory is the amor fa ti  implicit in his loving celebration 
of eternity at the end o f Part Three. All this is like Christ, not 
D ionysus...Perhaps he may be better described as a Sokrates with the 
soul o f Christ, for the view o f human things Zarathustra achieves in Part 
IV is comic, like Sokrates’, and yet the virtue he achieves is, like Christ’s, 
one o f love. So, too, N ietzsche, in imitation o f his hero, and his heroes, in 
Ecce Home, tries to unite Dionysus, Sokrates and Christ. How this might 
be is hard to see. (225)
Nietzsche does indeed characterise him self as an exemplary healer , a teacher , a
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prophet , and a destiny (225). Platt also points out that Nietzsche feels ready when 
he declares the war, preparing to make a defence: “In Ecce Homo Nietzsche tried to 
be a Christ who lived on after his redemption to become a Caesar ready to fight a war 
for the earth and perish in it for the children o f the earth” (244). Though Nietzsche 
does not be able to continue his war after he collapses in January 1889, his belief of 
self-affirmation is surely proved. After all, though it is difficult to know that Nietzsche 
views him self as another Christ or Caesar, it is undeniable that he does know how to 
measure his life with am or fati, “the quality and the strength of love” (Platt 250).
Here is Sarah K ofm an’s com m entary on Ecce Homo in “Explosion I: O f Nietzsche’s 
Ecce Homo”'.
Ecce homo has a more specific status as a test book which is to put spirits 
to the test, to gauge whether or not they will be capable o f bearing the 
radical inversion o f values, whether or not they will be strong enough to 
tolerate and thus understand the boldness of the immoralist, this hitherto 
unheard-of type which Nietzsche the artist invented as his own. (219)
Kofman considers Ecce Homo as a work that Nietzsche sets for himself as a test, in 
order to see how much pain he can bear and how individual or distinct he can become 
when he discloses him self in retrospect. Self-explosion is never easy, according to 
Kofman, but it is surely Nietzsche recreate his life. Self-explosion is Nietzsche’s
means to know himself. As she points out,
Burying himself, exploding him self as a German in order to be reborn -  
make him self be reborn -  and to reaffirm him self as a Frenchman, does 
not mean changing his nationality: what do nationalities matter to 
Nietzsche, this ‘stateless person,’ this beyond-all-borders! It means 
effecting a much more profound conversion: giving himself the 
opportunity o f being recognized for what he is, a man -  or Dionysus, 
which, understood correctly, is the same thing. (222)
By criticising the Germans and praising the French, Kofman observes that Nietzsche 
selects the harshest path in order to identify his exceptional courage and distinction.
208
The second point that Kofman questions is to relate Ecce Homo to Nietzsche’s 
madness which follows. Ecce Homo is his last work and is always considered the 
maddest text in his philosophy, at least bearing “symptoms of the madness to come” 
(223). But Kofman has a different interpretation o f it. She argues that Nietzsche feels 
it is his duty to say “in what respects he has remained ‘himself’ and in what respects 
he has become someone else” (223). Therefore, how Nietzsche has attained, in 
Kofman’s view, is not “his most profound s e lf ’ but “the one which was situated way 
above ‘him ’, at ‘h is’ highest point” (223). As Kofman argues, Ecce Homo is regarded 
as the exceptional autobiography; it is a work “which no one has had the courage or 
the intelligence to write, letting people know who he is and that he is not mad” (225).
However, Kofman also points out that Nietzsche reassures himself through Ecce 
Homo that “he is not mad and that at the very moment he is planning to blow up the 
entire earth he is not him self in the process o f exploding -  o f shattering into a 
thousand figures with no link or unity” (225-226). Kofman, furthermore, has her own
interpretation o f N ietzsche’s “satyr” as follows,
Nietzsche would prefer, he says, to be taken for a satyr than a saint, that 
is, a servant o f Christ, for he is neither a fanatic nor an apostle, a founder 
o f a religion, a monster o f virtue, or a moral man. But taking him purely 
and simply for a satyr would mean making another mistake. For the satyr 
is also that cynical and shameless buffoon who is unafraid to wallow in 
his books as in his own dung...N ietzsche feels no typological affinity at 
all with these buffoons, whose cynicism is the form in which only base 
and vulgar souls prize what is called sincerity. (229)
Kofman concludes that Nietzsche is not a cynical person at all, though he criticises 
Christianity in a cynical perspective (229). Being a cynic, in other words, is the way 
that Nietzsche chooses to testify and prove himself, in order to express his radical 
criticism o f Christianity and then point out a new understanding of life, as a living
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hero with the purest spirit.
In this respect, I agree with K ofm an’s comment, arguing that Nietzsche plans to 
identify him self by setting a test for himself. In Ecce Homo, we can see that Nietzsche 
treats him self as “a disciple o f the philosopher Dionysos” (EH: Foreword 2), 
expresses his own unshakable belief in affirming life through self-display, and 
indicates that life should m anifest itself not with cowardice but with courage. As he 
says: “Error (-belief in the ideal-) is not blindness, error is cowardice...Every 
acquisition, every step forward in knowledge is the result o f courage, o f severity 
towards oneself, o f cleanliness w ith respect to oneself’ (EH: Foreword 3). Ecce Homo 
is a retrospective book which deliberately exposes Nietzsche’s self-reflective analysis 
of human beings and the world. There are two aspects o f his thinking that call for 
analysis here. The first part is his conception o f humanity. In Nietzsche’s view, those 
who live in the modem world are habitually unaware o f the domination of Christian 
morality, which he calls a “decadence  m orality” (EH: Destiny 4) with its denial of life. 
Nietzsche stresses the prevalence o f resentment, the dangerous effect of the Christian 
morality that he rejects: “the instinct for self-recovery forbade  to me a philosophy of 
indigence and discouragem ent” (EH: Wise 2). He insists that the essential step to free 
us from resentment is to overcome the weakness o f humanity through self-recovery,
in order to affirm life. Taking him self as an example, Nietzsche writes:
Freedom from ressentiment, enlightenment over ressentiment -  who 
knows the extent to which I ultimately own thanks to my protracted 
sickness for this too! The problem is not exactly simple: one has to have 
experienced it from a state o f strength and a state o f weakness... Being 
sick is itself a kind o f ressentiment...to  free the soul o f that 
[resentment] -  first step is recovery. Ressentiment, bom o f weakness, to 
no one more harmful than to the weak man himself -  in the opposite case, 
where a rich nature is the presupposition, a superfluous feeling to stay
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master o f which is alm ost the proof o f richness. (EH: Wise 6)
Nietzsche knows that it is indeed hard for a person to rid herself of the influence of
resentment. Accordingly, he is convinced that he is the one who is capable of helping
himself and achieving a release from resentment. Nietzsche understands that man has
to test and prove him self through his own experience, which cannot be replaced by
anything else. His view o f the need for experience is closely analogous to Emerson’s.
They not only claim the importance o f self-experimentation which helps to be wise,
independent and self-reliant, but also choose to manifest it themselves by the means
of writing in solitude. “Both Em erson and Nietzsche often suggest that the realization
of the ambitions o f the great writer may require keeping the personal, or impersonal,
distance called solitude” (Hanson 36). Their works make a proof of what life in
themselves they urge to claim.
As Nietzsche explains his experience awakens him to reproach the virtue claimed in 
Christianity: “My experience gives me a right to a general mistrust of the so-called 
‘selfless’ drives, o f the whole ‘love o f one’s neighbour’ which is always ready with 
deeds and advice” (EH: Wise 4). By announcing what follows, Nietzsche is convinced
of his attack on Christianity:
If I wage war on Christianity I have a right to do so, because I have never 
experienced anything disagreeable or frustrating from that direction -  the 
most serious Christians have always been well disposed towards me. I 
myself, an opponent o f Christianity de rigueur, am far from bearing a 
grudge against the individual for what is the fatality of millennia. (EH:
Wise 7)
This experience o f reproaching Christian morality, for Nietzsche, is the means o f 
self-recovery by which he releases him self from resentment in modem culture. 
Self-recovery, for Nietzsche, is the cure that makes him bravely confront resentment. 
According to Nietzsche, he knows that he is different from others, observing that
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resentment makes m odern people sick, as explained in the following passage,
I took m yself in hand, I m yself made myself healthy again: the 
precondition for this -  every physiologist will admit it -  is that one is 
fundam entally healthy. A being who is typically morbid cannot become 
healthy, still less can he make him self healthy; conversely, for one who is 
typically healthy being sick can even be an energetic stimulant to life, to 
more life. (EH: Wise 2)
Being healthy, in N ietzsche’s view, can be interpreted in psychological and physical 
terms. Those who are psychologically sick, those ‘morbid’ people, are difficult to be 
healthy on account o f the lack o f  will and courage; nevertheless, those who are 
physically sick, like Nietzsche himself, can be cured through self-recovery, affirming 
life through experiencing every test happened in it. In this respect, we can see how 
Nietzsche regards his physical sickness as the source o f a strength that stimulates his 
affirmation o f life. However, the implication does not mean that everyone is able to 
conceive what Nietzsche claims, agreeing that he is fundamentally healthy. In other 
words, Nietzsche understands that he is the one who helps himself away from 
resentment through self-recovery.
Regardless o f his unhealthy body condition and finally insanity, Nietzsche in his life 
demonstrates him self as a living example o f life-affirmation. As Lou Salome shows, 
Nietzsche reveals him self “in the way a poet shapes his own unique world through 
words, metaphors, and correspondences” (quoted in Behler, 285).47 Nietzsche, in 
Salome’s portrayal, is more than a so-called theoretician or academic philosopher: 
“For the value o f his thoughts does not lie in their originality of theory, nor does it lie 
in that which can be established or refuted dialectically. What is of value is the 
intimate force which speaks through one personality to another personality” (ibid.).
47 Ernst Behler describes how  Lou Salom 6 portrays N ietzsche’s life and writings not as a biography 
nor a psychological study but a book depicting his personality and individuality (1988, Reddinjg Ridge: 
Black Swan Books, Trans. S iegfried Mandel).
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But Nietzsche surely knows that it is impossible to persuade others to believe his 
writing unless they dare to experience life on their own account, as he argues: “Now I 
bid you lose me and find yourselves; and only when you have all denied me will I 
return to you” (EH: Foreword 4). Similar to Emerson, Nietzsche claims that life can 
only be affirmed through experience, which can never be taught by others. At this 
point, he understands that his business is to exemplify himself, to “overthrow idols” 
(EH: Foreword 2), including himself, if  someone wants to treat him as a new idol. 
Like Emerson who never asks for the followers, Nietzsche does not want to be a new 
idol at all; he shows how he is capable o f affirming life. “It was Emerson who first 
saw him self (as Nietzsche would later see himself) as a source of cultural strength -  
the hero who could restore the balance o f  power between man and his environment” 
(Lopez 45).
Nietzsche and Emerson both choose to affirm their lives alone as a living individual:
[H]e [Emerson] encouraged an experimental approach to thought and 
prized the accumulation o f knowledge -  knowledge of nature, o f the 
world, o f the human condition, and o f the self... Seeing through 
deceptions and renouncing our former beliefs in what Nietzsche later 
calls ‘self-overcom ing.’ That is, deliberately overcoming one’s own 
cherished ideals, one’s consoling illusions. (Stack 1992: 59)
Likewise, with respect to resentment, Nietzsche realises that it is hard to free oneself 
from its effects but nevertheless strives to overcome the self with courage and 
determination. Nietzsche argues that only the rare individual, like himself, who is able 
to conceive o f the need for freedom from resentment through self-overcoming and 
self-realisation, will know how to live in the world with a free soul: “He [the 
individual] is always in his company, whether he traffics with books, people or 
landscapes: he does honour when he chooses, when he admits, when he trusts (EH. 
Wise 2). Nietzsche knows that this is his own path of solitude to individuality. As he
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argues, my humanity consists, not in feeling for and with man, but in enduring that I 
do feel for and with h im ...M y humanity is a continual self-overcoming. — But I have 
need of solitude, that is to say recovery, return to myself, the breath of a free light 
playful air” (EH: Wise 8). With his ceaseless affirmation o f life, Nietzsche 
demonstrates him self as an exceptional and honourable individual, like Emerson, who 
never ceases to overcome his own human weakness with great endurance and 
strength.
The second part sets out to analyse how Nietzsche views modem culture. He criticises 
modem culture which has been misled and dominated by Christianity. Nietzsche’s 
criticism of Christianity resembles Em erson’s. Both Emerson and Nietzsche, simply 
put, are concerned with cultural values and crisis, and Stack regards them the
philosophers o f culture (1992: 33). As Stack continues,
Although other thinkers later reinforced Nietzsche’s awareness o f a 
coming crisis in Western culture in general and an emerging crisis in 
Christian culture in particular, it was Emerson who first conveyed to him 
the idea that Christendom was in decline, that the official doctrines o f the 
Christian religion were losing their hold on the minds and hearts of men.
His allusions to the question o f the status of the claims to truth in 
Christianity, as well as to changing attitudes toward them, in “Fate and 
History,”48 were framed in the context o f his recent reading of Emerson.
(1992: 33-34)
Emerson and Nietzsche provide a new religion with a new morality, according to 
Stack (1992: 35). But the difference between them is their personal definition o f this 
new religion. Emerson believes in “an affirmative religion of immanence”, which 
should be “a religion o f  life and affirmation, a religion o f beauty and strength, that
48 “Fate and History” is one o f  N ietzsch e’s early essays which have been translated from German to 
English by Richard Perkins in Young N ietzsche an d  Philosophy. Three Juvenile Essays (Mount 
Pleasant, MI: Enigma Press, n.d.). Stack retranslates it again with another essay “Freedom o f  Will and 
Fate”, which I have already m entioned.
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would replace the encrusted forms o f ‘historical Christianity’” (Stack 1992: 35). 
Nietzsche nevertheless concentrates on the development o f the self, without offering 
any arguments related to the religion o f immanence that Emerson claims. Though 
their stances on the new religion are different, Emerson and Nietzsche similarly 
assume that this new religion has to be made with a new morality with autonomy and 
self-development, which is different from Christian morality. Nietzsche argues that 
Christian morality misinterprets love: “The Circe o f mankind, morality, has falsified 
all psychologica to its very foundations -  has moralized it -  to the point o f the 
frightful absurdity that love is supposed to be something ‘unegoistic’” (EH: Books 5). 
Christian morality misleads us into following Christian doctrine, assuming that being 
unegoistic is the quintessential m anner o f expressing love. Nietzsche, like Emerson 
claims in “The Divinity School A ddress”, corrects this false concept: “One has to be 
set firmly upon oneself, one has to stand bravely upon one’s own two legs, otherwise 
one cannot love at all” (EH: Books 5). According to Nietzsche, it is only after a 
person is firstly able to love and respect him self that he will automatically know how 
to spread love to others. Love, in N ietzsche’s interpretation, should not be manifested 
by doing something according to Christian doctrine as obligation, but by expressing 
itself naturally and instinctively.
Moreover, as Nietzsche explicates that “what isolates us is not that we don’t f in d  any 
God, either in history, or in nature, or behind nature -  but that we feel what was 
revered as God to be not ‘divine’ but a hideous holy grimace, a sheep-like, absurd and 
pitiful inanity, a principle o f slander against man and the world: in short, that we deny 
God as God” (Notebook 1887-1888, 11: 122), Nietzsche argues that modem culture 
isolates those few individuals with self-knowledge in decadence and depression. Life, 
under the influence o f  Christianity, is denied and degenerated, as Nietzsche continues:
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“Our human life being as it is, all ‘truth’, all ‘goodness’, all ‘holiness’, all ‘divinity’ in 
the Christian style has hitherto proved to be a great danger -  even now, mankind is in 
danger o f perishing through an ideality hostile to life” (Notebook 1887-1888, 11: 122). 
The danger that emerges from Christianity is the denial of life. Being aware of the
danger, Nietzsche has a new way o f  interpreting the world as follows:
It is precisely here that one has to begin to learn anew. Those things 
which mankind has hitherto pondered seriously are not even realities, 
merely imaginings, more strictly speaking lies from the bad instincts of 
sick, in the profoundest sense injurious natures -  all the concepts ‘God’,
‘soul’, ‘virtue’, ‘sin’, ‘the Beyond’, ‘truth’, ‘eternal life’. (EH: Clever 10)
All these imaginary concepts, according to Nietzsche, are illusory. All the concepts 
related to the world, similarly, are imagined. Nietzsche claims that it is better to be 
wary of knowledge and consciousness: “The entire surface of consciousness -  
consciousness is a surface -  has to be kept clear o f any o f the great imperatives. Even 
the grand words, the grand attitudes must be guarded against! All of them represent a 
danger that the instinct will ‘understand itself’ too early” (EH: Clever 9). To develop 
humanity to a higher level with the free soul is the way that helps to clarify and 
overcome the limits o f consciousness.
Everything in the world is transitory, as Nietzsche claims,
To ‘want’ something, to ‘strive’ after something, to have a ‘goal’, a ‘wish’ 
in view -  I know none o f this from experience. Even at this moment I 
look out upon my future -  a distant future! -  as upon a smooth sea: it is 
ruffled by no desire. I do not want in the slightest than anything should 
become other than it is; I do not want myself to become other than I 
am ...B ut that is how I have always lived. I have harboured no desire.
(EH: Clever 9)
On the one hand, it seems that Nietzsche is too passive and indifferent to the outside 
world; but on the other hand, this is the way he knows himself through self-realisation. 
Nietzsche never calls a halt to his self-transformative and self-overcoming process
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through self-realisation, knowing that he is responsible for exhibiting himself through 
his life, even in an erratic way as he portrays, “I am the anti-ass par excellence and 
therewith a world-historical monster” (EH: Books 2). Additionally, he never denies 
the inner struggles o f  his tragic life, such as his relationship with his family and 
Wagner. He knows he is never perfect, but he dares to confront his past experience in
order to continually overcome and develop himself. As he points out,
The genius o f the heart who makes everything loud and self-satisfied fall 
silent and teaches it to listen, who smooths rough souls and gives them a 
new desire to savour...The genius o f the heart from whose touch 
everyone goes away richer, not favoured and surprised, not as if blessed 
and oppressed with the goods o f others, but richer in himself, newer to 
himself than before, broken open, blown upon and sounded out by a 
thawing wind, more uncertain perhaps, more delicate, more fragile, more 
broken, but full o f hopes that as yet have no names, full o f new will and 
current, full o f new ill will and counter current. (EH: Books 6)
In this view, Nietzsche does not only conceive that he will be the genius o f the heart, 
but also realises that all his previous works merely record the traces which help him 
return to himself, becoming who he is. As he argues in the very beginning of Ecce 
Homo, “//ow  should I  not be grateful to my whole life? -A nd so I tell myself my 
life”.49 Ecce Homo in this respect signifies a significant point of closure not only for 
Nietzsche’s work but also for N ietzsche’s life.
“Emerson and Nietzsche also hold in common those various, exalted 
nineteenth-century conceptions o f the seer -  the artist-philosopher or poet-thinker 
capable o f initiating profound transfigurations in culture and humanity” (Lopez 127). 
Both Emerson and Nietzsche provide a new conception of the world and a new way 
of living. They emphasise the significance o f individuality and the affirmation of life, 
manifesting themselves as true individuals. Emerson regards himself as a seeker, an
49 This is from a short passage after the Forward o f  Ecce Homo.
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individual alone on the spiritual path with the unlimited power of the soul. He 
advocates that the soul inside humankind unites itself and God, contending that it is 
not the limited mind but the unlimited power o f the soul that allows humankind to 
conceive o f the greatness o f humanity. He also argues that it is possible for us to know 
greatness through personal experience. Emerson stresses two points: the first is to 
keep a humbler attitude toward fate and Nature that can never be manipulated by the 
mind, in order to make a balance between man and the world through the power of the 
soul. The second is to know man is united with all beings in the universe and believe 
that man can be a hero determining the world with the power of the universe. 
Nietzsche represents himself, like Emerson, as a hero: “There remains a final affinity 
between the Nietzschean image o f a man ‘beyond-man’ as he has been and Emerson 
the man and ‘the teacher’ o f practical wisdom. It is one that is based upon Nietzsche’s 
profound admiration for the man him self and his orientation towards life” (Stack 1992: 
351). Nietzsche focuses on the importance o f being an individual and proclaims that 
life is affirmed through self-experimentation.
Nietzsche argues that only the few individuals with self-knowledge are able to 
develop the mind. The world, according to Nietzsche and Emerson, is a realm o f 
transient appearances. For Nietzsche, the crucial point is that life should be proved 
and affirmed through experience, which is echoed in Emerson’s. Though Nietzsche is 
not like Emerson who proclaims the concept o f religious immanence and the unity o f 
man and God, their criticism o f Christianity, assertion in life-affirmation and
proclamation o f the concept o f individuality are the same. As Lopez comments,
Nietzsche and Emerson were, differences notwithstanding, both well 
aware o f the danger, the extravagance, o f thought and language and of the 
potential for misunderstanding inherent in the vocation of any thinker 
who aspires to more than lecture-hall wisdom. Both speak o f the
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hyperbolic and apocalyptic nature o f their own profession; both recognize 
the potential destructiveness involved in the transformations great 
thinkers can initiate. (130)
Emerson and Nietzsche know that they are exceptional individuals who are 
responsible for their lives. As Em erson argues: “We live amid surfaces, and the true 
art o f life is to skate well on them ” (Experience: 294); life is the way that helps 
Emerson discern what man really is. For Nietzsche, he conceives o f decadence 
derived from Christianity in m odem  culture and reveals his resistance o f being a part 
o f it. Nietzsche demonstrates him self with courage and individuality, proclaiming that
life should be affirmed through internalisation. As Stack concludes,
Because Emerson and Nietzsche desired a ‘victory to the senses,’ they 
sought and hoped for a living embodiment o f an aesthetico-ethical ideal 
and turned away impatiently from the ancient promise of a perfection that 
transcends the world o f time and becoming. They hoped for a creative, 
self-creative, independent person who could escape the powerful nets of 
the all-too-human and cultivate an affirmative, distinctively individual 
style o f thought and existence. They tried to teach mankind a difficult 
faith, a faith far more demanding than a belief in a distant, perfect, 
omniscient, but hidden and strangely silent, deity: a faith in man and his 
capacity for self-overcoming. (1992: 355-356)
From his first book The Birth o f  Tragedy to Ecce Home, Nietzsche’s project finally 
fulfils itself with the idea o f eternal return, proving himself a self-critical individual, 
like Emerson a self-reliant individual. His hope, therefore, is not for all humanity but 
for himself, which is the strength he ceaselessly embraces in the journey o f life.
I add a crucial point to clarify N ietzsche’s claim here. Nietzsche is not a self-centred 
person who acts as he likes and attacks what he dislikes, because this is contradictory 
to his perspectivism. In other words, when we interpret Nietzsche’s rejection of 
decadence in m odem  culture, we should connect it with his concept of individuality, 
which is the basis o f his thought. Rorty in Contingency Irony and Solidarity displays
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a self-contradictory attitude in reading Nietzsche. On the one hand he comments that
Nietzsche is an ironist who stands in contrast to Proust:
When Nietzsche and Heidegger stick to celebrating their personal canons, stick 
to the little things which meant most to them, they are as magnificent as Proust. 
They are figures whom the rest o f us can use as examples and as material in our 
own attempts to create a new self by writing a bildungsroman about our old self. 
But as soon as either rests to put forward a view about modem society, or the 
destiny o f Europe, or contemporary politics, he becomes at best vapid, and at 
worst sadistic. (1989: 119-120)
Rorty here drastically divides Nietzsche into two types o f personhood: the one to the 
public inspires us by emphasising self-creation, but the one in private is an alternative 
person who cares about himself, as Rorty on the other hand associates Nietzsche to 
Proust: “Proust and Nietzsche are paradigm nonmetaphysicians because they so 
evidently cared only about how they looked to themselves, not how they looked to the 
universe” (1989: 98). Rorty’s self-contradictory but absolute criticism is questionable 
because we should not forget that N ietzsche’s key argument in his perspectivism is to 
reject the concept o f the absolute; for Nietzsche, the concept of the absolute inhibits 
individuality. In this respect, N ietzsche does not divide himself into two different 
types in public and in private as Rorty argues. In contrast, Nietzsche not only sets 
himself as a living example for maintaining his concept o f individuality, but also 
shows his concern o f humanity by stressing the significance of this concept of 
individuality in his work. N ietzsche might be a solitary and reclusive thinker, but his 
concern with humanity does not distinguish him from others. Alexander Nehamas also 
gives his question o f R orty’s commentary: “But on what grounds can we maintain 
such a strong distinction between the private project of making something out of 
ourselves and the public goal o f changing the lives of others, for better or worse?” 
(237) With regard to any criticism o f Nietzsche, we need to keep in mind that 
rejection to the absolute is what Nietzsche maintains, as Nehamas remarks: “Absolute
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rejections, like absolute distinctions, are very much what he [Nietzsche] constantly, 
absolutely tried to avoid” (245). Through his work, we may say that Nietzsche has 
transformed him self as a tragic, imperfect but brave individual who honours life with 
love and respect. As he claims: “My formula for greatness in a human being is amor 
fa ti : that one wants nothing to be other than it is, not in the future, not in the past, not 
in all eternity. Not merely to endure that which happens of necessity, still less to 
dissemble it -  all idealism is untruthfulness in the face o f necessity -  but to love it” 





What creates a morality or a law-book, the deep instinct for the fact that only 
automatism  can enable perfection in living and creating.
(Nietzsche: Notebook 1888, 14: 226)
If philosophy is a self-reflexive means for inspiring us to understand ourselves, 
Nietzsche’s attitudes toward humanity and morality not only allow us to see the 
possibilities o f the development o f the self, but also show us the way we can choose 
to live with self-respect and intellectual independence. Nietzsche doubtless provides 
us with a radical and unconventional way o f interpreting the self, life, history and 
culture, and brings us to understand how we are able to enlighten ourselves. 
“Nietzsche’s radicalism proclaims itself, in all possible guises, as a critique 
embodying a radical break from the philosophical presuppositions which dominate 
thinking from Plato to Hegel” (Sedgwick 1991: 30). In order not to follow traditional 
philosophy which maintains the mind-body dichotomy, and Christian morality which 
implants an extreme and pessimistic view o f life by directing us to rely on divine 
redemption, Nietzsche suggests we should instead identify the embodied self and 
overcome nihilism with life-affirmation. As Murray argues: “For Nietzsche, value is 
to be based in life, where this world retains the expanded meaning derived from the 
belief in such a ‘beyond’. The feeling o f being exceeded by the world, should be 
experienced as rapture, rather than fear” (162). My study of Nietzsche’s concept of 
individuality, which compares it with the ideas o f Darwin, Freud, St Augustine, Mill 
and Emerson, aims at exploring how Nietzsche inspires us to rethink the self and be 
responsible for our existence.
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Nietzsche’s concept o f individuality is the main concern of his philosophy. To 
understand human nature is the first crucial step toward grasping his concept of 
individuality. Attacking Darwin’s theory o f evolution and Spencer’s theory of 
“Survival o f the Fittest” which mislead us to believe we, nearly physical organisms, 
progress through competition and struggle for the survival, Nietzsche argues the need 
for cultural evolution. In N ietzsche’s view, we are animals but we are more than 
animals; we cultivate ourselves by way o f the ability to reflect ourselves. Different 
from Freud who provides biological conception o f instinct and argues that instinct 
should be satisfied for contentment, Nietzsche likewise elucidates the concept of 
instinct in different levels. N ietzsche explores how herd instinct and consciousness, 
under the influence o f Christian culture and morality, skilfully work on us and 
constantly hinder us from knowing the self. He also emphasises our self-evaluating 
nature, which is usually repressed in the unconscious, and suggests we liberate 
ourselves from herd instinct and master ourselves intellectually by way of 
self-interpretation. For Nietzsche, we live in a decadent modem culture which is 
inculcated by Christianity to believe we were bom with original sin and we need to 
ask for redemption. Nietzsche does not agree with Augustine who argues that the 
fundamental way to develop humanity is to obey God and follow Christian doctrine. 
In contrast, he suggests we firstly understand what Christianity claims is solely a 
product o f interpretation, and then recognise our self-interpretative nature for 
developing the self. N ietzsche’s proclamation of the death o f God and his attack on 
Christianity not only show his view o f life, which should not be denied but be 
affirmed, but also confirms his belief in this stance, arguing that we liberate from the 
domination o f  Christianity in order to create our values. As Keith May comments, 
Nietzsche knows that “a world without God must be a wilderness as well as an 
opportunity” (144). Nietzsche understands that human nature is contradictory and
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most people find it difficult to develop themselves to a higher level on account of the 
limitations o f consciousness, but he implies the potential to be an individual with 
higher humanity. People usually try to limit their experience and simplify themselves, 
but according to what Nietzsche tells us, man is “more complex than other organisms 
and must healthily embrace a greater diversity o f experiences” (May 149). Nietzsche, 
after all, provides us a new approach to understand contradictory human nature and 
shows us how the self can possibly be raised through self-interpretative development.
Nietzsche’s criticism o f Christian morality is the second step to approach his concept 
of individuality. Nietzsche and Mill both hold that the one-sided and prejudiced value 
judgement that emerges from Christian morality misleads and dominates humankind 
in modem culture, and they emphasise the development of individuality. Mill 
indicates the errors transmitted Christian morality and claims his concept of 
individuality, which is on the basis o f his utilitarian morality. Nietzsche similarly 
attacks Christianity, contending that Christian morality negates the self and brings 
humankind to nothingness and decadence. Mill aims to present a new moral 
conception concerning the development o f individuality by means of his ideas of 
liberty and utilitarianism, whereas Nietzsche does not formulate any norm o f morality. 
Nietzsche rejects M ill’s theory o f utility and claims that individuality does not require 
following any mode o f morality. As May comments: “Our aim should be not to 
weaken morality for the sake o f  self-gratification, but to confine morality to its proper, 
subordinate place” (149). Nietzsche proposes the possibility of the development of
individuality through self-realisation and self-overcoming. As Kaufmann explains,
Traditional morality seems to Nietzsche ineluctably moribund -  a dying 
tree that cannot be saved by grafting new fruit on it. We may recall his 
conception o f  the philosopher as a doctor -  a surgeon. The health o f our 
civilization appeared to him to be severely threatened: it looked
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impressively good, but seemed to Nietzsche thoroughly undermined.
(1974:109)
Nietzsche on the one hand is like Mill who loathes the problem of Christian morality 
in its denial o f life and its way o f undermining our self-confidence by emasculating 
human culture. But he on the other hand has different response to Christian morality 
and individuality. His aim is to offer an autonomous judgement on human conduct 
and an affirmative stance on life beyond the domination of Christian morality. In his 
understanding o f Christian morality, Nietzsche argues that human history and modem 
culture do not develop humanity but restrict us through custom and tradition. 
Nietzsche offers a different way that inspires us to view the possibility o f individuality 
by means o f his concept o f the sovereign individual. This individual, the ripest but 
late fruit, according to Nietzsche, is exceptional and supramoral. The individual, with 
power and freedom, is able to constantly reflect and overcome himself without being 
restricted by tradition and Christian morality.
The final step to approach to N ietzsche’s concept of individuality is to see how 
Nietzsche leads us to understand the potential to individuality. Compared with 
Emerson’s concept o f individuality, we can see clearly how Nietzsche appreciates 
Emerson’s thought and how he ceaselessly transforms his own ideas through personal 
experience and self-reflection. Emerson has greatly influenced on Nietzsche from the 
time o f his youth. Emerson advocates the unity of God and humankind, attempting to 
give his new conceptions o f God, Jesus and religion. Emerson’s concept of 
individuality is based on the idea o f immanence and the unity between God and 
human beings. Emerson implies the importance o f conceiving the soul that associates 
humankind with God and the universe. In Emerson’s view, there is no difference 
between Jesus and humankind. According to Emerson, Jesus comes to show us how
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he finds God and unites with him; therefore, man can potentially develop his or her 
mind to a higher level, perceiving his unity with God as Jesus does. Emerson 
obviously shows his conviction o f the infinite power of the soul that awakens 
humankind to independence and finds God not through Christian doctrine but within 
humankind itself.
In order to address his concept o f individuality, Emerson suggests we rely on 
ourselves, the unlimited power o f  the soul inside us, to open the mind and believe that 
life is constantly transforming itself at every moment through personal experience. 
Arguing that we require self-reliance and experience as the means to be an individual, 
Emerson then emphasises that we can rely on our inner wisdom to undergo any 
obstacle provided by fate, and finally realises that we are great with the power o f the 
soul which unites us and everything in the universe. The individual who knows his 
greatness without pride and arrogance but with gratitude and contentment is able to 
bravely experience life with affirmation and responsibility. Like Emerson, Nietzsche 
also offers his conceptions o f God, Jesus and religion, which are not based on the idea 
o f immanence but the idea o f self-understanding and self-overcoming. Nietzsche 
criticises Christian morality, reinterpreting that Jesus does not come to redeem 
humankind but shows us how we ought to live; Nietzsche in other words regards 
Jesus as the only true Christian who dares to experience life. Nietzsche disagrees 
about the conceptions o f sin and redemption claimed by Christianity; on the contrary, 
he claims that it is possible for the individual to create life by himself without being 
restricted by Christian morality. Knowing that this possibility is the task not for 
ordinary people but for a select few individuals, Nietzsche stresses the development 




Nietzsche attempts to break the erroneous conception taught by traditional philosophy 
and Christian morality that misguides us to deny the self and life. Conscious o f the 
limitations o f humanity, Nietzsche redefines his stance on life and argues the 
development o f  the self. For Nietzsche, life is a battlefield in which we have to be 
brave to confront and experience by ourselves through self-overcoming and 
self-transformation. N ietzsche never says that it is easy or even possible for everyone 
to raise the self; he knows it is only through self-overcoming that life can be affirmed, 
which is the task that is prepared not only for those rare individuals but for himself as 
well. This is N ietzsche’s way, in association with his concept of individuality, of 
representing him self as an autonomous individual with courage and responsibility. As 
Michael Harr comments, “Nietzsche aims at a reversal not only o f the optimistic 
naturalism o f the Enlightenment, or o f the Rousseauean myth of the original goodness 
o f nature, but also o f the Stoic idea o f the essence -  both divine and moral -  o f nature. 
He also wants to dismiss finalistic views” (78), Nietzsche enlightens us to understand 
the possibility o f the true and independent individual beyond any limitation of 
tradition, culture and morality.
Emerson and Nietzsche are essentially similar in their concepts o f individuality, 
though they choose different ways to express their ideas. They both represent 
themselves as an exceptional and independent individual, showing that life should be 
affirmed and experienced to the maximum. Emerson’s concept of individuality is in 
accordance with his ideas o f immanence and self-reliance which are associated with 
God and the universe. Emerson sees himself as an individual who is walking alone on 
the spiritual path. He too advocates the importance of self-development in his concept 
o f individuality, asserting that humanity needs to conceive o f the soul inside itself that
227
unites itself with God and the universe. Similarly, Nietzsche not only stresses the 
importance o f self-overcoming and life-affirmation in his concept of individuality, but 
also bravely manifests him self as a supramoral individual who does not evade 
nihilism but knows how to overcome nihilism and live responsibly. As Ansell-Pearson 
says, “Nietzsche claims that the causes o f nihilism lie in our faith in the categories of 
reason by which we have measured the value o f the world in accordance with 
categories that refer to a purely fictitious world” (1997: 161), Nietzsche introduces an 
unusual way o f understanding nihilism. In Nietzsche’s view, everything in the world, 
including nihilism, can be interpreted by perspective. The crucial point is how we can 
possibly see through everything without being entrapped in it, and how we can create 
our values affirming life when we live amid nihilism.
“Nietzsche urges us to throw ourselves into life... We achieve something admirable 
when we pursue our endeavors with intensity and strive to give the process a 
well-wrought shape” (Somolon & Higgins 101). Nietzsche suggests we perceive the 
potential for individuality and develop ourselves through self-mastery. To conclude, 
my study in Nietzsche is a way I choose for myself in response to Nietzsche’s concept 
o f individuality, understanding that life should not be denied but affirmed and 
enriched through experience. To be an independent individual who is able to 
constantly develop and transform the self by self-overcoming is significant not only 
for Nietzsche and those who are inspired by his thought, but also for me. As a person 
who was bom  and grew up in a very traditional family in an Asian country but has 
unexpectedly been sent again and again by my family to schools studying Western 
culture, art and thought since adolescence, I always feel confused and eccentric as an 
outsider standing at the crossroads between Western culture and Eastern culture. My 
study inculcates me to see things extremely but my life and experience brings me to
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see things in a neutral way. The study of Nietzsche finally assists me to transform 
myself into a person who can live with extremes without losing her identity. I am not 
saying that I no longer view things extremely, but I know how to adjust it and return 
to balance when I am conscious o f the danger o f the extremes. The method is learned 
from Nietzsche’s perspectivism and the notion of self-reflection. For example, I learn 
to keep a balanced and considerate relationship with others, not to distinguish sharply 
but to appreciate difference between Western culture and Eastern culture, and to see 
responsibility and freedom as two sides o f one thing. I feel contented not only because 
I experience life in a balanced way but also because I live as an independent 
individual with a heightened sense o f life’s challenges and rewards.
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